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Essays on Accounting Information Quality in China 
Abstract 
This research contributes to provide a better understanding of the nature of accounting 
information reliability by measuring the relation between the informativeness of earnings and 
corporate governance based on the Chinese context with its unique political, social, cultural 
and economic environment and large sample size. In particular, mainland China has a distinct 
two-tier board structure comprising a supervisor board including employee representatives 
and board of directors of whom at least one third are independent directors. The objective of 
this thesis is to investigate accounting information reliability and corporate governance by 
addressing three predominant empirical research questions in three studies. The first study 
examines the impact of board composition and independence on earnings management in 
mainland China through investigating whether independent directors and supervisors are 
effective at restraining earnings management. To fully capture the earnings attributes, the 
second study investigates the quality of reported earnings in China from the perspective of 
both accounting-based (including accrual quality, persistence, predictability and smoothness) 
and market-based earnings attributes (including value relevance, timeliness, and conservatism 
and earnings response coefficient). A two-way test has been conducted to compare the 
difference in earnings quality between State-Owned and Non-State-Owned enterprises. 
According to financial distress theory, the incentives for Non-SOEs to manipulate earnings 
are stronger than in SOEs, since SOEs have the advantage to receive financial subsidies from 
government while Non-SOEs face more financing constraints. The agency theory, however, 
argues that state ownership in SOEs creates incentives and regulatory backing for self-serving 
purposes, thus motivating SOEs to manipulate accounting numbers. The political cost 
hypothesis complements the agency theory and illustrates that SOEs’ managers would 
manipulate accounting numbers in response to government intervention (report 
conservatively to disguise the profits or report aggressively to meet specific thresholds). In 
addition, it tests whether analysts' forecasts are more accurate than forecasts based on time-
series predicted statistics with random walk. Finally, the third empirical study detects whether 
managers intend to manipulate earnings via discretionary accruals in order to just meet or 
beat consensus analyst forecasts on the basis of earnings surprise (analyst forecast error).    
 
 
The key findings of the first study in this thesis suggest that the distinct Chinese two-tier 
board structure comprising independent directors and supervisory directors fails to mitigate 
earnings management. The second study documents that Chinese SOEs overall exhibit a 
lower earnings quality than Non-SOEs, supporting the agency theory. Government ownership 
might create incentives and regulatory backing for self-serving purposes that negatively 
influence the listed firms’ financial reporting. Moreover, SOEs manipulate downwards the 
earnings much more than Non-SOEs, manifesting the government generally expropriate the 
benefits of SOEs, according to the political cost hypothesis. One interesting finding in second 
study is that predicted earnings based on the time-series statistical model with drift are more 
accurate than the consensus analyst forecast. This result conflicts with findings from 
developed country studies, indicating the malfunction of financial analysts in mainland China. 
In the third empirical study, the findings suggest an optimistic bias in analysts' forecasts 
exists in Chinese listed companies but fail to provide any evidence supporting that 
discretionary accrual measures are positively associated with just meeting or beating the 
analysts’ forecast benchmark. It challenges the ‘benchmark beating’ incentive in most prior 
literature based on western developed countries, such as the US and the UK. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction  
1.1. Background and Context 
1.1.1. Accounting Information Reliability 
 
Information has the quality of reliability when it is free from material error and bias and can 
be depended upon by users to be a faithful representation (The Conceptual Framework, 1989). 
Ronen and Yaari (2008) generalize the value of accounting information as ‘informativeness’ 
(from investors’ demand) and ‘stewardship’ (from management and shareholders’ demand). 
Reported earnings are valuable when they convey useful information and generate economic 
consequences. The relevance of economic constructs and measurement attributes represented 
by accounting information is a prerequisite for reliability (Maines and Wahlen, 2006). Thus, 
reliability is a necessary but not sufficient condition for accounting information to be useful. 
Financial transparency and adequate information disclosure are crucial to developing 
countries. Sufficient, accurate and timely information regarding the firm’s operations, its 
financial status and the external environment is important, enabling shareholders to monitor 
the firm, to make investment decisions affecting the firm, and to exercise control over the 
firm through other means (Bushman and Smith, 2001). From the perspective of information 
economics, financial reporting plays a vital role in an efficient capital market. The primary 
accounting standard setting bodies such as the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
and the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) have adopted this investor 
oriented information usefulness perspective and specifically state that the main purpose of 
accounting information is to meet the requirements of capital markets (FASB, 1978; IASC, 
1994). Consequently, the primary target of Chinese accounting reform is to improve the 
reliability of financial reporting to meet the demands from the stock market (Winkle et al., 
1994; Xiang, 1998; Chen et al., 1999). Since fluctuations in stock prices generally are caused 
by information, a critical aspect of a capital market’s maturity is the question of transparency.  
The globalization of capital markets increases the demand for transparent and comparable 
financial accounting information around the world. Bushman et al. (2001) define corporate 
transparency as the widespread availability of relevant, reliable information about the 
periodic performance, financial position, investment opportunities, governance, value, and 
risk of publicly listed firms.  
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Black et al. (2000) propose that corporate governance structures serve to ensure that minority 
shareholders receive reliable information about firm value and that a company’s managers 
and majority shareholders do not cheat them out of the value of their investments, and to 
motivate managers to maximize firm value rather than pursuing their private objectives. 
Financial accounting information is the product of corporate accounting and external 
reporting systems that measure and routinely disclose audited, quantitative data regarding the 
financial position and performance of publicly held firms. Hence, the credibility of financial 
accounting information is a key component of the corporate governance process. A complex 
set of institutions and rules have evolved to facilitate the financial reporting process, and the 
information provided by this process is an important input to major governance mechanisms. 
Timely and conservative accounting, for example, can mitigate the agency problems 
stemming from information asymmetry between firms and investors (Ball et al., 2000). Even 
when there is no agency conflict between managers and investors, high-quality accounting 
information will enhance efficiency by enabling managers and investors to identify value 
creation opportunities with less error. This leads directly to more accurate allocation of 
capital; further helps reduce the cost of capital and contribute to economic performance. Ball 
(2001) argues that timely incorporation of economic losses in the published financial 
statements (that is, conservatism) increases the effectiveness of corporate governance. 
 
Reported earnings (Income) are composed of accruals and cash flows. The reliability of 
accounting information depends critically on the credibility of accruals, which is one of the 
focal points of the extensive literature on earnings management because the reported earnings 
are always the object to be managed or manipulated. Understanding the reason why earnings 
are managed is vitally important to both analytical and empirical research. Total accruals are 
generally separated into a discretionary component and a non-discretionary component. Xie 
(2001) indicates that discretionary accruals are less persistent than non-discretionary accruals. 
Dechow and Dichev (1995) decompose accruals into good accruals and bad accruals. They 
argue that ‘good’ accruals are those that match past, present, or future cash flows and ‘bad’ 
accruals are the result of estimation error or corrections of previous estimation errors. Accrual 
accounting creates the opportunity for earnings management because they require managers 
to make forecasts, estimates, and judgments. It implies that the greater the degree of 
discretion in the accruals, the greater the opportunity for earnings management. For instance, 
short-run income smoothing leads to future restatements and write-downs (e.g., Enron). 
Earnings quality can be improved when accruals smooth out value-irrelevant changes in cash 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
4 
 
flows, but reduced when accruals are used to hide value-relevant changes in cash flows. The 
‘smoothing effect’ of accruals moves earnings closer to or farther from permanent earnings 
(Dechow and Schrand, 2004). 
 
The explicit objective of International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) is to develop a set 
of ‘high quality’ accounting standards. Penman and Zhang (2002) deem high-quality earnings 
as sustainable earnings and regard it as a good indicator of future earnings. A high-quality 
earnings number (referring to it as persistent and permanent earnings), as defined in Dechow 
and Schrand (2004), will accurately reflect the fundamental intrinsic value of firms; will 
reflect current operating performance; and will be a good indicator of future operating 
performance. Ball and Shivakumar (2008) propose that high-quality earnings are 
conservative, while low-quality earnings are upwardly managed earnings. Consistent with 
Ronen and Yaari (2008), Chaney et al. (2011) also document that when the reported earnings 
convey useful information, they are considered as a primary indicator of information quality. 
Adapted from the Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1 (SFAC No. 1), Dechow 
et al. (2010, p.344) identify that ‘Higher quality earnings provide more information about the 
features of a firm’s financial performance that are relevant to a specific decision made by a 
specific decision-maker.’ It implies that the quality of reported earnings is a function of both 
the ability of the accounting system to evaluate the firm’s fundamental financial performance 
and how the accounting system is implemented. 
 
Reliability in conjunction with relevance is an essential characteristic for accounting 
information to be useful for decision making to investors, creditors, and other financial 
statement users. It represents the extent to which the information is unbiased, free from error, 
and representationally faithful (FASB, 1980). Despite the critical role of reliability, it is a 
complex and elusive construct of accounting information. It is difficult to investigate 
accounting information reliability directly in accounting practice. Multiple benefits are 
anticipated from a better understanding of the empirical literature on accounting information 
reliability: it should assist standard setters and regulators in establishing financial reporting 
standards, preparers and auditors in implementing standards, and financial statement users in 
evaluating accounting information reliability (Maines and Wahlen, 2006). The FASB’s 
Conceptual Framework (1980) emphasizes two characteristics of reliability: representational 
faithfulness (‘the correspondence or agreement between a measure or description and the 
phenomenon it purports to represent’) and verifiability (‘the ability through consensus among 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
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measurers to ensure that information represents what it purports to represent or that the 
chosen method of measurement has been used without error or bias’). A reliable number is 
one that is verifiable and reasonably free of error or bias, involving little estimation or 
judgment. A relevant number is one that is timely and has predictive value for valuation. 
Theoretically, a number that is relevant for valuation will not be useful if it is not reliable.  
 
Furthermore, Maines and Wahlen (2006, p.403) define ‘reliability’ as the degree to which a 
piece of accounting information (1) uses an accounting construct that objectively represents 
the underlying economic construct it purports to represent, and (2) measures that construct 
without bias or error using the measurement attribute it purports to use. It suggests that 
reliability is a matter of degree, rather than an all-or-none concept.  Reliability is inherent in 
the information itself, and not in the use of the information. Hence, the relevance of economic 
constructs and measurement attributes represented by accounting information is a prerequisite 
for reliability to matter. Thus, reliability is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
accounting information to be useful. Accounting information reliability depends on how well 
accounting standards require and enable firms to represent economic constructs with 
appropriately informative accounting classifications and measurements. It also depends on 
how well preparers use their private information to identify, classify, describe, and measure 
relevant firm-specific economic constructs. It can be impaired by biases or intentional or 
unintentional errors that arise from preparers’ incentives, lack of knowledge or data, decision 
processes, or personal traits. 
 
Financial reporting and disclosure are potentially important means for management to 
communicate firm performance and governance with outside investors. Corporate disclosure 
is critical for the functioning of an efficient capital market, providing disclosure through 
regulated financial reports, including the financial statements, footnotes, management 
discussion and analysis, and other regulatory filings. Regulated financial reports are 
informative to investors, and the degree of informativeness varies systematically with the 
characteristics of the firm and economy. In addition, some firms engage in voluntary 
communication, such as management forecasts, analysts’ presentations and conference calls, 
press releases, internet sites, and other corporate reports. Finally, there are disclosures about 
firms by information intermediaries, such as financial analysts, industry experts, and the 
financial press.  
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
6 
 
Previous studies examine the effects of preparers’ incentives on the behaviour of specific 
accruals (such as loss provisions) or aggregate accruals to test for potential unreliable 
reporting of earnings, components of earnings, balance sheet numbers, and footnote amounts. 
These studies find evidence of accruals-based earnings management resulting from various 
incentives, including incentives created by preparer opportunism (bonus plans, insider 
trading), corporate control activities (management buyouts, proxy contests, initial public 
offerings, seasoned equity offerings, mergers and acquisitions), political/economic objectives, 
earnings expectations (management’s forecasts or analysts’ forecasts), debt covenants and 
potential distress, tax strategies, pressure to meet regulatory requirements and so on. 
However, they simply show those incentives trigger less reliable reporting without examining 
how firms impair reliability of accounting information; they provide little specific evidence 
upon which standard setters and those involved in the financial reporting process can act to 
improve reliability. 
 
Recent studies adopt more specific approaches to examine which components of earnings 
firms manage to strategically increase or decrease reported earnings numbers, providing more 
specific implications regarding reliability. To illustrate, Plummer and Mest (2001) examine 
discontinuities in the distribution of earnings components and discover that firms appear to 
manage revenues upward and accrued operating expenses downward to meet earnings targets. 
Beatty et al. (2002) and Beaver et al. (2003) find that financial institutions meet earnings 
targets by exercising discretion over loss provision estimates and the timing of realized 
security gains. Phillips et al. (2003) find that preparers exercise discretion with respect to the 
deferred tax expense to avoid reporting an earnings decline. To summarize, it suggests that 
reliable accounting information depends on the interaction between accounting standards and 
the preparers who implement the standards. Some preparers will undermine the objective of 
reliable reporting by biasing their judgments and estimates to circumvent the intentions of the 
standards, particularly when preparers need to exercise significant judgment, as in the case of 
accrual estimates. Accounting standards can enhance the reliability of accounting information 
by requiring preparers to make judgments and estimates that more closely match the 
underlying economic constructs that the standards portray. Thus, accounting standards can (1) 
provide preparers and auditors with a more complete specification of the underlying 
economic constructs associated with a new standard and guidance for making appropriate 
choices within each new standard, and (2) require firms to make their judgments and choices 
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more transparent to external stakeholders by providing disclosures on the underlying 
economic assumptions on which they are based. 
 
A relatively direct route to test the reliability relation within the accounting relation is to 
examine the association between firms’ reported accounting information and observable 
economic benchmarks as proxies for firms’ underlying economic constructs. One implication 
from these studies is that disclosures of benchmark data related to underlying economic 
constructs may help financial statement users to assess the reliability of accounting 
information. Value-relevance studies employ stock returns to infer whether capital market 
participants consider accounting information to be sufficiently relevant and reliable to be 
useful for making investment decisions. These types of studies implement an approach 
consistent with the user expectation relation, in which share prices are proxies for the present 
value of the capital markets’ expectations of all future net cash flows to the firm. Studies in 
this line of research commonly deduce the reliability of accounting information by examining 
the strength of association between accounting numbers and share prices. Because these 
studies rely on share prices as proxies for expected future cash flows, they provide indirect 
evidence on accounting information reliability. Maines and Wahlen (2006) argue that value-
relevance studies are joint tests of: (1) the capital markets’ perception of relevance of a 
specific piece of accounting information for the future cash flows of the firm; (2) the capital 
market’s perception of the reliability of that accounting information; (3) the asset-pricing 
model that the researcher uses to control for all the other factors that explain share prices, 
such as risk; and (4) market efficiency. 
 
1.1.2. Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting 
 
The Conceptual Framework (1989) explains that reliable information is free from material 
error and bias and can be depended upon by users to represent faithfully that which it either 
purports to represent or could reasonably be expected to represent. To provide the best 
foundation for developing principle-based standards, the Boards (the IASB and US FASB) 
undertook a joint project to establish an improved Conceptual Framework (the revised 
Framework) in 2010. The revised Framework is based on fundamental economic concepts 
rather than a collection of arbitrary conventions. It will eventually replace the existing IASB 
and FASB Frameworks and result in a common basis for both standard setters, which will 
eliminate the risk of reaching different conclusions about similar or even identical issues and 
events. The revised Framework is applicable to all preparers of IFRS and US GAAP general 
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purpose financial statements. The revised Framework distinguishes between two types of 
qualitative characteristics that are necessary to provide useful financial information: (1) 
Fundamental Qualitative Characteristics including relevance and faithful representation and 
(2) Enhancing Qualitative Characteristics containing comparability, timeliness, verifiability 
and understandability. 
 
1.1.2.1. Fundamental Qualitative Characteristics 
 
Transparency, high quality, internal consistency, true and fair view or fair presentation, and 
credibility have been suggested as desirable qualitative characteristics of financial 
information. However, transparency, high quality, internal consistency, true and fair view or 
fair presentation are different words to describe information that has the qualitative 
characteristics of relevance and representational faithfulness enhanced by comparability, 
verifiability, timeliness, and understand-ability. Credibility is similar but also implies 
trustworthiness of a reporting entity’s management. Under SFAC No. 5 (FASB, 1984), 
accounting information is regarded as relevant if it is capable of making a difference for 
financial statement users when making decisions; accounting information is deemed as 
reliable if it represents what it purports to represent. SFAC No. 5 indicates that there are 
several dimensions of relevance and reliability. Dimensions of relevance incorporate 
feedback value, predictive value, and timeliness. Dimensions of reliability include 
representational faithfulness, verifiability, and neutrality. Value relevance is an empirical 
operationalization of these criteria because an accounting amount will be value relevant, i.e., 
have a predicted significant relation with stock prices, only if the amount reflects information 
relevant to investors in evaluating the firm and is measured reliably enough to be reflected in 
share prices. Value relevance tests generally are joint tests of relevance and reliability. 
 
In the revised Framework (2010), the fundamental qualitative characteristics are relevance 
and faithful representation. Relevant financial information is capable of making a difference 
to the decision made by users. The revised Framework carries forward the notion of 
materiality as an element of ‘relevance’. However, the Boards (the IASB and US FASB) have 
clarified that materiality is an entity-specific aspect of relevance based on the nature or 
magnitude of items to which the information relates. Information may be capable of making a 
difference in a decision even if some users choose not to take advantage of it or already are 
aware of it from other sources. Financial information is capable of making a difference in 
decisions if it has predictive value, confirmatory value, or both. Financial information has 
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predictive value if it can be used as an input to processes employed by users to predict future 
outcomes. Financial information need not be a prediction or forecast to have predictive value. 
Financial information with predictive value is employed by users in making their own 
predictions. It is self-evident that financial information is only useful for making a decision if 
it is capable of making a difference in that decision. Relevance is the term used in the 
Conceptual Framework to describe that capability. It is a fundamental qualitative 
characteristic of useful financial information. 
 
Faithful representation replaces the previously used terminology ‘reliability’ (described in 
The Conceptual Framework, 1989), since the Boards determine that there is a lack of 
consensus in the understanding of reliability. Financial information faithfully represents 
economic phenomena with three characteristics: complete, neutral and free from error. The 
revised Framework acknowledges limitations in achieving a faithful representation, for 
instance, due to inherent uncertainties, estimates and assumptions. Correspondingly, financial 
information might not always be entirely from error. Free from error means there are no 
errors or omissions in the description of the phenomenon, and the process used to produce the 
reported information has been selected and applied with no errors in the process. In this 
context, free from error does not mean perfectly accurate in all respects. 
 
Information must be both relevant and faithfully represented if it is to be useful. Neither a 
faithful representation of an irrelevant phenomenon, nor an unfaithful representation of a 
relevant phenomenon, helps users make good decisions. Substance over form, prudence 
(conservatism) and verifiability, which were aspects of reliability in Concepts Statement 2 or 
the Framework (1989), are not considered aspects of faithful representation. Empirical 
accounting researchers have accumulated considerable evidence supporting relevant and 
faithfully represented financial information through correlation with changes in the market 
prices of entities’ equity or debt instruments. However, such studies have not provided 
techniques for empirically measuring faithful representation apart from relevance. Relevant 
and faithfully represented financial information is assumed to result in more efficient 
functioning of financial markets and reduces the cost of capital for the reporting entity. 
However, the quality of information disclosed can be influenced by the sophistication of the 
managers, in understanding their own operations, and having the ability to manipulate 
disclosed information, from earnings smoothing to misrepresentation. 
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Most studies document that earnings, book values, and other required financial statement 
information is ‘value relevant’. The evidence suggests that regulated financial information 
provides valuable information to investors (Healy and Palepu, 2001). In the capital markets 
research, studies examine the relation between accounting information and stock prices or 
returns as a measure of value relevance. This research is extensively reviewed by Kothari 
(2001). The most significant conclusion is that regulated financial reports provide new and 
relevant information to investors. 
 
1.1.2.2. Enhancing Qualitative Characteristics 
 
Comparability, verifiability, timeliness, and understand-ability are directed to enhance the 
usefulness of information that is both relevant and faithfully represented. These enhancing 
qualitative characteristics should be maximized both individually and in combination. (1) 
Comparability enables users to identify similarities and differences among items, both 
between different periods within a set of financial statements and across different reporting 
entities. Consistent application of methods and policies to prepare financial statements helps 
to achieve comparability. (2) Verifiability is a new concept in the revised Framework (2010). 
Financial Information is verifiable when it enables knowledgeable and independent observers 
to reach a consensus on whether a particular depiction of an event or transaction is faithful 
representation. (3) Timeliness of financial information is a qualitative characteristic under the 
existing framework. However, rather than stressing the balance between timely reporting and 
reliable information, the revised Framework (2010) refers more broadly to timeliness as 
being able to influence decision makers. The Framework (1989) discussed timeliness as a 
constraint that could rob information of relevance.  Timeliness is very desirable, but it is not 
as critical as relevance and faithful representation. Timely information is useful only if it is 
relevant and faithfully represented. In contrast, relevant and faithfully represented 
information may still be useful (especially for confirmatory purposes) even if it is not 
reported in as timely a manner as would be desirable. Timeliness means having information 
available to decision makers in time to be capable of influencing their decisions. Generally, 
the older the information is, the less useful it is. However, some information may continue to 
be timely long after the end of a reporting period because, for example, some users may need 
to identify and assess trends. (4) Understandability has been carried forward from the existing 
Framework. Financial information that is classified, characterized and presented in a clear 
and concise way is understandable. 
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The reliability of accounting information is assessed by auditors, users, and regulators. This 
includes inferring the degree of reliability from the relation between accounting information 
and proxies for underlying economic constructs and/or future cash flows; both experimental 
and archival research also infers reliability from aspects of the financial reporting process or 
from characteristics of financial reporting outcomes. Studies in this area consistently 
highlight the importance of disclosures designed to reveal reliability. Accounting standards 
that require firms to provide more complete disclosures related to the underlying economic 
constructs represented by accounting information can help users better assess accounting 
information reliability. Maines and Wahlen (2006) summarize that in some cases reliability 
can be assessed directly using relation to evaluate representational faithfulness through 
comparing accounting information to various economic benchmarks, including empirical 
proxies for economic constructs, simulated economic constructs, future cash flows, and 
forward-looking accounting measures. In addition, research also generates insights about 
assessing reliability by analysing the characteristics of firms for which the accounting data 
have been revealed to be unreliable through subsequent restatements. Meanwhile, reliability 
can be assessed indirectly using relation by comparing current period accounting information 
to the future cash flows that the accounting information purports to represent (see details in 
Figure 1.1) 
 
Maines and Wahlen (2006) depict three distinct relations in their framework as in following 
Figure 1.1: (a) the economic relation between economic constructs arising from current-
period commercial arrangements, transactions, and events and future-period cash flows. This 
relation describes the link between current economic constructs and future cash flows, which 
refers to ‘economic relevance’ of the economic constructs. The degree of economic relevance 
is influenced by two factors: the stakeholder’s decision context and the likelihood that 
unexpected future events will affect future cash flows; (b) the accounting relation between 
current-period economic constructs and current-period accounting information representing 
and measuring those constructs. Accounting information represents and summarizes a firm’s 
current commercial arrangements, transactions, and events (economic constructs) within a set 
of financial statements and related notes. The left half (2a) of the accounting relation in 
Figure 1.1 describes the relevance of accounting information as a function of the subset of 
economic constructs disclosed in the financial statements and notes and the measurement 
attributes (e.g., historical cost, fair value) used to measure these economic constructs. The 
right half (2b) of the accounting relation in Figure 1.1 depicts the reliability of accounting 
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information, which relies on the choice of an accounting construct and the choice of a 
measured value. Accounting reliability is inherent in the accounting information itself, not in 
the use of the information; and (c) the predictive relation and users’ expectation formation 
indicate the relation between current-period accounting information and future-period cash 
flows. The predictive relation (3a) in Figure 1.1 represents the association between a firm’s 
current accounting information and future cash flows. The predictive relation encompasses 
both the economic relation and the accounting relation and implies that the usefulness of 
accounting information depends on the degree to which it provides a reliable representation 
of the relevant economic constructs that have a direct impact on the future cash flows to the 
firm. In practice, the predictive relation depends on users’ collection and analysis and 
transformation of accounting information into cash flow expectations. Users’ expectation 
formation is reflected as relation (3b) in Figure 1.1 representing the ability of users to 
appropriately use accounting information to form expectations of future cash flows.  
 
1.1.3. Chinese Context 
 
Emerging markets have very distinctive characteristics and are structurally different from 
both developed markets and each other. Bekaert et al. (1998) found that the returns 
distributions of emerging markets are significantly non-normal, with significant (usually 
positive) skewness and excess kurtosis that vary through time. These characteristics may 
become less pronounced as a market’s economy comes to more closely resemble a developed 
market through increased openness and liberalization. Regarding to earnings management, 
mainland China (excluding Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan) is a special case to be studied 
for its unique political, social, cultural and economic environment. The People’s Republic of 
China was established as a socialist country in 1949, the new government led by the Chinese 
Communist Party. Since the Economic Reform 1  in 1978, China has transferred from a 
centrally planned economy to a market economic system with socialist characteristics. The 
only form of economic entity before Economic Reform was state-owned enterprise (SOE)2. 
                                                 
1 It is commonly accepted that one of the main goals of China’s market-oriented reforms is to establish a 
corporate governance system that could provide incentives for investment, adequately restrain and monitor 
management, and promote the optimal use of resources for wealth creation. (Ronen, J. and V. Yaari,2008)  
 
2  ‘SOE employees benefited from housing, medical care, and schooling for their children, with the 
government providing benefits for maternity, injury, disability, and old age. Many SOEs were heavily 
subsidized and the government gave them access to bank financing, partly to pay for the social welfare 
needs of the workers.’ (Tricker, 2009, p.192) 
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Figure 1.1 Representation of the Accounting Information Framework 
(Source: Maines and Wahlen, 2006, Accounting Horizons, p.402) 
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China started to corporatize and privatize the SOEs in the early 1990s, because the  
government found that the ownership structure of SOEs hinders enterprises’ economic 
efficiency (Tan and Wang, 2004; Chen, 2005). In the past ten years, China has been the 
largest developing country with average annual growth at around 10 per cent and GDP 
quadrupled, which attracts considerable attention from researchers and potential investors all 
over the world (Ding et al., 2007). Both institutional and individual investors are seeking 
investment opportunities in the Chinese financial market 3 . However, the Chinese stock 
market has been criticized for its high speculation and extensive insider dealings (Hu et al., 
2010). Furthermore, China is an interesting case to be studied; while it has adopted many of 
the corporate governance mechanisms applied in the developed countries, it also has its sui 
generis characteristics. It has a distinct two-tier board structure comprising a supervisory 
board including employee representatives and board of directors with at least one third 
independent directors.  
 
Research on earnings management in mainland China has flourished in recent years. Wang et 
al. (2008) express that earning management studies in emerging countries are especially 
important because higher demand for capital in these emerging capital markets can be met 
only if investors are protected from accounting frauds. Extant studies have documented that a 
rampant earnings management phenomenon does exist in China driven by the stringent China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) regulations4 and ineffective monitoring on the 
board of directors and supervisory board (Aharony et al., 2000; Chen and Yuan, 2004; Haw 
et al., 2005; Ding et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2008). Effective monitoring on boards is very 
crucial to ensure reliable and integrated financial reports. The failure of gatekeepers (such as 
independent directors and financial analysts) to prevent harmful earnings management has 
been attributed mainly to the conflicts between their own interests and monitoring 
responsibilities. Earnings management will mislead the users of financial reports by 
providing them with the falsification of accounting information. 
 
                                                 
3  The ratio of China’s stock market capitalization to GDP rose from 4% in 1992 to about 100% in 2007. 
 
4  See Table 1.1  CSRC Profitability Requirement for Rights Issue and Table 1.2  CSRC Profitability 
Requirement for Delisting for details 
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The incidences of accounting scandals in China, such as Yin Guang Xia, Lantian, and 
Zhengzhou Baiwen, in which the interests of minority shareholders are exploited by 
controlling shareholders via related party transactions and falsifications of financial reports 
(Hu et al., 2010). Ding et al. (2007) claim that ‘the conflict of interests between controlling 
shareholders (the State) and minority shareholders is the root cause of earnings management 
in China.’ Even worse, the State plays dual roles as both controlling shareholder and 
regulator (Clarke, 2003; Chen et al., 2006; Liu and Lu, 2007). Evidence in prior literature 
shows that the practice of earnings management in China tends to ascend both in frequency 
and magnitude after 2000 (Chen et al., 2008; 2010). As stated by Chen et al. (2008), earnings 
management is an indicator of the corporate governance quality and investor protection 
standard, suggesting the effectiveness of market regulation and policy enforcement. 
 
Table 1.1 CSRC Profitability Requirement for Rights Issue 
 
Year Profitability Requirement for Rights Issue 
1993 
Rights offering companies must make profits for two successive years to be 
qualified for rights issue. 
1994 
Rights offering companies have to make profits for three consecutive years with 
an average return on equity (ROE) of 10%. 
1996 
More stringent, the criteria requires a 10% ROE in each of the three previous 
year (resulted in the outbreak of earnings manipulation). 
1999 
CSRC reduced the minimum ROE to 6% for three consecutive years and the 
average ROE within the three years must be no less than 10%. 
2001 
ROE policy has changed to ‘average ROE should be more than 6% in the past 
three years, and the principle of ROE calculation is that you must choose the 
lower value after non-operating gains or losses are deducted’ (Wang et al., 2008, 
p.729). 
2002 
ROE criteria required an average of 10% for three consecutive years and the 
ROE of the latest year must be no less than 10%. 
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Table 1.2 CSRC Profitability Requirement for Delisting 
 
Type Profitability Requirement for delisting 
ST 
(Special 
Treatment) 
If a listed company reports a net loss for two successive years it will be 
labeled as ‘ST’, which stands for ‘Special Treatment’. ‘ST’ stocks can 
only be traded within 5 percent price volatility limit each day versus 10 
per cent for normal stocks. 
PT 
(Particular 
Transfer) 
If a ‘ST’ company can’t make profits in the third year, it will be labeled as 
‘PT’, which stands for ‘Particular Transfer’. ‘PT’ stocks can only be 
traded on Fridays with a maximum 5 per cent upper limit, but no 
restriction on the lower limit. The ‘PT’ firms will face delisting if it can’t 
turn losses into gains in the next three years (Chen et al., 2008; Ding et al., 
2007). 
 
1.1.3.1. Overview of Corporate Governance in China 
 
China introduced the OECD corporate governance practices in 2001. After 2003, Chinese 
firms were required by law to follow several OECD practices. Recent developments of 
corporate governance in China have been remarkable (Liu, 2006; Cheung et al., 2010). In 
2001, the Code of Corporate Governance for listed companies5 promulgated by CSRC and 
State Economic and Trade Commission, sets forth the basic principles for corporate 
governance of Chinese listed companies, the means for the protection of investors' interests 
and rights, the basic behavior rules and moral standards for directors, supervisors, managers 
and other senior management members. Since the enactment of the 1994 Company Law, a 
two-tier Board structure for Chinese companies was introduced and a Supervisory Board is 
mandatory for a joint stock limited company. The amended 2006 Company Law6 influences 
the Board monitoring in three aspects: (1) a significant enhancement of the effectiveness of 
the Supervisory Board; (2) a modest strengthening of participation by workers, and (3) the 
independent director system for listed companies is codified (Article 123.2) (Xi 2006). 
 
                                                 
5 See http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release/200708/t20070810_69223.htm 
6 See http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383787.htm 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
17 
 
The current corporate governance system in China mixes the features of the Anglo-American 
model with the German model while having its sui generis characteristics. Prima facie, the 
mechanism is identical with the two-tier system in Germany and Japan, in which firms are 
governed by a board of directors and a supervisory board. However, there is a substantial 
difference. There is no hierarchical relationship between the board and supervisory board in 
China, which are both appointed by and report to shareholders’ general meetings. Under the 
German model, the supervisory board is superior to the board of directors. The Chinese 
Security Regulation Commission (CSRC) began to emphasize the importance of independent 
directors after 1999. For those companies listed on domestic, the definition of independent 
directors was first introduced in the Guidelines on Company Chapter of Listed Companies by 
CSRC as an optional article in 1997. Until 2001, an official and comprehensive guideline on 
independent directors was enacted, which required domestically listed companies to appoint 
at least one third independent directors on their board of directors by 30th June, 2003 (CSRC, 
2001). From this perspective, Chinese corporate governance system is closer to the Anglo-
Saxon one-tier structure (Chen and Al-Najjar, 2012). The State Assets Management Bureau 
(SAMB) was elevated to ministerial level as the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC) 7  in 2003 (Wang 2010). SASAC has considerable 
power over SOEs in China, including the appointment and dismissal of directors and top 
executives of the supervised enterprises. The SASAC holds Chinese Government’s 
shareholding8 in all Chinese listed companies except the financial institutions. 
 
1.1.3.2. Split Share Structure Reform   
 
The reform which started in 2005 symbolizes a dramatic change in the institutional setting of 
the Chinese stock market. Split Share Structure Reform in China abolishes the trading 
restriction on shares mainly owned by state shareholders. Hence, state shareholders’ wealth is 
more sensitive to share price movements and decreases their conflict of interests with private 
shareholders. This change is expected to strengthen the corporate governance incentives of 
state shareholders and reduce the information asymmetry in Chinese listed firms. Prior to 
                                                 
7 The SASAC, authorized by the State Council in accordance with the Company Law and other administrative 
regulations, performs investor’s responsibilities, supervises and manages the State-owned assets of the 
enterprises under the supervision of the Central Government (excluding financial enterprises), and enhances the 
management of the State-owned assets. SASAC guides and pushes forward the reform and restructuring of 
state-owned enterprises, advances the establishment of modern enterprise system in SOEs, improves corporate 
governance.’ 
 
8 At the end of 2008, the total assets held by SASAC amounted to RMB5.56 trillion. 
http://xxgk.sasac.gov.cn/gips/contentSearch?id=7379976 
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split share structure reform, state shareholders mainly held restricted shares that could not be 
freely traded in the stock market in the same way as shares held by private shareholders. A 
conflict of interest between state and private shareholders is generated because share price 
movements in the capital market did not affect the wealth of the former. Following the Split 
Share Structure Reform, the increased share price informativeness reflects a corporate 
governance improvement. This unique split share structure can lead to divergent interests and 
incentive conflicts between tradable and non-tradable shareholders and has long been 
recognized as the source of many corporate governance problems in China (Chen, Firth, Gao 
and Rui, 2006; Chen, Firth, Xin and Xu, 2008). They examine the role of government 
shareholders (controlling shareholders) and mutual funds (institutional shareholders) play in 
the split share structure reform in China.  
 
To carry out the reform, the non-tradable shareholders have to negotiate with the tradable 
shareholders on a suitable compensation plan for converting non-tradable shares to tradable 
shares. The roles of the state shareholders and mutual funds in this reform are particularly 
interesting. The state is the largest non-tradable shareholder, while mutual funds are the 
largest type of institutional investor in tradable shares in Chinese capital market. The non-
tradable shareholders need to offer compensation to tradable shareholders (including mutual 
funds) in order for the latter to agree to the reform. In theory, the interests of mutual funds 
should align with the interests of the private investors in tradable shares. Individual investors 
can therefore free ride on the efforts of mutual funds in the belief that the funds will look 
after their interests (Davis and Kim, 2007). 
 
Fully realizing the problems with the split share structure, the Chinese government began to 
reduce the proportion of state ownership by selling (non-tradable) state-owned shares into the 
market in June 2001. In light of the strong adverse reaction from tradable A-shareholders, the 
government withdrew the plan in October 2002, and this marked the initial, albeit 
unsuccessful, attempt at share ownership reform. The chronic governance problems persisted, 
investors lost more confidence in the listed companies, and the stock market crashed. During 
this period, the Shanghai Composite Index plunged from its peak of about 2,245 points to 
around 998 points at the end of May 2005, with market fundraising activities shrinking 
significantly. With the intention to improve corporate governance, the State shares and Legal 
Person Shares have been gradually allowed to be tradable on the stock exchanges by the 
government since the start of the spilt share structure reform in 2005 (Cheung et al., 2008).  
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The share segmentation reform commenced from 2005 and finished at the end of 2006. In 
essence, the reform approved non-negotiable state and legal person shares to be gradually 
negotiable after two years. Consequently, at the end of 2009, about 80% of non-negotiable 
shares became negotiable. However, only a small fraction of these were traded in the market, 
as the CSRC only allows them enter into the market gradually. To help stabilize the stock 
markets and strengthen corporate governance, the Chinese government made a strategic 
decision in 2000 to develop securities mutual funds as institutional investors in tradable 
shares (CSRC, 2000). Since then, the growth of the mutual fund industry has become 
remarkable. The number of fund management companies increased from 6 in 1998 to 57 in 
2006, while the number of mutual funds increased from 5 in 1998 to 323 in 2006.  
 
1.1.3.3. Accounting and Financial Reporting Standards   
 
As stated in Healy and Palepu (2001), accounting standards define the reporting choices 
available to managers in presenting the firm’s financial statements, which potentially reduces 
processing costs for financial statement users by providing a commonly accepted language 
that managers can use to communicate with investors. The globalization of capital markets 
has been accompanied by calls for globalization of financial reporting.  
 
Ball et al. (2000) extends Nobes (1998) by showing that political factors have strongly 
influenced the nature of the accounting system in a developing economy. Further, because of 
both self-motivation and external pressure, the Chinese government has been active in 
developing accounting standards in harmony with IAS (Weetman, 2004). In China, firms 
have to announce their earnings within four months of their fiscal year end. Recent scandals 
over the last decade have made people believe that a rules-based financial reporting regime is 
not sufficiently robust for stakeholder needs. Whereas a rules-driven approach would make it 
easier for investors to make comparisons between companies, another view was that under 
principles-based standards users would better understand the ‘language of accounting’. The 
adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by the Chinese government 
as the foundation for its new principles-based regime was thus welcomed by a number of 
parties. Principles-based accounting is thought to provide the most ‘authentic presentation’ of 
financial information and represent economic reality with a focus on economic substance 
over legal form. 
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1.1.3.3.1 Authorities in Chinese Accounting System 
Unlike in the West, the authority for formulating, promulgating and administering accounting 
standards is not the Accounting Society of China (ASC) or the Chinese Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (CICPA), the Ministry of Finance (MOF) is the authoritative standards 
setting body which undertakes the task of formulating, promulgating accounting standards 
and overseeing all financial and accounting affairs in China (Peng et al, 2008). In the United 
States, the SEC, under the oversight of the U.S. Congress, is responsible for maintaining and 
regulating the required accounting and disclosure rules that firms must follow. These rules 
are produced both by the SEC itself and through SEC oversight of private standards-setting 
bodies such as the Financial Accounting Standards Board. Table 1.3 illustrates the relevant 
authorities in China’s accounting system as follows. 
 
Table 1.3 Relevant Authorities in China’s accounting system 
 
Authority Role 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
Under State Council 
Formulating, Promulgating and administering all accounting 
standards; No direct involvement with enterprises. 
State Administration for 
Taxation (SAT) 
Tax collection, official invoice supplier, accounting audits; 
Most important authority related to tax & accounting 
State Administration for 
Industry and 
Commerce(SAIC) 
Issue business licenses, reviews financial statements of 
enterprises on an annual basis 
External Audit Firm (CPA) Conducts compulsory annual audit by third party 
 
(Source: InterChina Consulting, 2009) 
 
1.1.3.3.2 The evolution of China Accounting Regulatory Framework 
The rapid growth and marketization of the economy, the influx of foreign investment, 
accession to the WTO, as well as the increasing maturity and importance of China’s 
securities market, have all highlighted the need for a sound, reliable, and transparent 
accounting system in China. To meet this need, a series of regulations have been issued over 
the past several years, including the Accounting Law (1999), the Standard Rules for 
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Enterprise Accounting (2000), the Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises (2001), 
and the Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises - updated (2006). 
 
The introduction of the Enterprise Accounting System is part of a continuous regulatory 
response to ‘an accounting information crisis’ (Li, 2001). Extensive false reporting and 
earnings management by companies have discredited accounting information and hampered 
the development of the capital market. To tackle this issue, the Accounting Law was 
amended in 1999 to stress the importance of ‘true and complete’ accounting information. In 
2000, the State Council issued an Enterprise Financial Reporting Regulation, redefining the 
elements of financial statements in line with the conceptual framework of the IASC and 
stipulating responsibilities and liabilities for parties involved in accounting, auditing and 
reporting. The Enterprise Accounting System has three parts: part one defines basic concepts, 
elements of financial statements, recognition and measurement principles, permissible 
accounting methods, structures and content of the main financial statements; part two 
prescribes a chart of accounts and financial statements; and part three demonstrates 
accounting treatments of the main elements of financial statements. 
 
The present Chinese accounting regulations and practices have evolved from a Soviet-style 
macro-economy oriented accounting system adopted by China in the 1950s. Beginning in the 
late 1970s, China’s economic reforms aimed at rebuilding a market economy have introduced 
fundamental changes to its accounting system. During the 1990s, a set of accounting 
standards, in line with International Accounting Standards (IAS), has been promulgated for 
Chinese listed companies. The Chinese accounting profession was revived in 1980 when the 
first regulation on practicing accountants took effect to meet the urgent need for direct 
foreign investments. The first Chinese CPA firm was established in Shanghai in January 1981. 
All listed companies are required by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) to have their annual 
reports audited by independent CPAs. Listed companies in China are subject to special 
accounting and disclosure regulations issued by the Ministry of Finance and CSRC. A 
summarized version of the audited annual report is required to be published in selected 
securities newspapers on or before April 30 following the year-end. Companies issuing B- 
shares are required to publish summarized financial statements that are based on both 
Chinese GAAP and IAS. The required financial statements include a balance sheet, an 
income statement, a cash flows statement, attached schedules and footnotes.  
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Listed companies’ periodical financial reports disclosure duties include those of the annual 
report, interim report and quarterly report. Any information having major impact on the 
investors’ decisions must be disclosed. Annual report shall be prepared and disclosed within 
4 months since the end of the fiscal year; Interim report shall be prepared and disclosed 
within 2 months since the end of the first half of the fiscal year; quarterly report shall be 
prepared and disclosed within 1 month since the end of the 3rd and 9th month of the fiscal 
year. Any forecasted operational losses or big fluctuations shall be disclosed in form of 
earnings forecast (Regulations on Information Disclosure of Listed Companies, 2011).  
 
The following Table1.4 displays the development of China Accounting Regulatory 
Framework. The first stage of the Accounting Regulatory Framework development was from 
1992 to 1997. The 1992 Chinese GAAP was a milestone in the history of Chinese accounting 
standards and regulations because it represented a remarkable change from providing the 
accounting information for a central government-planned economy to a socialist market 
economy (Peng et al, 2008). The second stage was from 1998 to 2000. The 1998 Chinese 
GAAP replaced the previous one. The implementation of the Accounting System for Joint 
Stock Limited Enterprises set by the MOF in 1998 was in order to eliminate the discrepancies 
between Chinese GAAP and IFRS in the 1992 regulation. During this period, the listed A-
share companies were required to conform to Chinese Accounting Standards (CAS) and 
Accounting Law of the People’s Republic of China (Peng et al, 2008). The third stage was 
from 2001 to 2006. The 1998 Chinese GAAP was substituted by the Accounting System for 
Business Enterprises issued by the MOF (the 2001 Chinese GAAP). The 2001 GAAP moves 
Chinese accounting standards further towards convergence with IFRS (Pacter and Yuen, 
2001). The fourth stage of China’s regulatory development started form 2007. It is 
represented by the revised Chinese GAAP which was issued in February 2006 but effective in 
January 2007. The 2006 Chinese GAAP promulgated by the MOF and China Accounting 
Standards Committee is introduced in an attempt to further improve the standardization 
process and narrow the existing gap, covering a new Basic Standard and 38 Specific ASBEs. 
The new ASBEs include nearly all of the topics under the current International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
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Table 1.4 China Accounting Regulatory Framework Development 
 
  Stage 1 Stage 2 
Period 1992.1.1--1997.12.31 1998.1.1--2000.12.31 
Accounting 
regulations in 
effect 
throughout  the 
stage 
Experimental Accounting System 
for Joint Stock Limited Enterprises 
Accounting System for Joint Stock 
Limited Enterprises 
ASBE ASBE 
Form and Content of Information 
for Disclosure by Companies with 
Securities Issued to the Public 
Form and Content of Information 
for Disclosure by Companies with 
Securities Issued to the Public 
  Chinese Accounting Standard 
  
Accounting Law of the People's 
Republic of China 
Referred to 1992 GAAP 1998 GAAP 
 Stage 3 Stage 4 
Period 2001.1.1--2006.12.31 from 2007.1.1 to date 
Accounting 
regulations in 
effect 
throughout  the 
stage 
Accounting System for Business 
Enterprises 
Accounting System for Business 
Enterprises 
ASBE ASBE 
Form and Content of Information 
for Disclosure by Companies with 
Securities Issued to the Public 
Form and Content of Information 
for Disclosure by Companies with 
Securities Issued to the Public 
Chinese Accounting Standard Chinese Accounting Standard 
Accounting Law of the People's 
Republic of China 
Accounting Law of the People's 
Republic of China 
Referred to 2001 GAAP 2006 GAAP 
 
Notes:  ASBE: Accounting Standard for Business Enterprises  
“Accounting Law of the People’s Republic of China” revised by the State Council of China
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In February 2006, the Ministry of Finance announced the introduction of 39 new Chinese 
Accounting Standards explicitly based on IFRS. In this research, the term “new Chinese 
Accounting Standards” refers to the Basic Standard and the 38 specific Accounting Standards 
for Business Enterprises (ASBEs) issued by the Chinese Ministry of Finance. Although not 
complying fully with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), the new Chinese 
Accounting Standards nonetheless adopt the principles contained in IFRS and are therefore 
considered to be substantially converged with IFRS. Furthermore, in December 2008, the 
European Commission decided to permit Chinese issuers to use Chinese Accounting 
Standards in the European Community for a transitional period of up to three years. A final 
decision on the equivalence of Chinese Accounting Standards to IFRS will be taken at a later 
date. The new Chinese Accounting Standards were adopted by all listed companies from 1st 
January, 2007 and are being phased in over time for other companies and enterprises. Chinese 
Accounting Standards will continue to be updated in line with IFRS developments.  
 
The introduction of these new accounting standards represents a remarkable achievement. 
The former standards in mainland China had been highly prescriptive and rules-based. In 
addition, the previous standards were industry-specific and as each set of industry-based 
standards was so different in nature, from a technical point of view, it would have been 
difficult for diversified groups of companies to produce meaningful consolidated accounts. In 
part, the transition to new Chinese Accounting Standards was significantly challenging 
because it had taken place during China’s fast-moving reform from a planned to a market 
economy and a relative lack of education and experience of IFRS accounting. As is well 
known, the Chinese economy is dominated by State-Owned Enterprises and indeed, prior to 
1999, many accounting firms were themselves government owned. IFRS is usually as a proxy 
for a principles-based system. The experience of implementation of IFRS in China is 
particularly interesting as Chinese standards are moving from a ‘rules-based’ 9 to a more 
‘principles-based’ 10  regime. The introduction to the new Chinese Accounting Standards 
marked a watershed moment not only for China but also in the development of accounting 
                                                 
9 The ICAS definition of a rule: A rule is a means of establishing an unambiguous decision-making method. 
There can be no doubt about when and how it is to be applied. (ICAS, 2006, p. 4) 
 
10 The ICAS definition of a principle: A principle is a general statement, with widespread support, which is 
intended to support truth and fairness and acts as a guide to action. Principles-based accounting standards 
are based on a conceptual framework, consist of a clear hierarchy of over-riding principles and contain no 
“bright-line” or anti-abuse provisions. Such an approach requires the use of judgment by preparers, 
auditors and regulators. (ICAS, 2006, p. 1-2) 
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standards more widely. For China, the new standards represented a radically different 
approach at a time of fast-moving reform in the economy. The magnitude of this step cannot 
be overstated. But the explicit recognition of IFRS by China marks a significant step on the 
road towards a single, global accounting language.  
 
The most challenging aspect of operating in a principles-based environment is the need to 
apply professional judgment effectively, consistently and fairly. However, the degree of 
support within China, and the determination across all stakeholders to make the new IFRS-
based Chinese Accounting Standards effective, is very impressive. Where problems or issues 
have been encountered, these appear to have been resolved quickly and diligently. To support 
such an environment, accounting professionals have to be trained, ethics have to be upheld 
and additional guidance must be provided to make principles operational. Furthermore, all 
stakeholders need to recognize their responsibility for making and accepting judgments. The 
implementation effort has been remarkable through official support and commitment to 
principles-based accounting led by the Ministry of Finance (Chinese accounting reform, 
2010). Strong support throughout Government circles, led by the Ministry of Finance, was 
expressed for principles-based standards based on IFRS, but it was thought unlikely that 
China would simply give up its sovereignty in this area by adopting IFRS in their entirety in 
the near future. Further, the previous cultural background was not one which allowed or 
encouraged judgment and this has shaped people’s current perspectives. Preparers of 
accounts tend to be risk averse and to favor reliance on a definitive source as justification for 
a particular accounting treatment.  
 
The same set of accounting standards will yield different accounting outcomes when different 
preparer incentives are offered. The application of accounting standards involves the use of 
judgment and discretion by corporate insiders through the use of reported earnings to provide 
more information about a firm’s economic performance or to serve other less benign interests 
(Burgstahler et al., 2006; Leuz et al., 2003). For this reason, the reporting incentives and the 
forces shaping them are likely to determine earnings quality. Watts and Zimmerman (1978, 
1986) hypothesize that political cost is one of the important incentives that drive managers’ 
accounting choices and reporting practices. Healy and Wahlen (1999) identify political cost 
as one of the incentives for earnings management. This research will examine how 
government ownership shapes a firm’s incentives to influence the accounting earnings that 
reflect economic performance.  
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1.1.3.4. Emerging Chinese Capital market  
 
China is the largest developing country and its impressive growth astonished the world and 
has attracted considerable attention from researchers and potential investors all over the 
world in last ten years. China started the Economic Reform in a context where most 
important elements characterizing a sound institutional infrastructure (e.g. well-structured 
legal system, rigorous law enforcement and well-functioning capital markets) were absent. 
Since the Economic Reform in 1978, China has transferred from a centrally government 
owned economy to a free market economy with its sui generis characteristics. Before the 
Reform, the only form of economic entity was state owned enterprise (SOE)11. During the 
transition, the government started to partially privatize the state-owned firms and listed them 
on the stock market to enhance the economic efficiency (Tan and Wang 2004; Chen 2005). 
With the sustainable growth of Chinese capital markets, it has witnessed remarkable 
improvements in corporate governance, transparency, and investor protection (Chen et al., 
2011).  
 
In order to help SOEs raise capital and improve their economic efficiency, Chinese stock 
market was established with the opening of Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) in 1990 and 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in 1991. Establishing and developing a well-
functioning capital market is an important element of China’s overall reform strategy. Most 
listed firms are transformed from SOEs. Prior to an IPO, SOEs must go through a 
restructuring process in which an SOE is split in two parts: a subsidiary (state-owned listed 
firm) that goes IPO and a parent company that remains an SOE. The subsidiary takes the 
productive assets and efficient employees. The parent company takes the non-productive 
assets and undertakes the responsibility for existing liabilities. The listed firm with the 
productive assets needs to be profitable for at least one year before IPO. The parent company 
owns about one third of the listed firm’s shares which is called ‘legal person shares’ and not 
supposed to be traded in the stock market. Another one third of the shares are owned by the 
government in the form of non-tradable ‘state shares.’ A state-owned listed firm usually has 
only one third of its total shares as tradable and sells to individual investors. Figure 1.2 
presents the ownership structure of a typical Chinese state-owned listed firm. 
                                                 
11 ‘SOE employees benefited from housing, medical care, and schooling for their children, with the 
government providing benefits for maternity, injury, disability, and old age. Many SOEs were heavily 
subsidized and the government gave them access to bank financing, partly to pay for the social welfare 
needs of the workers.’ (Tricker, 2009, p.192) 
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Figure 1.2 The restructuring process from a typical SOE to a listed firm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: The Chinese Stock Market-Possibilities and Pitfalls. Trade Council of Denmark-China, 2006) 
 
During the development of capital market in China, there are five types of shares: A-Shares, 
B-Shares, H-Shares, N-Shares, L-Shares (for details see Table1.5).  
 
Table 1.5 Types of shares in China 
Types of Shares Definition 
A-Shares 
Initially, only A-shares were issued and shares are only available to 
Chinese domestic investors are denominated in Chinese currency RMB 
B-Shares 
In 1992, the issuance of B-shares started the trading of Chinese 
securities for foreign investors. Prior to 2001, B shares could only be 
traded by foreign investors. After March 2001, domestic investors are 
also permitted to trade B shares. B shares are denominated in foreign 
currencies (U.S. dollars for the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Hong 
Kong dollars for the Shenzhen Stock Exchange). 
H-Shares 
Shares of China based companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange 
N-Shares 
Shares of China based companies listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange 
L-Shares Shares of China based companies listed on the London Stock Exchange 
Local government Local government as ultimate 
shareholder 
State-owned 
enterprise 
State asset 
management 
bureau (1/3) 
‘State shares’ 
Parent firm, a SOE 
or incorporated 
firm (Former SOE 
part I) (1/3) ‘Legal 
Person Shares’ 
Individual 
Shareholders 
(1/3) 
‘Individual 
Shares’ 
Shareholding firm with productive assets (former SOE 
part II) 
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Both institutional and individual investors are seeking for investment opportunities in the 
Chinese capital market12. Foreigners are permitted to invest in A-shares via QFII13  (the 
qualified foreign institutional investors) system regulated by China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) and the People’s Bank of China. Listed firms in the A-shares market, 
which are required to report under a common set of standards—the Chinese GAAP. The A-
shares market is deemed not as efficient as the U.S. stock market (Morck et al., 2000; Wang 
et al., 2009). There has been a ‘10 per cent price limit’ on daily stock price fluctuation 
imposed by the Chinese government since December of 1996 (Lin and Swanson 2008). Wang 
and Xu (2005) believe that the floating ratio, i.e. the proportion of tradable shares, captures a 
firm’s corporate governance level. In terms of the data from the CSRC, tradable shares on 
average accounted for 33 percent of total shares in the year of 2000. The floating ratio has 
increased slightly since then, but is still below 40 percent. B shares, H shares, overseas shares, 
and firms that are dual-listed are excluded from this study because they are subject to either 
different accounting standards or different listing regulations. This thesis focuses on the A-
shares market only because the small sample sizes in either the B-shares market or the H-
shares market does not allow for a reasonably powerful test.  
 
The Chinese stock market has been criticized for high speculation and extensive insider 
dealings (Hu, Tam et al. 2010). Because the Chinese government 14 plays the roles of both 
controlling owner and regulator, its social purpose is deemed to cause major conflict of 
interests between the controlling shareholders and the minority shareholders. Although listed 
private enterprises (non-SOEs) are increasing in number rapidly and the private sector has 
stimulated China's economic development in the last two decades (Allen et al., 2005), the 
listed SOEs still dominate the Chinese capital market. Compared with the private sector, 
government policies have been favoring the state sector. The government intervention in 
SOEs through majority state ownership or the appointment of connected managers makes the 
Chinese context particularly interesting and special. However, government intervention in 
business activities is not unique to China (Chen et al., 2011). 
 
                                                 
12 The ratio of China’s stock market capitalization to GDP rose from 4% in 1992 to about 100% in 2007, 
further declined to 44.9%. 
 
13 The first approved QFII traded in A-shares on 9th July, 2003. 
 
14 China’s government administration has five levels: (1) central; (2) provincial; (3) prefecture; (4) county; 
and (5) township.(Chen et al., 2008) 
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Despite the fact that China is the largest emerging economy with the fastest growing stock 
market and increasing global importance, it has some unique institutional features. Firstly, 
most listed firms in China came into being due to partial privatization, and the Chinese 
government is usually the largest co-investor or controlling shareholder in these firms (Sun 
and Tong, 2003). Secondly, the government ownership is represented by various entities such 
as government agencies (the state asset management bureau at various levels), state asset 
holding/management companies, and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Chen et al., 2009). 
Thirdly, the shares of Chinese listed firms are separated into two categories as negotiable and 
non-negotiable shares (Li et al., 2009). The former shares were tradable on the stock market 
and were mainly held by individual investors, while the latter were not allowed to trade and 
mainly held by the government (state shares) and other legal entities (legal person shares). 
Legal persons are often related to the government in various ways. Negotiable shareholders 
were usually minority shareholders in a firm and could not play an effective role in 
monitoring management. The controlling shareholders who hold non-negotiable shares are 
usually connected to the government (Huang et al., 2011). 
 
A distinct feature of the Chinese capital market is almost all listed companies were 
transformed from state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and that state-owned assets thus dominate 
the firms’ capital structures. Either evaluated by the number of listed firms, GDP or market 
capitalization, or liquidity and fund-raising capability, the Chinese stock market has 
outperformed other emerging markets in the year 2012 as demonstrated in Table 1.6. 
According to the statistics released by the CSRC, at the end of June, 2015 there were 2798 
companies listed on the two stock exchanges (1071 companies listed on Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and 1721 listed on Shenzhen Stock Exchange), with a total market capitalization of 
RMB ¥62746.55 billion (Data Source: CSRC15; Shanghai Stock Exchange16; and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange17, June, 2015). Although Chinese capital market has achieved astonished 
development and attracted global attention, it is still regarded as immature, which is 
characterized by weak equity outsiders, strong market speculation, weak form efficiency, 
rampant earnings management and deceptive financial reporting, and extensive market 
manipulation (Weetman et al., 2004). 
 
                                                 
15 http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/G00306204/zqscyb/201507/t20150716_281094.htm 
16 http://english.sse.com.cn/ 
17 http://www.szse.cn/main/en/ 
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Although the capital market has played an important role in accounting standard setting in 
China, its continued structural weaknesses and significant imperfections have seriously 
restricted the supply of, and demand for, decision-useful accounting information and IAS-
type accounting standards (Weetman et al., 2004). Financial accounting systems support the 
informational role played by stock price. Black (2000) and Ball (2001) argue that a strong 
financial accounting regime focused on credibility and accountability is a prerequisite to the 
very existence of vibrant securities markets. Efficient stock markets, in which stock prices 
reflect all public information and aggregate the private information of individual investors, 
presumably communicate that aggregate information to managers and current and potential 
investors. 
 
Table 1.6  GDP, Market Capitalisation and number of Listed Companies 2012 
 
  GDP(2012) 
Market 
Capitalization 
Market 
CAP/GDP 
2012 
Listed 
Domestic 
Companies 
2012 
  
(PPP, current 
USD billions) 
(USD millions) (nominal) 
Bangladesh*    286.3    17,479.0  15.00%    229 
China** 12,268.6 3,697,376.0  44.90%   2494 
Chinese 
Taipei** 
   894.3   831,900.0 177.00%    802 
Hong Kong 
China* 
   365.6 1,108,127.0 420.90%   1553 
India*  4,715.6 1,263,335.0  68.60%   5294 
Indonesia**  1,203.6   396,772.0  45.20%    483 
Korea**  1,540.1 1,180,473.0 104.50%   1798 
Malaysia*    494.6   476,340.0 156.20%    900 
Mongolia**     15.0     1,292.0  12.60%    329 
Pakistan*    491.1    43,676.0  19.40%    573 
Philippines*    419.5   264,142.0 105.60%    254 
Singapore*    322.9   414,125.0 150.80%    479 
Thailand**    645.1   382,999.0 104.70%    585 
Vietnam**    336.2    32,933.0  21.10%    311 
     
* Common law jurisdiction 
   
** Civil law jurisdiction 
   
Sources: Corporate Governance in Asia, OECD, 2014 
              GDP& Market Capitalisation &Market Cap/GDP: World Bank 
             Listed domestic companies: World Federation of Stock exchanges & World Bank 
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1.1.3.5. Capital Market Regulator 
 
It is evident that the poorly developed capital markets have an impact on the regulators in 
choosing an approach to accounting regulation and in prioritizing the needs of different users 
(Weetman et al., 2004). The Chinese regulators are aware of the weaknesses of the capital 
market and its impact on the demand for, and supply of, accounting information. China 
Securities Regulatory Commission18 (CSRC) is the capital market regulator in China playing 
the similar role as US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), with the prime objective 
of protecting investors' rights and interests. CSRC issues the corporate governance code and 
other corporate governance regulations, and publishes regular reports on corporate 
governance reform and performance in China.  
 
During the initial development of the stock market, the Chinese central government designed 
the regulatory structure via a stringent IPO quota system, which was formally abolished in 
2001. (Pistor and Xu 2005; Cheung, Ouyang et al. 2009) The quota was determined by the 
State Council and was allocated to local governments by the CSRC. Under the quota system, 
local governments were delegated to select which firms should go public for equity financing 
(Tan and Wang 2004; Chen, Lee et al. 2008). Initially, CSRC predetermined the issue prices 
of an IPO based on a fixed price earnings (P/E) ratio method, in which a pre-set P/E ratio 
between 13 and 15 multiplied the company’s average earnings over the past three years. Tan 
and Wang (2004) and Cheung et al. (2009) claim that this situation seriously distorted the 
market mechanism and caused huge IPO underpricing. Until 1st of January, 2005, the 
cumulative price inquiry from institutional investor method19 was introduced.  
 
Healy and Palepu (2001) suggest that, by setting minimum disclosure requirements, 
regulators attempt to reduce the information gap between the informed and uninformed. 
CSRC revises its disclosure requirement to continuously improve the quality of information 
disclosure of listed companies with the ultimate goal being to improve corporate governance. 
Furthermore, CSRC sets tough regulations for the profitability requirements for rights issue 
                                                 
18 China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), a ministerial-level public institution directly under the 
State Council, performs a unified regulatory function, according to the relevant laws and regulations, and with 
the authority by the State Council, over the securities and futures market of China, maintains an orderly 
securities and futures market order, and ensure a legal operation of the capital market. 
 
19 The offering price is based on results from a book-building process oriented to institutional investors. 
Brokerage houses use the final negotiated price for the retail offering. 
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and delisting. To better develop the securities market and protect investors, the Securities 
Law was introduced in 1999. It regulates the rules of corporate governance for listed 
companies and requires listed companies to disclose financial information (Lin and Swanson, 
2008). The Securities Law moved the IPO system towards a more market-oriented system, 
under which the firms satisfying the demand of IPO can be approved to offer after 
verification without the regulatory examination (Cheung, Ouyang et al., 2009).  
 
1.2. Aims, Objectives and Research Questions 
 
The main purpose of this thesis is to provide a better understanding of the nature of 
accounting information reliability by measuring the relation between the informativeness of 
earnings and corporate governance based on the Chinese context with its unique political, 
social, cultural and economic environment and large sample size. In particular, mainland 
China has a distinct two-tier board structure comprising a supervisor board including 
employee representatives and board of directors of whom at least one third are independent 
directors. The objective of this thesis is to investigate accounting information reliability and 
corporate governance by addressing three predominant empirical research questions in three 
studies. The first empirical study aims to examine the impact of board composition and 
independence on earnings management in mainland China through investigating whether 
independent directors and supervisors are effective at restraining earnings management. In 
fulfilling this research aim and objective, the following research questions are developed: 
Hypothesis la: Firms with a greater number of independent directors will constrain earnings 
management. 
Hypothesis lb: Firms with a greater number of supervisors will constrain earnings 
management. 
Hypothesis 2a: Firms with a greater number of independent directors with 
financial/accounting expertise will reduce their engagement in earnings management. 
Hypothesis 2b: Firms with a greater number of supervisors with financial/accounting 
expertise will reduce their engagement in earnings management. 
Hypothesis 3a: Firms with a greater number of independent directors with official 
backgrounds will be more likely to engage in earnings management. 
Hypothesis 3b: Firms with a great number of supervisors with official background will be 
more likely to engage in earnings management. 
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There is a debate whether SOEs have more incentives to manipulate earnings than in non-
state-owned enterprises Non-SOEs. According to financial distress theory, the incentives for 
Non-SOEs to manipulate earnings are stronger than in SOEs, since SOEs have the advantage 
to receive financial subsidies from government while Non-SOEs face more financing 
constraints. The agency theory, however, argues that state ownership in SOEs creates 
incentives and regulatory backing for self-serving purposes, thus motivating SOEs to 
manipulate accounting numbers. The political cost hypothesis complements the agency 
theory and illustrates that SOEs’ managers would manipulate accounting numbers in 
response to government intervention. When the government aims to expropriate the benefits 
of firms, SOEs would report conservatively to disguise the profits. However, when the 
government impels firms to enhance performance via stringent government regulations, 
SOEs would report aggressively to meet specific thresholds. To fully capture the earnings 
attributes, the second study investigates the quality of reported earnings in China from the 
perspective of both accounting-based (including accrual quality, persistence, predictability 
and smoothness) and market-based earnings attributes (including value relevance, timeliness, 
and conservatism and earnings response coefficient). The objective of this investigation is to 
compare the difference in earnings quality between State-Owned and Non-State-Owned 
enterprises through tracking the ultimate controllers instead to grade government intervention. 
This study tests whether analysts' forecasts are more accurate than forecasts based on time-
series predicted statistics with random walk. It further detects how the explanatory power of 
the earnings/returns relation is enhanced by varying the return interval (13-month, 15-month 
and 18-month return windows respectively). In fulfilling this research aim and objective, the 
following research questions are developed: 
Ho: There is no difference in the quality of reported accounting information between state-
owned listed and non-state-owned listed firms. 
H1: State-owned listed firms have higher quality of reported accounting information than the 
Non-state-owned listed firms. 
 
The third empirical study aims to detect whether managers intend to manipulate earnings via 
discretionary accruals in order to just meet or beat consensus analyst forecasts on the basis of 
analysts forecast error (analysts-based unexpected earnings). Management judgment with 
respect to determining earnings is often associated with discretionary accruals. Sine managers 
may use these discretionary accrual choices in an opportunistic manner (perhaps to increase 
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their own compensation or conceal poor performance) or they may use this discretion to 
improve the informational value of earnings (perhaps to communicate to investors the long-
term performance of the firm). In any case, discretionary accruals are often used as a measure 
of earnings quality (e.g., Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Francis et al., 2004). Assuming that 
firms intend to meet or beat market expectations, one would expect that results improve when 
utilizing a forecast proxy that better represents these expectations. This study improves upon 
previous studies by considering firms’ earnings management with respect to analysts’ 
forecasts. Analysts are hypothesized to understand these earnings management practices and 
incorporate firms’ expected behavior into their forecasts so that the managers try to slightly 
beat forecasts or maximize positive earnings surprises. Hence, the following research 
questions are developed: 
H0: Managers tend to use discretionary accruals to meet or beat analyst forecast.  
H1: Managers do not tend to use discretionary accruals to meet or beat analyst forecast. 
 
1.3. Research Motivation 
 
The study is motivated by the earnings quality literature in the U.S. and by the recently 
remarkable developments of corporate governance, accounting and the stock market in 
mainland China. Although the capital market in China has achieved astonishing development 
and attracted global attention, it is still regarded as immature, and characterized by weak 
equity outsiders, strong market speculation, weak form efficiency, rampant earnings 
management, deceptive financial reporting, and extensive market manipulation (Weetman et 
al., 2004). The A-shares market is deemed not as efficient as the U.S. stock market (Morck et 
al., 2000; Wang et al., 2009). The study empirically investigates the value relevance of 
accounting information in the emerging Chinese stock market on the basis of a large sample 
of all listed firms in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges with available data. This 
research has implications for China’s regulators who are striving to improve accounting 
information, transparency, and corporate governance. The primary goal for this thesis is to 
provide a better understanding of the nature of accounting information reliability by 
measuring the informativeness of earnings within the context of the accounting framework 
for China which has moved from a ‘rules-based’ to a more ‘principles-based’ regime. 
 
The extant literature suggests that corporate governance may significantly influence firm 
accounting and auditing decisions, thus affecting the quality of accounting information. 
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However, corporate governance in China is significantly different from that in developed 
markets such as the United States, United Kingdom, or other European countries. In China, 
the government as the controlling shareholder controls on average nearly two fifths of the 
stock of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Before 2005, shares in these companies could not be 
freely traded at the market price on the open market. In addition, management ownership is 
much lower in China, averaging only 0.03%. A compounding factor is that legal enforcement 
in China is very weak, which likely causes board monitoring and corporate governance 
mechanisms to be ineffective. The failure of gatekeepers (such as independent directors and 
financial analysts) to prevent harmful earnings management has been attributed mainly to the 
conflicts between their own interests and monitoring responsibilities. Hence, mainland China 
is a special and interesting case to be studied for its unique political, social, cultural and 
economic environment. These institutional characteristics raise the question of how corporate 
governance influences accounting information quality in China. Hence, this study of Chinese 
corporate governance and its role in determining earnings usefulness has generalizable 
implications that cannot be drawn from the prior literature on U.S. and Anglo-Saxon firms. 
 
There are discernible factors suggesting that accounting information may not be as value-
relevant in the Chinese market as in a mature market. Firstly, Chinese accounting systems 
and regulations were traditionally not market-oriented. Most listed companies were state-
owned before going public and the purpose of their accounting was not to provide useful 
information to investors but to facilitate centralized state planning and control. Although the 
Chinese government issued a separate accounting standard for listed companies as early as in 
1992, there have been numerous unresolved issues in implementing a shareholder-oriented 
accounting system. Consequently, the value of accounting information in the Chinese market 
has been questioned in the literature (Curran, 1994; Aharony et al., 2000; Haw et al., 1998). 
Secondly, the reliability of accounting information in China has been a source of concern. 
Independent auditing is relatively a new phenomenon in China. While it is true that financial 
statements of listed companies must be audited by CPAs, the quality of audits in China has 
been generally perceived as low (Aharony et al., 2000). A relatively weak monitoring role by 
outside auditors may contribute to a lack of confidence in and less use of financial statements. 
Finally, compared to a mature market such as the U.S., the Chinese market lacks a sufficient 
level of corporate governance including independent outside directors, audit committees, and 
competition in the managerial labor market, which weakens investors’ confidence in their use 
of accounting information. 
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1.4. Potential Contribution 
 
This thesis will make potential contributions to the earnings quality literature in several ways. 
First of all, this thesis provides a better understanding of the nature of accounting information 
reliability by measuring the relation between the informativeness of earnings and corporate 
governance based on the Chinese context with its unique political, social, cultural and 
economic environment and large sample size. The sweeping size of state intervention has 
made China an ideal research context. A different context, legal institutions, political and 
economic environment will affect accounting information quality. Second, it will extend the 
existing literature through examining the relationship between board monitoring 
(Independent Directors and Supervisory Directors) and earnings management in mainland 
China with weak corporate governance but stringent regulations which is totally distinct from 
developed countries and other emerging markets. In addition, the background and the 
financial expertise of the independent directors and supervisory directors from the fiscal year 
of 2005 to 2010 are manually collected, which is a huge workload. Third, this research 
extends the earnings attributes research that has focused mainly on agency cost issues in 
China by detecting the impact of government ownership on earnings quality, which is an 
important institutional incentive for financial reporting. To fully capture the earnings 
attributes, this study classifies accrual quality, persistence, predictability, and smoothness as 
‘accounting-based’ earnings attributes and categorizes value relevance, timeliness, and 
conservatism as ‘market-based’ ones. Few studies statistically test the research area of ERC 
in China, this research fills in the gap by extending ERC as a function of ‘market-based’ 
earnings quality via detecting earnings surprise, which is measured by: (a) the deviation of 
actual earnings from a predicated amount based on a time-series model of earnings and (b) 
the deviation of actual earnings from the consensus (median) analyst forecast (analyst 
forecast error), computed using each analyst’s latest forecast before the earnings 
announcement. Fourth, while most previous country-level studies give valuable insights into 
the influence of institutional factors on earnings quality, they do not tell us anything about 
firm-level earnings quality, which can vary considerably not only across countries, but also 
across firms within a country. Moreover, not each country has state-owned firms and non-
state-owned firms, for instance there are no SOEs in the US. This thesis contributes to the 
accounting literature by examining firm-level evidence and to inspect the first-order impact 
of government ownership and its associated institutional incentives on firms’ earnings quality. 
The firm and industry characteristics provide incremental explanatory power beyond cross-
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country variation in determining earnings quality worldwide. Fifth, from the perspective of 
financial analysts, this study improves upon previous studies by considering firms’ earnings 
management with respect to analysts’ forecasts. This study finds that predicted earnings 
based on the time-series model with drift are more accurate than the consensus analyst 
forecast earnings. This result conflicts with findings from developed country studies, 
indicating the malfunction of financial analysts in mainland China. In addition, it summarizes 
how the explanatory power of the earnings/returns relation is enhanced by varying the return 
interval (13-month, 15-month and 18-month return windows respectively). Sixth, this thesis 
provides a better understanding of the properties of analysts’ forecasts by modeling firms’ 
earnings management practices and analysts’ response to them. While some evidence shows 
a relation between discretionary accruals and meeting or beating analyst forecasts, firms 
managing earnings upward or downward to meet consensus forecasts poses a challenge to 
researchers attempting to directly link these two activities. Consistent with earlier studies 
(such as Fried and Givoly, 1982; O'Brien, 1988; Klein, 1990 and Abarbanell, 1991), this 
study also finds an optimistic bias in analysts' forecasts for Chinese listed companies. Finally, 
this research will provide both theoretical and practical implications for accounting standards 
setters and provide useful insights into how to improve the quality of reported earnings in 
China. It has implications for China’s regulators who are striving to improve accounting 
information, transparency, and corporate governance.  
 
1.5. Thesis Structure 
 
This research contributes to provide a better understanding of the nature of accounting 
information reliability by measuring the relation between the informativeness of earnings and 
corporate governance based on the Chinese context with its unique political, social, cultural 
and economic environment and large sample size. The objective of this thesis aims to 
investigate accounting information quality and corporate governance by addressing three 
predominant empirical research questions in three studies. This thesis is structured in five 
chapters as follows.  
 
Chapter 1 gives an introduction to accounting information reliability and qualitative 
characteristics in FASB’s Conceptual Framework. China is an ideal context to be studied 
with its sui generis characteristics, which has adopted many of the corporate governance 
mechanisms applied in developed countries. Thus, the Chinese background and institutional 
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context have been introduced in this thesis, including an overview of earnings management 
and corporate governance in China, split share structure reform and Accounting and Financial 
Reporting Standards application and convergence process and capital markets etc. The aims, 
objectives and research questions and research motivation and potential contribution as well 
as thesis structure are all included in Chapter 1.  
 
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 (i.e. the 1st empirical study) reviews some key 
papers that have had an influential impact on the literature related to earnings management as 
well as the empirical research in corporate governance in general. In addition, the concept of 
earnings management discussed in detail and the most widely used accrual models for 
capturing earnings management are considered. The distinct corporate governance model 
with two-tier board structure in mainland China is explained and compared with the 
American Model, UK Model and German Model in this section. More importantly, it 
examines the impact of corporate governance on earnings management in China through 
investigating whether the board composition and the independence, financial/accounting 
expertise and official background of independent directors and supervisors are correlated to 
the absolute value of discretionary accruals or discretionary revenue. It focuses on two 
aspects from the perspective of board monitoring: the role of independent directors on the 
board and the supervisory directors in constraining earnings manipulation. The key findings 
in Chapter 2 suggest the Chinese two-tier board structure comprising a board of directors 
with at least one third independent directors and a supervisory board fails to mitigate earnings 
management. One possible explanation for this finding is that independent directors and 
supervisory directors in China are often ‘vases’ and do not work as efficiently as in the 
developed countries. This indicates the independent directors and supervisory directors 
cannot voice for the minority shareholders; what they do is simply to agree with whatever the 
management or larger shareholders want, supporting the agency theory (conflict between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders) and stewardship theory.   
 
Chapter 3 (i.e. the 2nd empirical study) investigates the quality of reported earnings in China 
from the perspective of both accounting-based (including accrual quality, persistence, 
predictability and smoothness) and market-based earnings attributes (including value 
relevance, timeliness, and conservatism in order to fully capture the earnings attributes. ERC 
is extended as a function of ‘market-based’ earnings quality via detecting earnings surprise, 
which is measured by: (a) the deviation of actual earnings from a predicated amount based on 
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a time-series model of earnings and (b) the deviation of actual earnings from the consensus 
(median) analyst forecast (analyst forecast error), computed using each analyst’s latest 
forecast before the earnings announcement. A two-way test has been conducted to compare 
the difference in earnings quality between State-Owned and Non-State-Owned enterprises, 
since there is a debate whether SOEs have more incentives to manipulate earnings than in 
Non-SOEs. According to financial distress theory, the incentives for Non-SOEs to 
manipulate earnings are stronger than in SOEs, since SOEs have the advantage to receive 
financial subsidies from government while Non-SOEs face more financing constraints. The 
agency theory, however, argues that state ownership in SOEs creates incentives and 
regulatory backing for self-serving purposes, thus motivating SOEs to manipulate accounting 
numbers. The political cost hypothesis complements the agency theory and illustrates that 
SOEs’ managers would manipulate accounting numbers in response to government 
intervention (report conservatively to disguise the profits or report aggressively to meet 
specific thresholds). It tests whether analysts' forecasts are more accurate than forecasts based 
on time-series predicted statistics with random walk. This study also detects how the 
explanatory power of the earnings/returns relation is enhanced by varying the return interval 
(13-month, 15-month and 18-month return windows respectively).  
 
In Chapter 4 (i.e. the 3rd empirical study), it detects whether managers intend to manipulate 
earnings via discretionary accruals (the residuals derived from the Performance Matched 
Discretionary Accrual Measure and Forward-looking model and Modified Jones Model) in 
order to meet or beat analyst forecasts. It provides a better understanding of the properties of 
analysts’ forecasts by modeling firms’ earnings management practices and analysts’ response 
to them. This study assigns firms to ‘analysts-based unexpected earnings’ bins based on the 
firm’s unexpected earnings per share (in cents) and divides the earnings surprise (scaled by 
stock closing price) range from of -0.1 to 0.1 into 19 bins. Each just-beat and just-miss bin 
has a width of 0.01, and each firm-year observation appears once in a just-beat group and 
once in a just-miss group. The empirical results support that none of the discretionary accrual 
measures are positively associated with meeting or beating the analysts’ forecast benchmark. 
It indicates that managers do not intend to manipulate discretionary accruals to meet or beat 
analyst forecasts.  
 
Chapter 5 discusses the main findings and limitations of this thesis as well as the reflections 
on Chinese context. It also provides the policy implications and the overall conclusions. 
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Chapter 2 
Are Independent Directors and Supervisory Directors 
Effective in Constraining Earnings Management in China? 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The existing academic literatures about earnings management indicate that there has been a 
continuous interest in this area (e.g. Barnea et al., 1976; Imhoff, 1977; Ronen and Sadan, 
1981; Buckmaster, 1992, 1997; Dechow et al., 1995, 1996; Healy and Wahlen, 1999; 
Dechow and Skinner, 2000; McNichols, 2000; Fields et al., 2001; Stolowy and Breton, 2004; 
Peasnell et al., 2005; Ronen and Yaari, 2008). In the good sense, earnings management is an 
effective way to bridge the information asymmetry between management and shareholders, 
conveying a signal on future value. In the bad sense, earnings management arises from poor 
corporate governance, distorting the truth of financial reports (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). 
Dechow and Schrand (2004) argue that report earnings should reflect current performance, 
forecast future performance and mirror intrinsic firm value. Consistent with this view, most 
empirical studies regard earnings management as detrimental to the quality of financial 
reporting. Studies on earning management in mainland China have flourished in recent years 
(for instance, Chen et al., 2004; Ding et al., 2007). Although China has adopted many of the 
corporate governance mechanisms applied in the developed countries, it has its sui generis 
characteristics with a distinct two-tier board structure comprising a supervisory board and 
independent directors.  
 
With the eruption of the Internet bubble in 2000, the previously bullish stock markets became 
bearish, and the ugly truth started to be exposed. In the same year, the first big financial 
scandal from Xerox was disclosed by $1.4 billion overstated profits over the past four years. 
However, it was just the tip of an iceberg. Following the Xerox incident, twenty influential 
accounting scandals subsequently occurred, including World Com20, Adelphia, Tyco, and 
Global Crossing. Investors suffered losses of hundreds of millions of dollars in these 
corporate scandals which shook the faith of investors in the integrity of the capital markets. 
                                                 
20 The largest collapse was WorldCom’s meltdown with estimated losses approximating $180 billion in 
2002. 
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Studies on earning management in emerging countries are especially important because 
higher demand for capital in these emerging capital markets can be met only if investors are 
protected from accounting frauds (Wang et al., 2008). Ewert and Wagenhofer (2011) assert 
that only corporate governance may play a critical role in dampening real earnings 
management to some extent. Board of directors are widely accepted to play a vital role in 
corporate governance, especially in monitoring top management (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Previous US studies indicate that outside directors have great influence on a wide range of 
board decisions. Outside directors are deemed to make the distinctive contribution in helping 
ensure that managers act on behalf of the interests of outside stockholders (Fama, 1980; and 
Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
 
In the context of reliability discussed by Maines and Wahlen (2006), they suggest that for 
enabling accounting information to be reliable, preparers and standard setters and monitors 
must be knowledgeable about economic constructs affecting future cash flows, the relation 
between accounting constructs and these economic constructs, and methods for measuring 
reliable values. The purpose of this research is to investigate whether boards actively monitor 
and take actions that reduce the incidence of earnings management when the incentives for 
manipulations are high. It focuses on two aspects from the perspective of board monitoring: 
the role of independent directors on the board and the supervisory directors in constraining 
earnings manipulation. This study use board independence and financial expertise required by 
CSRC as measures of corporate governance. It examines the impact of corporate governance 
on earnings management in China through detecting whether the independence, financial or 
accounting expertise and official background and a higher proportion of independent 
directors and supervisors are correlated to the absolute value of discretionary accruals or 
discretionary revenue. The absolute value of discretionary accruals and absolute discretionary 
revenue are employed here to proxy for earnings management. Hence, this study will also 
explore the ability of revenue and accrual models to detect earnings opportunistic behaviour.  
 
This study extends the existing literature through examining the relationship between board 
monitoring (from the perspective of Independent Directors and Supervisory Directors) and 
earnings management in mainland China with weak corporate governance but stringent 
regulations. Mainland China provides an interesting experimental setting for investigating 
these issues since there is greater variation in outside director representation on boards in 
China than in the UK or in the US and other emerging countries (Peasnell et al., 1999) and 
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audit committees are not mandatory. It is a special case to be studied for its unique political, 
social, cultural and economic environment. The People’s Republic of China was established 
as a socialist country in 1949. The new government led by the Chinese Communist Party. 
Since the Economic Reform 21  in 1978, China has transferred from a centrally planned 
economy to a market economic system with socialist characteristics. The only form of 
economic entity before Economic Reform was state-owned enterprise (SOE)22. China started 
to corporatize and privatize the SOEs in the early 1990s, because the government found that 
the ownership structure of SOEs hinders enterprises’ economic efficiency (Tan and Wang, 
2004; Chen, 2005). Ownership structure is the primary determinant of agency cost. One 
feature of Chinese listed companies is that ownership is highly concentrated. Ding et al. 
(2007) argue that highly concentrated ownership determines the nature of the agency problem 
in Chinese listed companies. It coincides Shleifer and Vishny’s view (1997) that one of the 
two most effective solutions to the agency problem is concentrated ownership (the other is 
legal protection). Johnson et al. (2000) suggest that the controlling shareholders pursue their 
own benefits at the expense of minority shareholders referring to as ‘tunneling’.  
 
The results show that Chinese two-tier board structure comprising a board of directors of 
whom at least one third are independent directors and a supervisory board, fails to mitigate 
earnings management. The findings are inconsistent with the prediction that outside directors 
contribute towards the integrity of financial statements. One possible explanation is that 
independent directors and supervisory directors in China are often ‘vases’ and do not work as 
efficiently as in the developed countries. This indicates the independent directors and 
supervisory directors cannot voice for the minority shareholders; what they do is simply to 
agree with whatever the management or larger shareholders want, supporting the agency 
theory (conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders) and stewardship 
theory. It implies that the market regulators, policy makers and standard setters should pay 
more attention to enhance the authentic independence of independent directors and 
supervisory directors in Chinese firms. 
                                                 
21 It is commonly accepted that one of the main goals of China’s market-oriented reforms is to establish a 
corporate governance system that could provide incentives for investment, adequately restrain and monitor 
management, and promote the optimal use of resources for wealth creation. (Ronen, J. and V. Yaari,2008)  
 
22 ‘SOE employees benefited from housing, medical care, and schooling for their children, with the 
government providing benefits for maternity, injury, disability, and old age. Many SOEs were heavily 
subsidized and the government gave them access to bank financing, partly to pay for the social welfare 
needs of the workers.’ (Tricker, 2009, p.192) 
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The next section 2.2 explains the definitions of corporate governance and earnings 
management and their relationship and the mechanisms of corporate governance in mainland 
China as well as the commonly used accrual models proxy for earning management. Section 
2.3 presents the theoretical framework for this research. Section 2.4 reviews the empirical 
literature on the monitoring role of board of directors and supervisory directors. Section 2.5 
develops the research hypotheses. The research methodology to identify earnings 
management and research design are presented in Section 2.6. Section 2.7 explains the 
definition of variables and measurement. The sample data are described in Section 2.8. The 
empirical results are presented in Section 2.9. Robustness test results are reported in Section 
2.10. The conclusions appear in Section 2.11. 
 
2.2. Corporate Governance and Earnings Management 
 
2.2.1. Definition of Corporate Governance  
Considering different sets of conflicts of interest due to the separation of ownership and 
management, Denis and McConnell (2003) define corporate governance as a set of 
mechanisms, both institutional and market based, that induce the self-interested controllers of 
a company (including both managers and controlling shareholders) to make decisions that 
maximize the value of the company to its owners. Practitioners share the same view. Becht et 
al. (2003, p.17) provide a relatively more general conceptual framework and define corporate 
governance as a set of mechanisms that are necessary for two reasons: ‘first, to overcome the 
collective action problem resulting from the dispersion among shareholders and second, to 
ensure that the interests of all relevant constituencies besides shareholders face the same 
basic collective action problem’. Corporate governance deals with the rights and 
responsibilities of a company’s management, its board, shareholders, and various 
stakeholders.’ (OECD, 2004) 
 
2.2.2. Definition of Earnings Management 
 
The most influential definitions of Earning Management in the extant literature are from 
Schipper and Schipper (1989) and Healy and Wahlen (1999). The former defines earnings 
management as a ‘purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the 
intent of obtaining some private gain’. The latter define ‘Earnings Management occurs when 
managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial 
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reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of 
the company, or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported numbers’. They 
carry an implication of wrong-doing, mischief, fraud and even mystery, similar to other 
criminal activities (Lo, 2008). 
 
2.2.3. Basic Forms of Earnings Management 
 
According to Ewert and Wagenhofer’ summary (2011), earnings management mainly takes 
two basic forms. First, accounting (accruals-based) earnings management starts with given 
transactions and aims at influencing the recognition, measurement, and disclosure of these 
transactions and other events in the financial statements after the fact. Recognition and 
measurement choices affect net assets and earnings in a period and they usually reverse in 
future periods (except for certain effects that are recognized directly in equity and presented 
in other comprehensive income without reverse), thus clean surplus prevails. Disclosure 
choices may affect the amount of information provided in financial statements, but do not 
change the numbers reported in the balance sheet and income statement. Second, real 
(economic) earnings management includes performing or structuring transactions that are 
then reported in the financial statements to affect the reported numbers. The transactions 
generally influence total cash flows negatively, so they do not fully reverse. However, real 
earnings management is costly to the firms and is a kind of signal jamming activity. The 
accounting consequences for these transactions are given, and they may not even provide 
discretion. Thus, accounting standards usually fail to stop managers from this type of 
earnings management as they are unable to distinguish between normal transactions and those 
that are simply induced by earnings management incentives.  
 
Accounting (accruals-based) earnings management is often constrained by the clean surplus 
condition that requires that it reverses because cash flows are not affected. Nevertheless, real 
earnings management is not subject to clean surplus, although it also shifts real earnings from 
one period to the other. A key difference need to notice is that a standard setter can strengthen 
accounting standards to restrict the discretion for accounting earnings, but it can do little if 
anything to restrict real earnings management. Outside auditors or enforcement agencies 
assume real transactions as given and scrutinize how they are reported in the financial 
statements. Only corporate governance may play a critical role in dampening real earnings 
management to some extent (Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2011). 
Chapter 2 Are Independent Directors and Supervisory Directors 
Effective in Constraining Earnings Management in China? 
46 
 
 
2.2.4. Summary of the commonly used Accruals models 
 
Researchers frequently use measures of discretionary accruals in tests for earnings 
management and market efficiency. This section introduces the general representations of 
those models that have been most commonly used in the extant literature to capture earnings 
manipulation behaviour. In Table 2.1, it summarizes the commonly used accruals models 
with an introduction of research design of the approach and criticisms in terms of the 
generalization of Dechow et al. (1995). They evaluates alternative accrual-based models for 
detecting earnings management and compare the specification and power of commonly used 
test statistics across the measures of discretionary accruals generated by the models. Dechow 
et al. (1995) conclude that a modified version of the model developed by Jones (1991) 
exhibits the most power in detecting earnings management. A modified Dechow et al. (1995) 
model that controls for the effect of performance by either adding ROA as an additional 
independent variable or by using performance-matched portfolios, which proved to be a 
better approach.  Kothari et al. (2005) examine the specification and power of tests based on 
performance-matched discretionary accruals, and make comparisons with traditional 
discretionary accrual models (e.g. Jones and modified-Jones models). Performance matching 
on return on assets controls for the effect of performance on measured discretionary accruals. 
Their results suggest that performance-matched discretionary accrual model enhance the 
reliability of inferences from earnings management research when the hypothesis being tested 
does not imply that earnings management will vary with performance. 
 
2.2.5. Corporate Governance Mechanisms in China 
 
Tricker (2009) considers that two decades ago corporate governance in China virtually did 
not exist. China introduced the OECD corporate governance practices in 2001. Since 2003, 
Chinese firms have been demanded by law to follow several OECD practices. A corporate 
governance infrastructure has been built, something that did not exist before the crisis. This 
infrastructure includes corporate governance committees, institutes of directors and many 
other institutions. Recent developments of corporate governance in China have been 
remarkable and received much attention (Liu, 2006; Cheung et al., 2010).  
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Table 2.1 Summary of the commonly used accruals models 
 
Model Formula Approach Critique 
 
Healy 1985 Model 𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 =
1
𝐸𝑃
∑
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑗
𝑇𝐴𝑗−1
𝐸𝑃
𝑗
 
The non-discretionary accruals are 
estimated as the average total accruals 
for a given estimation period prior to the 
period of interest. 
The model presumes that earnings 
management occurs systematically 
each period. 
 
DeAngelo 1986 Model 
 
𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 =
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡−1
𝑇𝐴𝑡−2
 
The normal accruals are defined as the 
lagged total accruals. This is a special 
version of Healy’s model where the 
estimation period available consists of 
one year. 
The model assumes that firm’s 
non-discretionary accruals keep 
constant, while accruals are 
changing with the firm’s economic 
circumstances from period to 
period. 
 
Jones 1991 Model 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝛼1 (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝛼2 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝛼3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑡 
The non-discretionary accruals are 
estimated as a function of revenue 
growth and the size of the firm’s 
property, plant and equipment. 
The model hypothesizes that 
accrual revenues are not subject to 
the managers’ discretionary power. 
Dechow et al. 1995 
(Modified Jones) Model 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝛼1 (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝛼2 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡 − ∆𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
)
+ 𝛼3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑡 
A modified Jones model that considers 
the change in revenues after deducting 
the change in trade receivables. They 
argue that exercising managerial 
discretion over the recognition of credit 
revenues is much easier than exercising 
discretion over cash revenues. 
The residual is significantly 
correlated with the firm’s 
performance. Null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected for firms with 
good performance due to the bias 
of estimation. 
Kothari et al. 2005 
(Performance-Matched) 
Model 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝛼2(∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡 − ∆𝐴𝑅𝑡)
+ 𝛼3(𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡) + 𝛼4(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡[𝑜𝑟 𝑡−1]) + 𝜀𝑡 
A modified Dechow et al. (1995) model 
that controls for the effect of 
performance by either adding ROA as 
an additional independent variable or by 
using performance-matched portfolios, 
which proved to be a better approach. 
Controlling for firm performance 
reduces the model’s power in this 
model. 
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In 2001, the Code of Corporate Governance for listed companies23 promulgated by CSRC 
and State Economic and Trade Commission, sets forth the basic principles for corporate 
governance of Chinese listed companies, the means for the protection of investors' interests 
and rights, the basic behavior rules and moral standards for directors, supervisors, managers 
and other senior management members. Since the enactment of the 1994 Company Law, the 
corporate governance system has played an important role in bringing vitality to Chinese 
enterprises. Under this law, a two-tier Board structure for Chinese companies was introduced 
and Supervisory Board is mandatory for a joint stock limited company. The 2006 Company 
Law24 amended based on the 1994 Company Law, influences the Board monitoring in three 
aspects: (1) a significant enhancement of the effectiveness of the Supervisory Board; (2) a 
modest strengthening of participation by workers, and (3) the independent director system for 
listed companies is codified (Article 123.2) (Xi, 2006). 
 
According to Liu (2006), good corporate governance in essence incorporates a set of 
mechanisms to ensure that suppliers of finance get an adequate return on their investment. 
There is no exception including China. The corporate governance mechanisms adopted in 
China are based on a framework proposed in Bai et al. (2004). Generally speaking, there are 
two types of mechanisms that resolve the conflicts especially between owners and managers, 
and those between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. The first type consists 
of various internal mechanisms, such as the ownership structure, executive compensation, the 
board of directors and financial disclosure. Among the aforementioned four internal 
governance mechanisms, ownership structure is crucial to the firm’s value maximization. The 
second are external mechanisms, comprising the effective takeover market, legal 
infrastructure and product market competition. 
 
Researchers and scholars debate how China can develop an effective corporate governance 
system to improve the listed companies’ performance and protect the minority shareholders. 
Many studies investigate whether good governance structures help constrain management's 
opportunistic behaviours in one of the world's most dynamic economies and suggest that 
good corporate governance serves as an effective mechanism to constrain the managers’ 
opportunistic behaviours and to improve a company's reporting quality, and hence increase 
firm value (e.g., Chen et al., 2009; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Denis and McConnell, 2003).  
                                                 
23 See http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release/200708/t20070810_69223.htm 
24 See http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383787.htm 
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2.2.5.1.  Models of Corporate Governance  
 
On the basis of Tricker (2009) and Tan and Wang (2004) and Wei (2003), this study 
compares Chinese Model with the American Model, UK Model and German Model, see 
details as presented in Table 2.2 as follows. In China, the current corporate governance 
system combines features of the Anglo-American model with the German model while 
having its sui generis characteristics. Prima facie, the mechanism is identical to the two-tier 
system in Germany and Japan, in which firms are governed by a board of directors and a 
supervisory board. However, there is a substantial difference (see details as described in 
Table 2.2). In Chinese listed firms, there is no hierarchical relationship between the board and 
supervisory board, which are both appointed by, and report to shareholders’ general meetings. 
Under the German model, the supervisory board is superior to the board of directors. The 
supervisory board in China has been criticized for its dysfunction (Dahya, Karbhari and Xiao, 
2002). Therefore, the monitoring function rests on the directors on the board and especially 
on independent directors after 1999, when Chinese Security Regulation Commission (CSRC) 
commenced to emphasize the importance of independent directors. The definition of 
independent directors was first introduced in the Guidelines on Company Chapter of Listed 
Companies by CSRC as an optional article in 1997. An official and comprehensive guideline 
on independent directors was enacted, which required domestically listed companies to 
appoint at least on third independent directors on board of directors by 30th June, 2003.  
 
To sum up, Chinese corporate governance system is closer to Anglo-Saxon one-tier structure 
(Chen and Al-Najjar, 2012). The State Assets Management Bureau (SAMB) was elevated to 
ministerial level as the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC)25 in 2003 (Wang 2010). SASAC has considerable power over SOEs in China, 
including the appointment and dismissal of directors and top executives of the supervised 
enterprises. SASAC holds Chinese Government’s shareholding 26  in all Chinese listed 
companies except the financial institutions. In terms of Fama and Jensen (1983), the Board of 
Directors was introduced as an important element of corporate governance to align the 
                                                 
25 The SASAC, authorized by the State Council in accordance with the Company Law and other administrative 
regulations, performs investor’s responsibilities, supervises and manages the State-owned assets of the 
enterprises under the supervision of the Central Government (excluding financial enterprises), and enhances the 
management of the State-owned assets. SASAC guides and pushes forward the reform and restructuring of 
state-owned enterprises, advances the establishment of modern enterprise system in SOEs, improves corporate 
governance.’ 
 
26 At the end of 2008, the total assets held by SASAC amounted to RMB5.56 trillion. 
http://xxgk.sasac.gov.cn/gips/contentSearch?id=7379976 
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interests of shareholders and managers to reduce agency costs stemming from the separation 
of ownership and control. In the unitary board structure, a company’s Board of Directors 
plays an administrative role comprising executive and non-executive directors and consists of 
a Supervisory Board and a Management board. The Supervisory Board, comprising non-
executives, represents the interest of shareholders and monitors the management board. The 
Management board conducts the daily operation of the firm and reports to both Supervisory 
Board and shareholders.  
 
2.2.5.2. Independent Directors 
 
In 2001, Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of 
Listed Companies27 set by CSRC requires independent directors to be qualified persons. The 
requirement for no less than one third of independent non-executive directors on the Boards 
of Directors by 30th of June, 2003 indicates that China’s corporate governance practices move 
towards Anglo-American practices. The monitoring role of independent directors is 
especially relevant in jurisdictions where there is no separation of ownership and control, 
such as in mainland China. Individuals in China are limited to five independent directorships 
in listed companies. Independent directors could be nominated by the Board of Directors, 
Supervisory Board or any shareholders holding five percent of the company’s shares (Tricker, 
2009, p.194). The definition of independent directors is as follows: 
  
‘Independent directors of the listed company refer to the directors who hold no posts in the 
company other than the position of director, and who maintain no relations with the listed 
company and its major shareholder that might prevent them from making objective judgment 
independently. The qualified independent directors should have ‘more than five years' work 
experience in law, economics or other fields. Independent directors should ensure financial 
decisions represent the best interests of all shareholders and should not result in biased 
earnings or cash flows towards the managers, controlling shareholders, or the minority 
shareholders’ (CSRC, 2002). 
 
From the abovementioned definition, independent directors are supposed to have the same 
function as non-executive directors in the Anglo-American model. Independent directors in 
China are granted special powers including that ‘major related party transactions should be 
approved by the independent director before being submitted to the board of directors for 
discussion’ (Wang, 2010).  
                                                 
27 See http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release/200708/t20070810_69191.htm 
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Table 2.2 Comparison of Board Models 
                                                 
10 The role of Corporate Board Secretary (CBS) is usually narrowly defined and too often focused on the secretarial responsibilities. However, in a majority of cases 
in Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden, the role is combined with that of legal counsel (Heidrick & Struggles, European Corporate Governance Report 2011).  
See http://www.heidrick.com/ExecutiveSearch/Pages/ExecutiveSearch.aspx 
Items American Model UK/Commonwealth Model Continental European Model Chinese Model 
Board Structure 
Unitary Board Model with a majority of 
non-executive directors 
Unitary Board Model with a majority of 
non-executive directors 
Two-Tier Board Model with equal 
number of employee representatives and 
shareholder representatives in the 
Supervisory Board 
Two-Tier Board Model with at least 
1/3 independent directors  and 
employee representatives in the Board 
of Directors and  Supervisory Board 
respectively 
Application 
Area 
Corporate governance practices 
required in the US and its influence on 
other countries 
Corporate governance practices 
required in the UK and  Australia, 
Canada, India, New Zealand, South 
Africa, and Singapore etc. 
Corporate governance practices required 
in Germany, Holland and France and 
Italy 
Corporate governance practices 
required in mainland China 
Compliance 
with Corporate 
governance code 
It is ruled-based, in which the 
governance is regulated by legal statue 
and mandatory rules and lack of 
flexibility 
It is principles-based, in which 
voluntary compliance with the 
corporate governance code or good 
practice 
It is ruled-based, in which the 
governance is regulated by legal statue 
and mandatory rules and lack of 
flexibility. 
It is ruled-based, in which the 
governance is regulated by legal statue 
and mandatory rules and lack of 
flexibility. 
Independence of 
the Chairman 
Usually Chairman is also CEO 
Chairman is required to be separate 
from the role of CEO 
Chairman is separated from CEO 
Equivalent to the CEO in Western 
countries, General Manager is the 
statutory title in any limited liability 
company; Chairman often is also 
General Manager 
Power of the 
Board 
Company law gives a wider range of 
power to the Board of Directors and a 
smaller scope of authority to the 
shareholders’ meetings 
Company law gives a wider range of 
power to the Board of Directors and a 
smaller scope of authority to the 
shareholders’ meetings 
Supervisory Board in Germany plays a 
crucial role in corporate governance, 
and it is above Board of Directors, e.g. 
have right to appoint and dismiss Board 
members; the executive directors in 
Germany attend the meetings hold by 
Supervisory Board, and have right to 
vote. 
The shareholders’ meeting is the organ 
of power in a firm, both Board of 
Directors and Supervisory Board have 
to report to the shareholders’ meeting. 
Chinese Company law entitles 
Supervisory Directors to attend 
meetings of the Board of Directors, but 
no right to vote. 
Corporate  
Board 
Secretary28 
Widely missing in the US 
Each UK Company has corporate board 
secretary; but it is widely missing in 
Austria, Denmark and Norway. 
it is widely missing in Germany 
Chinese listed companies normally 
have corporate board secretary who is 
included in the top management 
Shareholders’ 
Influence on 
Board directors 
Little influence 
Shareholders have 10 percent of voting 
rights in a public company, can call for 
an extraordinary meetings and vote on 
strategic decisions or dismiss a director. 
Banks wield power on corporate affairs 
with large equity stakes in the German 
companies other than their roles as 
creditors 
Controlling shareholders have 
significant influence on Board 
directors 
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2.2.5.3. Supervisory Board 
 
Hu et al. (2010) state that the two-tier board is a primary governance structure to safeguard 
the minority shareholders’ interests. Though inspired by German system, China does not 
simply copy it. The two Boards are obliged to submit their reports to the shareholders’ 
meeting for review and approval. In essence, several important differences distinguish the 
Supervisory Board in China from that in Germany and other European countries adopting 
two-tier boards. Firstly, unlike the superior-subordinate relationship between the Supervisory 
Board and Board of Directors in Germany, it is a parallel relationship under the shareholders’ 
meeting in China. But in fact the Supervisory Board is perceived inferior to the Board of 
Directors. Secondly, in Germany, the Supervisory Directors appoint and oversee the Board 
members and have right to dismiss if they perform poorly. However, the Supervisory 
Directors in China don’t have such power. Thirdly, Firth et al. (2006) describe that Chairmen 
are full-time executives with more significant power than CEOs in China. Finally, top 
management usually started their careers as government bureaucrats and consequently may 
have different mindsets from those in the US and Europe (Xiao et al., 2004).  
 
Wang and Liu (2006) and Liu et al.(2010) argue that most of the staff supervisors are 
representatives of government cadres or labor models, whose remuneration and position 
decided by the Board of Directors. Therefore, the supervision independence of workers 
representatives has been weakened. In order to strengthen the Supervisory Board's functions 
and rights, 2006 Company Law adds Disposal Right, Proposal Right, Convening and 
Presiding Right of Shareholder Meeting, and Litigation Right.  
 
2.2.5.4. Ownership Structure 
 
Ownership structure is crucial to the firm’s value maximization. Concentrated ownership 
gives the largest shareholders a substantial discretionary power to use the firm’s resources for 
personal gain at the expense of other shareholders. Concentrated share ownership has 
implications for the level of information asymmetry between managers and investors and 
influences the informativeness of accounting earnings and managers’ accounting choices 
(Fan and Wong, 2002; Donnelly and Lynch, 2002). To capture the ownership aspect of 
corporate governance, this study calculates the stake of the largest shareholder, and uses it to 
measure both the largest shareholder’s interest in a company and also the largest 
shareholder’s power on the board (Lo, Wong and Firth, 2010). According to Liu and Lu 
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(2007), a typical characteristic of most listed SOEs’ ownership structure in China is that a 
parent company usually exists. CSRC allowed listed companies to remunerate managers with 
stock options from mid-2005 (Ding et al., 2007 and Tricker, 2009). In addition, Chinese 
government still retains a significant proportion (about two thirds) of shares when an SOE 
goes public to preserve the socialist structure of the economy and prevent the mass 
privatization of SOEs. Thus, the ownership structure and corporate governance structures will 
influence the quality of financial information contained in accounting earnings and managers’ 
discretionary accounting choices.  
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Morck et al. (1989), as cited in Firth et al. (2007), suggest 
that different ownership structures imply different incentives to control and monitor a firm’s 
management. This idea is supported by Tricker (2009). The types of ownership have 
profound influence on the ability of a board to exercise its power over a company. Nearly 80 
percent of Chinese listed firms with a highly concentrated ownership structure are controlled 
by the government, and the level of management ownership in China is much lower than in 
other countries. The corporate governance in China is significantly different from that in the 
United States, United Kingdom. Although there are many regulations, standards and laws, 
their enforcement is fairly weak in mainland China. The management incentives and 
pressures differ among the various types of firms, especially between SOEs and non-SOEs. 
This provides us with an opportunity to investigate management incentives and conservative 
accounting in such an emerging economy. As the degree of state control in China is probably 
higher than that in most other countries, non-financial and budget information probably plays 
a greater role in China than elsewhere. It would be useful to study how information flows 
between government agencies and firms, and how the expectations of both parties are 
coordinated.  
 
Ownership structure impacts on corporate governance through incentive alignment and 
entrenchment. The incentive alignment effect occurs when the profit, or firm value, 
maximization objective of the minority shareholders is consistent with that of large 
shareholders, who in turn have more expertise and capability to monitor managers (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1986). Empirical evidence confirms this by showing that firms with large 
shareholders are associated with higher management turnover (Kang and Shivdasani, 1995) 
and tighter executive compensation control (Hartzell and Starks, 2003). The entrenchment 
effect of large shareholders is conceptually similar to the effect when managerial ownership 
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is high. Both theoretical and empirical studies suggest that managers with a greater degree of 
ownership have more incentive to expropriate the wealth of outside shareholders, which in 
turn reduces the value of the firm. On the other hand, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that 
large shareholders who gain effective control of a firm’s management also have a greater 
incentive to pursue their own interests.   
 
Khanna et al. (2006) and Doidge et al. (2007) suggest that institutional factors are the main 
source of variation in firm-level governance and transparency; this indicates a 
complementary role between country and firm-level governance and highlights the limits of 
convergence in corporate governance regimes. Warfield et al. (1995) examine the effect of 
managerial ownership on the informativeness of earnings and discretionary accruals. They 
argue that higher managerial ownership reduces the agency cost of information asymmetry, 
and therefore reduces earnings management. However, management, employee, and foreign 
shares account for a very small proportion of Chinese firms’ issued share capital (Firth et al., 
2002 and Xu, 2004 as cited in Firth et al., 2007). Managerial ownership in China is too 
minimal to generate an incentives alignment effect or entrenchment effect. Fama and Jensen 
(1983) and Jensen (1993) provide a relevant argument that is more applicable to China. They 
argue that when managerial ownership is low, companies need larger, more independent 
boards to monitor top management. This argument is consistent with the substitution effect of 
alternative governance mechanisms. 
 
2.2.5.5. Institutional Shareholders 
 
The issue of stock liquidity is another factor that may explain the variations of value 
relevance among firms in China. Although individual and institutional holdings constitute a 
company’s total tradable shares as in other stock markets, retail investors generate most of 
the trading volume in the Chinese market. Institutional shareholders in China are defined as 
those other than individual investors and they are generally government-owned organizations 
such as stated-owned enterprises, universities, and administrative agencies. They are clearly 
different from institutional investors in the West. While institutional shareholders in China 
may hold a large percentage of a company’s stock, their ability to trade is severely restricted 
by the government policy and trading rules in China. The institution-held shares can only be 
transferred to other institutions with approvals from the government. The transfer price is 
based on negotiations rather than the market price. Consequently, a higher percentage of 
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individual holdings may indicate a more active market, and it is through an active market that 
stock prices have the potential to fully reflect public information including accounting 
information. However, non-government institutional investors (e.g., insurance companies, 
mutual funds, and pension funds) are far less common in China. Therefore, managerial and 
institutional ownership are not likely to influence accounting quality in China.  
 
Regulatory effort has been made in China to develop mutual funds in recent years. For 
example, Chinese government made a strategic decision to cultivate the ‘pillar role’ of mutual 
funds, among other financial institutions in domestic stock markets in 2000 (CSRC, 2000). 
Mutual funds are now encouraged to invest in listed companies in the expectation that they 
can monitor corporate decisions and counter speculative behaviors by individual investors 
(e.g., free-riding problems). According to the CSRC statistics, at the end of 2005, there were 
54 closed-end and 164 open-end mutual funds in China. By the end of June 2007, the number 
of open mutual funds in China had grown to 343. In countries like the US and the UK, the 
role of institutional shareholders is mainly to monitor managerial activities and thereby 
mitigate the shareholders-manager agency problem. In contrast, the concentrated ownership 
structure in China places mutual funds in a unique governance role in monitoring the 
controlling shareholders and safeguarding the interest of minority shareholders. The 
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) Program, effective from December 2002, 
offers foreign investors access to the domestic A-shares market for the first time. This 
represents a significant step towards capital market opening-up in China, which is likely to 
bring significant pressure and challenges to mutual funds in China (Chen et al., 2005). 
 
2.3. Theoretical Framework 
 
2.3.1. Agency Theory 
 
Agency theory addresses the question of the separation of ownership and control, as 
identified by Berle and Means (1932). They state that, in practice, managers of a firm pursue 
their own interests rather than the interests of shareholders. There are three significantly 
influential articles about agency theory discussed in Eisenhardt’s paper (1989). Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) investigate how equity ownership by managers aligns the interest of 
managers with that of owners. Fama (1980) describes the role of efficient capital and labor 
markets as information mechanisms to control the self-serving behavior of top executives. 
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Fama and Jensen (1983) discuss the role of board of directors as an information system for 
the stockholders within large companies monitoring the opportunistic behavior of top 
executives. 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) extended the risk-sharing literature by incorporating the so-
called agency problem that occurs when co-operating parties having different attitudes 
towards risk. They define an agency relationship as a contract, in which one party (the 
principal) delegates work to another (the agent), who performs that work on behalf of the 
principal. In the paper carried out by Eisenhardt (1989), she proposes that agency theory is 
mainly concerned with two problems. Firstly, the agency problem arises when (a) the desires 
or goals of the principal and agent conflict and (b) it is difficult or expensive for the principal 
to verify what the agent is actually doing and whether the agent has behaved appropriately. 
Secondly, agency problem occurs when the principal and agent have different attitudes 
towards risk preferences or risk aversion. Since the interest of the agents is not always in line 
with that of the principals, the agents may act for themselves even though their behaviors will 
harm the interest of the principals. To ensure the agents act properly for the principal, the 
principals have to pay extra costs which are called ‘agency costs’. 
 
Ownership structure is regarded as the primary determinant of agency cost. Following Berle 
and Means (1932), Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Roe (1994) indicate the agency problems 
stem from the conflict of interests between the shareholders and managers when ownership is 
diffuse such as in the USA and the UK. On the other hand, ownership is highly concentrated 
such as the circumstances in East Asia, the agency problem stem from the conflicts between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 1998; Claessens et al., 
2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002). One distinct feature of Chinese listed companies is that 
ownership is highly concentrated. Ding et al. (2007) argue that highly concentrated 
ownership determines the nature of the agency problem in Chinese listed companies. It 
coincides Shleifer and Vishny’s view (1997) that one of the two most effective solutions to 
the agency problem is concentrated ownership (the other is legal protection). Ownership 
structure is crucial to the firm’s value maximization. Concentrated ownership gives the 
largest shareholders a substantial discretionary power to use the firm’s resources for personal 
gain at the expense of other shareholders. Johnson et al. (2000) suggest that the controlling 
shareholders pursue their own benefits at the expense of minority shareholders referring to as 
‘tunneling’. Furthermore, there is one more agency problem in Chinese state-owned 
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enterprises than in privately-owned companies because there is an extra agency relationship 
in SOEs, as the controlling owners are themselves agents of the true owners: the state.  
 
Controlling shareholders tends to have fewer agency conflicts with managers and boards of 
directors, because there is little separation between ownership and control, directors and 
managers can be hand-selected and appointed. Therefore, the demand for high-quality 
financial reporting disclosures for the purpose of monitoring management seems less 
important in firms with controlling shareholders than those with dispersed ownership which 
rely on outside directors to monitor management (LaFond and Watts, 2008). When 
government dominates as a controlling shareholder, its social purpose is considered to 
generate major conflict of interests between the controlling owner and the minority owner. 
Since the controlling shareholders have the incentives and access to extract private gains 
from control, for instance, self-serving investments (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Ajinkya et al. 
(2005) draw a similar conclusion that institutions with concentrated (block-holder) ownership 
have access to superior private information and are less likely to demand high-quality and 
timely disclosures of accounting information. Similarly, Fan and Wong (2002) and Francis et 
al. (2005) assume firms dominated by controlling shareholders have less governance-related 
demand for high-quality financial reporting, hence allowing controlling shareholders to 
protect proprietary information through less transparent financial reporting.  
 
2.3.2. Stewardship Theory 
 
A different stream of literature takes a principal-agent approach and focuses on the 
stewardship role of financial reporting in which the manager's compensation is endogenously 
set by the principal (see for example, Beyer et al., 1996). As expressed by Davis et al., (1997, 
p.21) ‘Stewardship theory defines situations in which managers are not motivated by 
individual goals, but rather are stewards whose motives are aligned with the objectives of 
their principals’. In essence, this theory assumes that managers have the incentives to 
practice earnings management to influence their firms’ value in line with the wealth 
maximisation objective of shareholders. Therefore, accounting earnings are not only utilized 
in equity valuation, but also in measuring managerial performance and how well the 
managers are delegating the interest of their shareholders (Dechow, 1994). 
 
 
Chapter 2 Are Independent Directors and Supervisory Directors 
Effective in Constraining Earnings Management in China? 
58 
 
2.4. Empirical Literature  Review 
 
Through making comparison of 31 countries, Leuz et al. (2003) find that corporations in 
those countries with developed capital markets (e.g. the United States, Australia and the 
United Kingdom), dispersed ownership structures, strong investor protection and strong legal 
enforcement engage in less earnings management. They develop a scoring method to measure 
earnings management in various countries and employ four measures of earnings 
management: (1) the volatility of earnings relevant to the volatility of cash flows; (2) the 
correlation between cash flows and accruals; (3) the extent of discretion in accruals based on 
the absolute magnitude of accruals relative to the absolute value of cash flows and (4) the 
extent of loss avoidance. In the developed capital markets, boosting the company’s stock 
price appears to be a major motivation for earnings manipulation, since it is often regarded as 
the benchmark for managerial compensation, stock options or other incentive schemes. 
However, it is not the case in China; the floating shares often account for only a small 
proportion of listed firms’ total shares and before mid-2005 stock options were prohibited 
(Ding et al., 2007; Conyon and He, 2011). Highly concentrated ownership by the State, 
multiple goals of listed companies other than profit maximization, weak legal enforcement, 
inadequate financial disclosure, controlling shareholders’ expropriation of minority 
shareholders’ interests and short-term speculative investments are the characteristics in China 
(Liu 2006; Cheung, Jiang et al. 2010; Chen, Li et al. 2011). Based on prior literatures (e.g. 
Young et al., 2008), Chen et al. (2011) summarize the ways in which controlling 
shareholders expropriate the minority shareholders’ interests. Ding et al. (2007) examine the 
relationship between ownership concentration and earnings management. Based on Shleifer 
and Vishny’s findings (1997), Liu and Lu (2007) and Ding et al. (2007) provide strong 
evidence that the conflict of interests between the controlling shareholders (the State) and 
minority shareholders is the root cause of the earnings management phenomenon in China. 
 
Some studies have focused on how governance shapes the actions of the CEO and top 
managers. For example, company ownership and boardroom structures, which represent a 
firm's governance style, have been used to help explain management's actions on corporate 
restructuring (e.g., Denis et al., 1997; Ahn and Walker, 2007; Netter et al., 2009; Bauguess et 
al., 2009), dividend decisions (Brav et al., 2005), and the pricing of executive stock options 
(Chidambaran and Prabhala, 2003). Other examples include how governance has constrained 
managers' opportunistic manipulation of discretionary accruals in a firm's financial 
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statements (Chung et al., 2002; Park and Shin, 2004), inter-group borrowings (Berkman et al., 
2009), and corporate fraud (Chen et al., 2006). These manipulations leading to distortion of 
financial statements cause greater information asymmetry. According to Chen et al.’s 
research (2008), lack of an audit committee and outside directors in the Board is regarded as 
the important catalyst for earnings manipulation. Through the empirical examination on US 
companies, Agrawal and Chadha (2005) conclude that only if the outside directors have 
accounting/financial expertise, the probability of earnings management will be reduced. It is 
consistent with Park and Shin’s (2004) findings on the basis of the sample data from Canada. 
Peasnell et al. (2005) report that outside directors are effective in constraining earnings 
management in the UK after the release of the Cadbury Committee Report (1992). There are 
also findings from Taiwanese listed companies indicating that the true independence and 
financial expertise of independent directors and supervisors lower the degree of earnings 
management (Chen, Elder et al. 2007).  
 
Good corporate governance mechanisms, in terms of the characteristics of the board of 
directors and corporate ownership, should enhance the fairness among the different 
stakeholders in the business (Collier and Esteban, 1999; Jensen, 2005; Matten and Crane, 
2005). For example, independent directors should ensure that financial decisions are made in 
the best interests of all shareholders and should not result in earnings or cash flows that are 
biased toward the managers, controlling shareholders, or minority shareholders (Donaldson 
and Preston, 1995; CSRC, 2002). Managers probably have a strong financial reporting 
incentive to shift income inward to maximize their performance-linked bonuses or to avoid 
losses (Lo et al., 2007). Prior research suggests that board independence, as measured by the 
percentage of independent directors, can improve corporate governance although its 
effectiveness depends on the business and regulatory compliance environment (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2003; Xie et al., 2003; Berghe and Baelden, 2005; Iwasaki, 2008; Cornett et al., 
2009).  
 
Common-law countries, such as the US and UK, are characterized by 'arms-length' 
transactions, diversity of external investors, fairly frequent hostile takeovers and a relatively 
high risk of litigation. In code-law countries, such as Germany and China, the stock markets 
are less active and have relatively low litigation rates (Maijoor and Vanstraelen 2006). Unlike 
the US and UK, an active corporate control market does not exist in China (Pistor and Xu 
2005; Liu 2006). China’s capital markets are underdeveloped with strong information 
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asymmetry between investors and companies. Hence, the investors are engaged in market 
speculation and sensitive to short-term stock price volatility. To some extent, the stock prices 
may not reflect the firms’ true performance (Peng 2004; Lin and Swanson 2008). Burgstahler, 
Hail, and Leuz (2006) find that strong legal systems are associated with decreased earnings 
management. In developing markets with concentrated ownership, especially those in East 
Asia, managers are usually appointed and controlled by controlling or ultimate shareholders, 
and firm behavior reflects the will of these shareholders. Managers play a less important role 
than do those in firms in other markets, such as the United States, because the control of 
controlling shareholders and ultimate shareholders is significant. Ultimate shareholders with 
few cash flows rights can build powerful empires via the pyramid structure, and this incentive 
is evident in countries and regions with a weak legal system and undeveloped economy (La 
Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000). 
 
Both internal and external corporate governance mechanisms are weak or non-existent in 
China (Weetman, 2004 and Tricker, 2009).  For example, externally the market for corporate 
control and managerial labor market are seriously underdeveloped, while internally it was not 
until 2002 that independent directors and audit committees appeared in listed companies. Not 
surprisingly, in a study of earnings management it was found that companies increased their 
non-recurring income to satisfy a regulation requiring a 10 per cent return on net assets as a 
condition for a rights issue of shares (Haw et al., 1998). The problem of creating fictitious 
transactions to falsify profits or conceal speculation appears much more severe than earnings 
management and leads to lack of confidence in annual reports or an accounting ‘Information 
Crisis’ as mentioned earlier (Chen et al., 2000). These irregularities in financial accounting 
and reporting suggest that the capital market does not provide sufficient monitoring of 
opportunistic behavior, nor does it provide sufficient incentives for listed companies to 
supply high quality information. 
 
Fan and Wong (2002) develop two complementary arguments referring to the relationship 
between ownership structure and earnings informativeness. The first argument is related to 
the entrenchment effect of ownership concentration (Morck et al., 1988). The countries in 
East Asia are characterized by highly concentrated corporate ownership. As the controlling 
owners are entrenched by their effective control of the firms, their decisions that deprive the 
rights of minority shareholders are often uncontestable in the weak legal systems (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999; Johnson et al., 2000b). Moreover, due to the 
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complicated pyramidal and crossholding ownership structures typical in East Asian 
companies, a significant number of controlling owners in the region actually possess more 
control than their equity ownership indicates, which further exacerbates the entrenchment 
effect. 
 
‘Bonus Hypothesis'29 and 'Debt Hypothesis'30 proposed by Watts and Zimmerman (1990) 
have received strong support. Healy (1985) and Gaver et al. (1995) and Holthausen et al. 
(1995) support evidences for bonus hypothesis. Dechow et al. (1996) also discover there is an 
important motivation for earnings manipulation to attract external financing at low cost and 
avoid debt covenant restrictions by detecting those firms which have violated US GAAP. 
Nevertheless, they don’t provide any systematic evidence that managers manipulate earnings 
to acquire a larger earnings-based bonus or to sell their shares at inflated stock prices. Healy 
and Wahlen (1999) summarize the incentives for earnings management as: (1) capital market 
motivation, (2) contracting motivation, and (3) regulatory motivation. Based on the summary 
of Healy and Wahlen (1999), Beneish (2001) adds the motivation for insider trading. Meeting 
or exceeding the regulatory profitability threshold is also a strong incentive for Chinese listed 
companies to manipulate earnings, such as acquiring the authorization for IPO, rights issue 
and avoiding delisting due to CSRC’s reliance on ROEs (Wong and Jian 2003; Chen and 
Yuan 2004; Yu, Du et al. 2006; Ding, Zhang et al. 2007; Liu and Lu 2007; Chen, Wang et al. 
2008; Chen, Lee et al. 2008; Chen, Wang et al. 2010). Empirically, the 6 percent and 10 
percent thresholds have been tested and proved to be the critical threshold in China in some 
studies (Chen, Wang et al. 2008; 2010) by employing mixed normal distribution to explore 
the frequency and magnitude of earnings management.  
 
Chen et al. (2008) argue that in China incentives for meeting or beating analysts’ forecast do 
not exist because the analysts only play a primitive role in the Chinese stock market and their 
forecasts usually have no impact on stock price. However, they (2010) re-examine and 
discover that the incentive to meet analysts' forecasts becomes dominant after 2001 and the 
frequency and magnitude of earnings management are higher when firms try to avoid 
earnings decrease rather than to avoid negative earnings. Schipper (1989) suggest that  
managing earnings to obtain favorable treatment from regulators represents a special case. 
                                                 
29 ‘Bonus Hypothesis’ assumes that managers alter reported earnings to increase their compensation. 
30 ‘Debt Hypothesis’ assumes that managers of firms with high level of leverage tend to choose accounting 
methods and policies that increase reported earnings to avoid technical default of debt covenants or to reduce the 
restrictiveness of accounting based constraints in debt agreements. 
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Chen et al. (2008) suggest that Chinese local governments assist local listed SOEs in earnings 
management to meet the regulatory requirements set by central government through offering 
subsidies and granting taxation preference or favoring listed firms in the project approval 
process.  
 
Wang et al. (2008) demonstrate that the shareholding ratio of institutional investors is 
negatively related with the degree of earnings management, since institutional investors often 
have high-quality personnel with professional financial and managerial backgrounds. 
Although institutional investors (i.e. life insurance companies, pension funds and collective 
investment funds) in China have become increasingly as important shareholders as in the US 
financial markets, they are still relatively immature. 
 
Many previous studies show that good corporate governance is an effective mechanism to 
mitigate the management’s opportunistic behaviors, to improve the quality of reported 
earnings and to increase firm value (Cheng and Warfield 2005; Chen, Firth et al. 2006; Ding, 
Zhang et al. 2007; Firth, Fung et al. 2007; Cornett, Marcus et al. 2008; Wang, Wang et al. 
2008; Young, Peng et al. 2008; Hu, Tam et al. 2010; Lo, Wong et al. 2010; Conyon and He 
2011). Several studies address the importance of corporate governance in constraining 
earnings management in the US, the UK, and other European countries (Shleifer and Vishny 
1997; Klein 2002; Goergen, Manjon Antolin et al. 2004; Hopt and Leyens 2004; Park and 
Shin 2004; Peasnell, Pope et al. 2005; Fauver and Fuerst 2006; Gillan 2006; Hillier and 
McColgan 2006; Osma and Noguer 2007; Cornett, Marcus et al. 2008; Jeanjean and Stolowy 
2009; Bermig and Frick 2010), as well as in emerging markets (Klapper and Love 2004; 
Cheung, Jiang et al. 2008; McGee 2008; Young, Peng et al. 2008; Hu, Tam et al. 2010; Lo, 
Wong et al. 2010; Yuka 2010; Chen, Li et al. 2011). Using a sample of 692 publicly traded 
U.S. firm-years, Klein (2002) shows a significantly negative relationship between abnormal 
accruals and the percentage of outside directors on the board and audit committees. Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997) and Gillan (2006) provide strong evidence that good corporate governance 
can mitigate the agency problems, especially the agency conflicts between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders. Such a conclusion is also applicable to Chinese 
market (Wong and Jian 2003; Ding, Zhang et al. 2007; Liu and Lu 2007; Young, Peng et al. 
2008; Aharony, Wang et al. 2010). 
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2.5. Hypotheses Development 
 
Monitoring managerial decisions becomes crucial for safeguarding the shareholders’ interests 
(Fama and Jensen 1983). There are many studies in the US and UK and other European 
countries which have tested whether board size, the percentage of non-executive directors, 
frequency of board meetings, duality of the CEO and Chairman and whether the board has an 
audit committee are related to a firm’s performance and earnings informative-ness. The 
results of these studies are mixed. The unique characteristics of internal governance in the 
Chinese background will influence the earnings quality differently from that in the West. In 
the developed capital markets with separation between ownership and management, and 
broad shareholder bases, earnings management is generally driven by the desire to boost the 
listed company’s stock price, since the price is often the key basis for managerial 
compensation, which may include stock options or other incentive plans. However, in some 
less developed capital markets these incentives are perhaps no longer relevant. In such capital 
markets, even listed firms have a highly concentrated ownership structure and top managers 
are or directly on behalf of controlling shareholders. The Chinese stock market is a good 
example of such a context: the floating shares often represent only a small proportion of 
listed firms’ total shares, and stock options were not implemented until mid-2005.  
 
Ownership structure is regarded as the primary determinant of agency cost, this study thus 
attempts to link companies’ ownership structure (largest shareholder, i.e. Top1 shareholder) 
with their earnings management behaviour. Concentrated ownership gives the largest 
shareholders a substantial discretionary power to use the firm’s resources for personal gain at 
the expense of other shareholders. Managerial ownership in China is too minimal to generate 
an incentives alignment effect or entrenchment effect. Fama and Jensen (1983) and Jensen 
(1993) provide a relevant argument that is more applicable to China, that is when managerial 
ownership is low, companies need larger, more independent boards to monitor top 
management. Following Berle and Means (1932), Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Roe 
(1994) indicate the agency problem stem from the conflict of interests between the 
shareholders and managers when ownership is diffuse such as in the US and the UK. 
According to agency theory, separation of ownership and control leads to a divergence in the 
pursuit of managerial interests versus owners’ interests (Jensen and Meckling 1976), and thus 
effective monitoring managerial decisions becomes essential for boards of directors as well as 
audit committees to ensure that shareholders’ interests are protected and to constrain the 
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occurrence of earnings management (Fama and Jensen 1983). However, if ownership is 
highly concentrated such as the circumstances in East Asia, the agency problem stem from 
the conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Ding et al. (2007) 
argue that the conflict of interests between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders is the root cause of earnings management in China. 
 
Beasley (1996) confirms Dechow et al.’s (1996) findings that a larger proportion of 
independent directors on the board is negatively associated with financial statements fraud, 
suggesting the higher likelihood of financial fraud is associated with the lower percentage of 
outside directors in the firm. Xie et al. (2003) and Liu and Lu (2007) and Jaggi et al. (2009) 
find that earnings management is negatively correlated with more independent directors on 
the board based on different country samples. Lo et al. (2010) also claim that a board that has 
more independent directors or less directors representing the parent companies are effective 
in constraining management's opportunistic behaviors (in the form of transfer pricing 
manipulations). Setia-Atmaja et al. (2011) support that a higher proportion of independent 
directors on boards is effective in reducing earnings management and mitigating agency 
problems by using panel data of Australian family controlled firms between 2000 and 2004. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) and Peasnell et al. (2005) also claim that outside directors tend to be 
more effective in monitoring the management than inside directors, because they have greater 
incentives to maintain the value of their reputational capital. However, Park and Shin (2004) 
find that only adding more outside directors to the board does not, on its own, reduce 
earnings management: they examine the Board composition in Canada where the capital 
market is well developed but ownership is highly concentrated.  
 
Some literature claims that the effectiveness of supervisory directors in China is undermined 
by incorporating political officers, close friends and allies of senior managers (Dahya et al. 
2003; Xiao et al. 2004; Xi 2006; Hu et al. 2010). However,   Firth et al. (2007) suggest that 
supervisory boards help improve the integrity of earnings. There have been controversial 
arguments about the mandatory requirement of having both a Supervisory Board and 
Independent Directors in China, as there exist some overlapping responsibilities including 
supervising the company’s financial affairs. Consequently, the overall monitoring efficiency 
will be diminished (Xi 2006). Xiao et al. (2004) provide that when supervisors lacked 
financial sophistication, the secretary to the Board of Directors usually drafted the 
Supervisory Board report for the Supervisory Directors. In addition, Wang and Liu (2006) 
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compare the functions and rights of Independent Directors with Supervisory Directors in 
China and find there exists a complementary relation. 
 
Prior research suggests that board independence, as measured by the percentage of 
independent directors, can improve corporate governance although its effectiveness depends 
on the business and regulatory compliance environment (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Xie 
et al., 2003; Berghe and Baelden, 2005; Iwasaki, 2008; Cornett et al., 2009). Based on prior 
studies, this study expects that higher independent director (supervisor) ratio indicating more 
a higher level of board independence is more likely to constrain earnings management. Hence, 
the hypotheses are developed as follows:  
Hypothesis la: Firms with a greater number of independent directors will constrain earnings 
management. 
Hypothesis lb: Firms with a greater number of supervisors will constrain earnings 
management. 
 
Prior US research supports that the board’s effectiveness at monitoring the financial reporting 
process will depend on the ability of outside directors to understand earnings management 
methods. For example, Peasnell et al. (1999) report that over a quarter of all UK board 
members are professionally qualified accountants. Furthermore, outside directors frequently 
hold senior management positions in other large corporations; hence, they are likely to be 
familiar with financial reporting from a senior management perspective. Xie et al. (2003) find 
that board and audit committee members with financial expertise are associated with firms 
that have smaller discretionary current accruals. Bédard et al. (2004) find that the presence of 
at least one financial expert in the audit committee is associated with a lower likelihood of 
aggressive earnings management. DeFond et al. (2005) find significantly positive cumulative 
abnormal returns around the appointment of accounting financial experts to the audit 
committee, suggesting audit committees with accounting financial expertise improve 
corporate governance. McDaniel, Martin and Maines (2002) demonstrate that financial 
experts (as defined by the stock exchanges) do check financial statements differently from 
ordinary people, since the financial experts have broader financial or accounting expertise 
and are more sophisticated. According to China's laws, independent directors are supposed to 
act in a similar way to those in the U.S. Therefore, this study expects that more independent 
directors (supervisor) with financial expertise are more likely to be effective to constrain 
earnings management. Hence, the following hypotheses are developed: 
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Hypothesis 2a: Firms with a greater number of independent directors with financial or 
accounting expertise will reduce their engagement in earnings management. 
Hypothesis 2b: Firms with a greater number of supervisors with financial or accounting 
expertise will reduce their engagement in earnings management. 
 
Some literature claims that the independence and effectiveness of independent directors and 
supervisory directors in China is undermined by incorporating political officers, close friends 
and allies of senior managers (Dahya et al. 2003; Xiao et al. 2004; Xi 2006; Hu et al. 2010). 
Therefore, the positive influences of independent directors and supervisory directors on 
monitoring the board decision are weakened. Based on prior literature, the following 
hypotheses are developed: 
Hypothesis 3a: Firms with a greater number of independent directors with official 
backgrounds will be more likely to engage in earnings management. 
Hypothesis 3b: Firms with a great number of supervisors with official background will be 
more likely to engage in earnings management. 
 
2.6. Empirical Modeling  
 
As Healy and Wahlen (1999) point out, total accruals can be divided into two components. 
One component is caused by the company’s normal business activities, while the other is 
discretionary accruals, considered as abnormal. The normal portion of total accruals can be 
predicted by a cross-sectional regression model in which the changes in revenue from main 
operations and in gross fixed assets from year t-1 to year t (scaled by total assets of the 
company in year t-1) are explanatory variables. As a result, the regression residual is 
discretionary accruals. 
 
𝑇𝐴𝑡 = (∆𝐶𝐴𝑡 − ∆𝐶𝐿𝑡 − ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡 + ∆𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑡 − 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡)/(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡−1) 
(Equation 2.1)   
Where 
                TAt             = Total Accruals 
              ∆𝐶𝐴𝑡           = Change in Current Assets 
             ∆𝐶𝐿𝑡            = Change in Current Liabilities 
             ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡        = Change in Cash and Cash Equivalents 
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             ∆𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑡          = Change in debt included in Current Liabilities; 
             𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡             = Depreciation and Amortization Expense 
            𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡−1   = Lagged Total Assets 
 
𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑡 = 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡−1
) + 𝛼2(∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑡) + 𝛼3(𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡) 
(Equation 2.2) 
 𝐷𝐴𝑡 = 𝑇𝐴𝑡 − 𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑡 
(Equation 2.3) 
Where,  𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑡 = Non-Discretionary Accruals 
             𝐷𝐴𝑡    = Discretionary Accruals 
            ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡 = Change of Sales Revenues 
            ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑡 = Change of Trade Receivables 
            𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡   = Plant Property and Equipment 
 
Many studies detect the relationship between abnormal accruals and earnings management 
incentives. The most common test for earnings management is based on Jones’s (1991) 
discretionary accruals model. She uses the residual as a measure of the discretionary accruals. 
In the past, the applicability and suitability of using discretionary accruals as an earnings 
management proxy in the Chinese context is often challenged, because it was difficult for the 
enterprises to manipulate their earnings via non-cash accruals. However, due to international 
accounting standardization in China (in particular, The 2006 Chinese GAAP is much closer to 
IFRS), it provides the enterprises with the opportunity to manage reported earnings via 
conventional discretionary accruals. A modified model by Dechow et al. (1995) that controls 
for the effect of performance by either adding ROA as an additional independent variable or 
by using performance-matched portfolios, which has been documented as a better approach. 
Based on the prior literature, the absolute effect of discretionary accruals and discretionary 
revenues (i.e. negatively signed accrual values reversed to positively signed values) will be 
employed as the proxy of earnings management regardless of its directions (income-
increasing or income-decreasing earnings management). This study does not focus on the 
direction of discretionary accruals or discretionary revenues, but concentrates on the 
magnitude (i.e. level of earnings management) of discretionary accruals and discretionary 
revenues.  
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2.6.1 Modified Jones Model with performance-matched estimates 
 
Previous studies investigate the specification and power of various discretionary accrual 
models (such as Dechow et al., 1995), as well as that of performance-matched accrual models 
(see Kothari et al., 2005). Dechow et al. (1995, p.193) identify that ‘all models reject the null 
hypothesis of no earnings management at rates exceeding the specified test levels when 
applied to samples of firms with extreme financial performance.’ It indicates that 
performance may influence the estimation of earnings management because Non-
Discretionary Accruals may be erroneously classified as Discretionary Accruals when 
performance is abnormal and the relationship between accruals and performance is non-linear. 
Kothari et al. (2005) identify that matching based on ROAt performs better than matching on 
ROAt-1. Existing models of accruals, earnings, and cash flows, and empirical evidence all 
document that accruals are significantly correlated with a firm’s contemporaneous and past 
performance (for example, Guayet al. 1996; Healy, 1996; Dechow et al., 1998, 1995; Barth et 
al., 2001). Among the various discretionary accrual models, Dechow et al. (1995) report that 
the Jones and the modified-Jones models perform the best. Thus, this study utilizes the 
abnormal accruals derived from the modified Jones model with performance-matched 
estimates as the proxy for earnings management. 
 
𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑎𝑣𝑔
= 𝛼0 + 𝛽1
1
𝑇𝐴𝑎𝑣𝑔
+ 𝛽2
∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑎𝑣𝑔
+ 𝛽3
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑎𝑣𝑔
+ 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
(Equation 2.4) 
 
Where  
AC            =Accounting Accruals 
△SALES =Change of Sales from year t to t-1,  
△AR       = Change in Net Account Receivables from year t to t-1.  
PPE          = Gross Property, Plant and Equipment 
ROA        = Rate of Return on Assets 
Variables are deflated by average total assets. 
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2.6.2 Discretionary Revenue Model 
 
Consistent with Palmrose and Scholz’s (2004) findings that the single largest item in 
restatements of financial reports is sales revenue, Dechow and Schrand (2004) summarize the 
most frequently manipulated accounts alleged by SEC is the overstatement of revenues. 
Ronen and Yaari (2008) suppose that if revenues are the target of earnings management, and 
reported earnings are simply a by-product of manipulated revenue, then the revenue ought to 
be detected in the empirical design rather than reported earnings. Meanwhile, this view is 
supported by Stubben (2010) as well. Hence, this paper utilizes the discretionary revenue as a 
measure of earnings management. The equation is as follows: 
∆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1∆𝑅13𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2∆𝑅4𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(Equation 2.5) 
Where:   Variables are deflated by average total assets. 
AR=end of fiscal year net accounts receivable 
R=total operating revenue (annual revenue) 
R1_3=revenues of the first three quarters 
R4=revenues of the fourth quarter 
△=annual change 
PPE= Gross Property, Plant and Equipment 
CFO=Cash from operations 
AC=accounting accruals=earnings before extraordinary items-cash from operations 
 
Revenues of the first three quarters are the difference between annual total operating 
revenues and fourth-quarter revenues. This model deflates all revenue and accrual variables 
by average total assets. The abnormal accruals are the residuals derived from Equation 2.5. 
 
2.7. Definition and Measurement of Variables 
 
The study aims to investigate whether board of directors and supervisory directors actively 
monitor and take actions that reduce the incidence of earnings management. The board 
independence and financial expertise of board members required by CSRC are used as 
measures of corporate governance. Concentrated ownership provides the largest shareholders 
a substantial discretionary power to allocate the firm’s resources for personal gain at the 
expense of minority shareholders. To capture the ownership aspect of corporate governance, 
this study calculates the stake of the largest shareholder to evaluate both the largest 
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shareholder’s interest in a company and its power over the board. The board of directors is a 
second mechanism through which shareholders can exert their influence on the behaviour of 
managers to make sure that the company operates in their interests (e.g., Hemailin and 
Weisbach, 2003). In order to measure the effective monitoring role of outside control of the 
board, this research takes the number of independent directors who are not members of the 
management team into account. This study considers one more variable to indicate whether 
or not the controlling shareholder is the government. A dummy variable equals 1 if the 
government is the controlling shareholder and 0 otherwise. The government is likely to have 
goals other than profit maximization, such as maintaining employment and social stability. A 
controlling government stakeholder can use the listed company as a vehicle to achieve its 
policy goals even though they may conflict with shareholders’ interests (Bai et al. 2000).  
 
Based on prior literature, this empirical study incorporates several influential control 
variables in the regressions, such as leverage, firm size, firm performance and firm age. 
Leverage represents the debt structure of a company and is widely used to proxy for the 
degree of closeness to a debt covenant restriction in previous studies. For instance, Dechow et 
al. (1996) find that closeness to debt covenant violations stimulate earnings management. 
Efendi et al. (2007) suggest that when a firm is close to technical default on accounting-based 
debt covenants, the management may manipulate the accounting numbers to avoid the default. 
Dechow et al. (1996), Richardson et al. (2002) and Person (2005) link leverage with earnings 
management (financial statements fraud). Following these prior studies, this study will 
consider leverage calculated as total debt divided by total assets as a control variable.  
 
Firm Size is often found to have significant impact on internal governance mechanism in 
prior literature (Wong and Jian 2003; Hu, Tam et al. 2010). The political cost hypothesis 
proposed by Watts and Zimmerman (1990), predicts that larger firms are more likely to 
reduce reported earnings to reduce the potential political risk. Wong and Jian (2003) state that 
large Chinese listed firms have a more extensive network of related parties, making it easier 
for them to manipulate the reported earnings via non-operating transactions. Thus, firm size 
is included as a control variable measured as the natural logarithm of total assets.  
 
Firm Performance: Return on assets (ROA) is used in many studies on both corporate 
governance and earnings management to control for the firm’s performance (e.g. (Kothari, 
Leone et al. 2005); Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Carter et al., 2003). Beneish (2001) 
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demonstrate that earnings management is more likely to occur when a firm’s performance is 
either unusually good or bad. In addition, Carter et al. (2003) find that ROA is highly 
significant in explaining Tobin’s Q and firm’s value. Hence, ROA can be considered as a 
robust measure of firm performance. In this study, ROA is calculated as net income divided 
by the total assets at the beginning of the testing period. Meanwhile, due to the tight 
regulation on delisting issued by CSRC, it is more likely that ‘ST’ and ‘PT’ companies will 
present a higher degree of earnings management to avoid delisting. 
 
Firm age：Evidence in prior literature has shown that young firms with high growth are 
more likely to commit financial statement fraud because they have strong financing needs, in 
addition, young firms are prone to have weaker governance structures and internal controls 
lag behind operations and have greater risk of distress (Beneish 1999). However, other 
researchers argue that older firms would be benefited from their ability to secure resources 
and their industrial experience. The old Chinese enterprises are characterized by both 
resource advantage and social burden (e.g. (Tian and Lau 2001)). Given the possible 
influences of firm age on organizational performance, it is incorporated as a control variable. 
 
Therefore, the regression models are expressed as follows: 
 
𝑫𝒊𝒔𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒋𝒕 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑂𝑃1𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷_𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐵_𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐼𝑁𝐷_𝑀𝑒𝑒𝑡_𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑁𝑜𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑁𝐷_𝑁𝑜𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝑆𝐵𝑀_𝑁𝑜𝑗𝑡+𝛽9𝐼𝑁𝐷_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡_𝑁𝑜 𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑆𝐵_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡_𝑁𝑜𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝑆𝐵_𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐼𝑁𝐷_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽14𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛽15𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽16𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽17𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽18𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡 
(Equation 2.6) 
Or  
𝑫𝒊𝒔𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒋𝒕 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑂𝑃1𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷_𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐵_𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐼𝑁𝐷_𝑀𝑒𝑒𝑡_𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑁𝑜𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑁𝐷_𝑁𝑜𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝑆𝐵𝑀_𝑁𝑜𝑗𝑡+𝛽9𝐼𝑁𝐷_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡_𝑁𝑜 𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑆𝐵_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡_𝑁𝑜𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝑆𝐵_𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐼𝑁𝐷_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽14𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛽15𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽16𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽17𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽18𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡  
(Equation 2.7) 
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Table 2.3 explains the definitions and measurements of variables utilized in this empirical 
modeling as follows. 
Table 2.3 Variables definition and measurement 
Dependent Variables Definition 
Discretionary Accruals 
 
Discretionary Revenues 
The abnormal accruals are residuals derived from the modified Jones 
model with performance-matched estimates (Equation 2.4). 
The abnormal revenues are the residuals derived from 
Discretionary Revenue model (Equation 2.5). 
Independent Variables Definition 
TOP1 Percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder 
State-owned If the company is state-owned, it is 1; otherwise, coded 0. 
BOARD_MEET The frequency of meetings of the Board 
SB_MEET The frequency of meetings of the Supervisory Board 
IND_Meet_Att The meeting attendance rate of Independent Directors 
Direct_No The number of Directors in the Board 
IND_No The number of Independent Directors in the Board 
SBM_No The number of Supervisory Board Member 
IND_expert_no  
The number of independent Directors with financial or 
accounting expertise 
SB_expert_no  
 
SB_official_no 
The number of Supervisors with financial or accounting 
expertise 
The number of Supervisors with official background 
IND_No. 
If the number of Independent Directors exceeds 1/3, it is coded 
as 1; otherwise, coded 0. 
Control Variables Definition 
Firm Age How long have the firm operated since its foundation 
ROA (Return on Assets) Return on assets=Net Profit/Total Assets 
SIZE Natural Logarithm of the average Total Assets 
LEV Total Debt/Total Assets 
Time Effect Year Dummy 
Industry Effect CRSC Industry Code 
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2.8. Sample Data 
 
The analysis is based on the financial information from the listed companies’ annual report 
over a six-year period, from the fiscal year of 2005 to 2010. There are several predominant 
reasons why the sample period starts from 2005 for this empirical analysis: (1) Guidelines for 
Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed Companies set by 
CSRC requires no less than one third of the Board of Directors to be independent non-
executive directors, completed by 30th of June 2003; (2) The data about the independent 
directors in the database even in 2004 is incomplete. (3) In 2006, the Ministry of Finance of 
the People's Republic of China promulgated a new set of Accounting Standards for Business 
Enterprises (ASBEs), which are substantially converged with the IFRS. All companies listed 
in China must apply ASBEs for the preparation of their financial statements. (4) The 2006 
Company Law influences the Board monitoring through (a) a significant enhancement of the 
effectiveness of Supervisory Board31 (b) a modest strengthening of participation by workers, 
and (c) the codified independent director system. And (5) the 2006 Securities Law requires 
supervisors as well as directors and senior managers to certify personally that the financial 
reports are not involved in any material misstatements or omissions.  
 
The financial data are all collected from CCER (SINOFIN) and CSMAR database. This study 
is my first empirical study which commences from 2010, in which I started my PhD study. 
Up to then, the sample period is selected from 2005 to 2010. Since the information on the 
financial expertise and background of independent directors and supervisory directors is 
manually collected from the finance website (SINA FINANCE) or the listed companies’ 
officially audited financial reports. The financial/accounting expertise (hold the degree of 
Finance or Accounting, with the title as CPA/ACCA/CIMA/CFA or Senior Accountant etc. 
with work experiences in Securities and Investment Bank and Future and Options field) and 
the official background (whether Communist Party Member or not, whether they are holding 
or was holding official position in the government or not) of both Independent Directors and 
                                                 
31 For instance, firstly, 2006 Company Law gives the Supervisory Directors a specific power to propose 
dismissal of directors and senior managers who violate laws, regulations, articles of association, or 
resolutions of shareholders’ meetings. Secondly, the Supervisory Board now may have the power to 
convene and preside over the shareholders’ meeting instead of the Board of Directors, when the latter fails 
to act in a prescribed manner. Thirdly, the amendments enable Supervisory Directors to inspect the 
company’s business operations, if they detect any signs of abnormality. 
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Supervisory Board Members are manually selected from the SINA FINANCE website32. The 
background of independent directors in Chinese listed companies will be classified into 
several groups: (1) Independent Directors with financial or Accounting Expertise; (2) 
Independent Directors with Law expertise; (3) Independent Directors with management 
expertise; (4) Independent Directors who are technicians or engineers and (5) Others. The 
manual data collection is a huge time-consuming process. Hence, the sample period for this 
empirical study has not been extended or updated. 
  
The industrial effects are controlled in this research. In light of the Industry Classifying 
Guidelines of Listed Companies (2001) released by the CSRC, there are 13 industry 
categories: (a) Farming, forestry, animal husbandry; (b) Mining; (c) Manufacturing; (d) 
Utilities; (e) Construction; (f) Transportation and warehousing; (g) Information Technology; 
(h) Wholesale and Retail Trade; (i) Financial, banking and Insurance; (j) Real Estate; (k) 
Social Service; (l) Communication and Cultural Industries; and (m) Conglomerates. In line 
with Peasnell et al. (2000) and Stubben (2010), the firms in the regulated industries of 
financial, insurance and banks and utilities are excluded because their revenues and accruals 
are different from those of other firms. Hence, 11 industries will be included in this research 
to examine the industry effect on earnings management (see details in Table 2.9A and 2.9B).  
 
Finally, year dummies are contained to capture the regulation effect. During the period of 
2005 and 2010, there are 9370 firm-year observations in total. Data were cross-checked for 
consistency. Data unavailable from these sources were manually collected from the sample 
companies’ audited annual reports. To keep the consistency of the research observations, the 
new entrances of listed companies during the period and the missing values of some 
observations are excluded in order to mitigate survivorship bias in the results. Firm-specific 
fixed-effects are included to control for the possibility that endogeneity arises from omitted 
unobserved factors. In addition, some outliers of observations have been removed from the 
sample data. Therefore, there are 6882 firm-year observations for Discretionary Accruals 
Model and 6486 firm-year observations for the Discretionary Revenues Model. This study 
acknowledges that this dataset is a balanced sample. 
 
 
                                                 
32  http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/index.shtml 
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2.9. Empirical results 
 
This study does not focus on the direction of discretionary accruals or discretionary revenues, 
but concentrates on the magnitude (i.e. level of earnings management) of discretionary 
accruals and discretionary revenues. Hribar and Nichols (2007) find that the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals is the most commonly used unsigned measure of earnings management. 
They argue that when testing for earnings management through signed discretionary accruals, 
firm characteristics associated with a lack of fit in the estimation of discretionary accruals 
will result in lower power tests and a reduced likelihood of rejecting the null hypothesis of no 
earnings management. It will lead to conservative tests of earnings manipulation even though 
significant results are obtained. In addition, they prove that operating volatility has little 
correlation with signed discretionary accruals, but significantly correlated with the absolute 
value of discretionary accruals and many of the earnings management partitioning variables 
used in recent studies. It is consistent with Reynolds and Francis’ conclusion (2000). They 
document that when a specific directional prediction is ignored, the extent to which 
companies use accruals to manipulate earnings is best measured by the unsigned (absolute) 
value of accruals.  
 
The term ‘unsigned’ refers to the models employed in this section that do not differentiate 
income increasing from income-decreasing earnings manipulation. Generally speaking, the 
absolute effect of negatively signed accrual values more intuitively captures the magnitude of 
earnings management. Although the methodology and specific measures are various, 
numerous studies utilize unsigned (absolute) value of accruals (for instance, Warfield et al., 
1995; Chung et al., 2002; Klein, 2002; Firth et al., 2007; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2011). Hence, 
based on the prior literature, the absolute effect of discretionary accruals and discretionary 
revenues (i.e. negatively signed accrual values reversed to positively signed values) will be 
employed as the proxy of earnings management regardless of its directions (income-
increasing or income-decreasing earnings management). Prior research has ignored the issue 
that using the absolute value of signed discretionary accruals has implications for the 
distribution of this variable. Absolute value of discretionary accruals will be defined as Y = 
|X|. The signed discretionary accruals are the residual from an OLS regression; they have an 
expected value of zero. High absolute discretionary accruals are often interpreted as earnings 
opportunistic behavior, implying poor earnings quality. 
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Table 2.4 presents summary statistics for the discretionary accrual calculations used in two 
models, both signed and absolute, as well as other firm characteristics. As expected, the mean 
and the median value of the signed distributions are close to zero by construction, while the 
means of the unsigned measures are both positive. The mean (median) value of discretionary 
accruals (DAC) is 0.000 (0.003) respectively. It ranges from -0.486 (minimum) to 0.499 
(maximum). For the absolute effect of discretionary accruals (DAC_abs), the mean (median) 
value is 0.066 (0.048). The mean (median) value of discretionary revenue (Rev) is 0.000 
(0.004) respectively. It ranges from -0.395 (minimum) to 0.329 (maximum), smaller than that 
of discretionary accruals. For the absolute effect of discretionary revenues (Rev_abs), the 
mean (median) value is 0.033 (0.018). Table 2.4 reflects that discretionary accrual (DAC) has 
a larger standard deviation (variance) 0.092 (0.008) than discretionary revenue (Rev) 0.054 
(0.003) in signed measures. So does the absolute measures; compared with the standard 
deviation (variance) of DAC 0.063 (0.004), Rev with 0.043 (0.002). 
 
 
Since the Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of 
Listed Companies set by CSRC requires, by the 30th of June 2003, no less than one third of 
board of directors to be independent non-executive directors, more and more companies have 
converged with the guidelines: more than 1/3 independent directors in Chinese listed 
companies from 2005 to 2010 according to Table 2.5. In this study, the descriptive statistics 
for the other variables in our sample are also reported. In order to detect how strongly the 
signed and absolute value of earnings management measures are correlated with underlying 
firm characteristics, it provides Correlation and Covariance Matrix among the sample 
variables in Table 2.6A (Discretionary Accruals Model) and Table 2.6B (Discretionary 
Revenue Model).  
 
Early studies measure earnings opportunistic behavior by using firm-specific, time-series 
estimation in a specific time period. Hribar and Nichols (2007) present the relationship 
between unsigned (absolute) value of discretionary accruals and firm characteristics such as 
market value of equity, total assets, sales growth, leverage, and cash from operations, 
volatility of sales, and volatility of cash flows. They find that the unsigned earnings 
management measures have the highest correlations with volatility of sales, and volatility of 
cash flows which are neglected in previous studies. Chen and Al-Najjar (2012) obtain the 
result that board independence is negatively correlated with the size of supervisory board and 
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state ownership. They even argue that Chinese listed firms with poorer performance incline to 
hire more independent directors, on the one hand to rely on external expertise to improve 
corporate performance, on the other to avoid criticism for not applying corporate governance 
practices. More importantly, the distribution of the absolute measure of discretionary accruals 
is unlike the distribution of signed measure of discretionary accruals. Hribar and Nichols 
(2007) point out the mean of the absolute discretionary accruals distribution is defined by the 
standard deviations of the signed discretionary accruals distribution.  
Table 2.4  Descriptive Statistics 
Variables  
Mean   
(Median) 
SD              
(Variance) 
Min                
(Max) 
Skewness                 
(Kurtosis) 
First 
(Third) 
Quartile        
Accruals 
     
AC/TA -0.062  0.098  -0.539  0.166  -0.114  
 
(-0.061)  (0.010)  (0.467)  (5.320)  (-0.014)  
DAC_Modified Jones 0.000  0.092  -0.486  -0.071  -0.047  
 
(0.003)  (0.008)  (0.499)  (5.634)  (0.050)  
DAC_abs 0.066  0.063  0.000  2.008  0.022  
 
(0.048)  (0.004)  (0.499)  (8.630)  (0.090)  
Residuals_Rev  0.000  0.054  -0.395  -1.066  -0.016  
 
(0.004)  (0.003)  (0.329)  (11.930)  (0.020)  
Residuals_Abs 0.033  0.043  0.000  3.137  0.008  
  (0.018)  (0.002)  (0.395)  (16.484)  (0.039)  
Ownership Structure 
     
Top1 Shareholding 0.360  0.153  0.035  0.405  0.238  
 
(0.335)  (0.024)  (0.852)  (2.413)  (0.479)  
State-owned 0.347  0.476  0.000  0.641  0.000  
 
(0.000)  (0.227)  (1.000)  (1.411)  (1.000)  
SO shares Percentage 0.218  0.233  0.000  0.576  0.000  
  (0.144)  (0.054)  (0.971)  (1.929)  (0.423)  
Board Structure 
     
Board Meeting 8.832  3.663  3.000  1.931  6.000  
 
(8.000)  (13.418)  (38.000)  (10.368)  (10.000)  
IND_Meet_Attend Rate 0.990  0.034  0.542  -5.411  1.000  
 
(1.000)  (0.001)  (1.000)  (40.753)  (1.000)  
No. of Directors 9.260  1.888  4.000  0.862  9.000  
 
(9.000)  (3.563)  (25.000)  (5.517)  (10.000)  
No. of IND 3.286  0.699  1.000  1.020  3.000  
 
(3.000)  (0.488)  (7.000)  (4.916)  (4.000)  
No. of IND_expertise 1.406  0.728  0.000  0.453  1.000  
 
(1.000)  (0.530)  (5.000)  (3.436)  (2.000)  
No. of IND_Official 0.333  0.608  0.000  1.966  0.000  
 
(0.000)  (0.370)  (5.000)  (7.341)  (1.000)  
No. of IND_communist 1.578  0.895  0.000  0.180  1.000  
  (2.000)  (0.801)  (5.000)  (2.717)  (2.000)  
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Table 2.4 Descriptive Statistics (Continued) 
 
Variables  
Mean     
(Median) 
SD              
(Variance) 
Min                
(Max) 
Skewness                 
(Kurtosis) 
First (Third) 
Quartile        
Supervisory Board          
Supervisor Meeting 4.377  1.722  0.000  0.992  3.000  
 
(4.000)  (2.964)  (17.000)  (6.619)  (5.000)  
No. of Supervisors 4.031  1.312  2.000  1.248  3.000  
 
(3.000)  (1.721)  (13.000)  (5.376)  (5.000)  
No. of SBM_expertise 0.965  0.777  0.000  0.497  0.000  
 
(1.000)  (0.603)  (5.000)  (3.114)  (1.000)  
No. of SBM_Official 0.144  0.421  0.000  3.509  0.000  
 
(0.000)  (0.178)  (4.000)  (18.662)  (0.0000  
No. of 
SBM_communist 
1.438  1.340  0.000  1.437  0.000  
 
(1.000)  (1.797)  (9.000)  (6.286)  (2.000)  
Performance          
1/TA 0.000  0.000  0.000  3.229  0.000  
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (18.981)  (0.000)  
(Sales-AR) 
change/TA 
0.094  0.213  -0.887  1.116  -0.003  
 
(0.073)  (0.046)  (1.879) (11.035)  (0.173)  
PPE/TA 0.342  0.219  0.000  0.741  0.182  
  (0.306)  (0.048)  (1.510)  (3.480)  (0.481)  
Control Variables 
     
Firm Age 12.304  3.982  3.000  0.326  9.000  
 
(12.000)  (15.858)  (30.000)  (2.883)  (15.000)  
ROA 0.033  0.072  -0.543  -0.760  0.009  
 
(0.031) (0.005)  (0.524)  (11.360)  (0.060)  
SIZE 21.477  1.018  18.665  0.324  20.746  
 
(21.414)  (1.036)  (24.846)  (3.030)  (22.136)  
Leverage 0.552  0.224  0.021  0.507  0.401  
  (0.549)  (0.050)  (1.984)  (4.548)  (0.697)  
 
 
Table 2.5 Number of Listed Companies with Independent Directors 2005-2010 
No. of Independent Directors 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Greater than (Equals to) 1/3 1053 1067 1092 1111 1119 1120 
Less than 1/3 94 80 55 36 28 27 
Total 1147 1147 1147 1147 1147 1147 
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Table 2.6A Correlation and Covariance Matrix (Unsigned Discretionary Accruals) 
 
 Residual_abs Stateown 
Top1 
Shareholder 
Board 
Meeting 
IND_Meeting 
Attendance 
Directors 
NO. 
IND_expert 
NO. 
IND_officials 
NO. 
SB 
Meeting 
SB_expert 
NO. 
SB_officials 
NO. 
Firm 
Age 
ROA SIZE LEV 
Residual_abs 1.000               
Stateown 0.066* 1.000              
Top1 
Shareholder 
0.0280 -0.249*** 1.000             
Board 
Meeting 
0.067 0.062*** -0.044*** 1.000            
IND_Meeting 
Attendance 
-0.028 -0.012 0.019*** -0.042** 1.000           
Directors 
NO. 
-0.04** -0.177*** 0.035*** -0.021 -0.012 1.000          
IND_expert 
NO. 
0.015 -0.024 -0.018 0.078 0.031 0.199 1.000         
IND_officials 
NO. 
0.019 -0.046 -0.027 -0.001 -0.002 0.071 0.065 1.000        
SB Meeting 0.067 0.025** -0.007 0.317*** 0.045*** -0.022 0.087 0.039 1.000       
SB_expert 
NO. 
-0.010 -0.081 0.048 -0.000 0.025 0.153 0.069 -0.044 0.023 1.000      
SB_officials 
NO. 
-0.004 -0.069 0.046 0.002 0.024 0.070 0.007 0.042 0.022 0.145 1.000     
firm age 0.077* 0.070*** -0.288*** 0.106*** 0.0240 -0.093*** 0.137 0.108 0.172*** -0.007 -0.035 1.000    
ROA 0.079*** 0.010 0.126 0.011 0.072 0.058** 0.005 -0.007 0.068 0.074 0.051 -0.056 1.000   
SIZE -0.003*** -0.229*** 0.262*** 0.159*** 0.048*** 0.243*** 0.130 0.016 0.114*** 0.116 0.079 0.039*** 0.179*** 1.000  
LEV 0.119*** -0.007*** 0.0303 0.1476 -0.0495 0.044*** 0.031 0.061 0.038 0.022 0.003 0.101*** -0.176*** 0.204*** 1.000 
 
Notes: * p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 2.6B Correlation and Covariance Matrix (Unsigned Discretionary Revenue) 
 
 Residual_abs Stateown 
Top1 
Shareholder 
Board 
Meeting 
IND_Meeting 
Attendance 
Directors 
NO. 
IND_expert 
NO. 
IND_officials 
NO. 
SB 
Meeting 
SB_expert 
NO. 
SB_officials 
NO. 
Firm 
Age 
ROA SIZE LEV 
Residual_abs 1.000               
Stateown 0.059* 1.000              
Top1 
Shareholder 
-0.021 -0.236*** 1.000             
Board 
Meeting 
0.030 0.065*** -0.05*** 1.000            
IND_Meeting 
Attendence 
-0.098 -0.007 0.015*** -0.037** 1.000           
Directors 
NO. 
-0.06*** -0.172*** 0.032*** -0.001 -0.003 1.000          
IND_expert 
NO. 
-0.028 -0.030 -0.021 0.073 0.025 0.206 1.000         
IND_officials 
NO. 
-0.031 -0.047 -0.040 0.011 0.002 0.077 0.070 1.000        
SB Meeting -0.028 0.032** -0.012 0.32*** 0.054*** -0.011 0.089 0.043 1.000       
SB_expert 
NO. 
-0.025 -0.078 0.057 0.004 0.019 0.145 0.079 -0.037 0.023 1.000      
SB_officials 
NO. 
-0.029 -0.067 0.046 -0.001 0.014 0.068 -0.002 0.036 0.012 0.127 1.000     
firm age -0.034 0.067*** -0.276***  0.101*** 0.025 -0.092*** 0.137 0.112 0.176*** -0.009 -0.043 1.000    
ROA -0.121*** 0.008 0.124 0.014 0.064 0.058** 0.031 0.001 0.061 0.059 0.0367 -0.051 1.000   
SIZE -0.197*** -0.221*** 0.253*** 0.163*** 0.047*** 0.250*** 0.118 0.028 0.119*** 0.115 0.071 0.035* 0.189*** 1.000  
LEV 0.103*** -0.02*** 0.055 0.138 -0.061 0.052*** 0.019 0.050 0.034 0.030 0.016 0.104*** -0.183*** 0.227*** 1.000 
 
Notes: * p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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The Regression results are listed in Table 2.7. For both of two measures of earnings 
management, the panel data are estimated with fixed effects as well as the random effects. 
Meanwhile, Pooled OLS Regression and Tobit Regression (since the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals and discretionary revenues are employed, greater than 0) are tested for 
both two models. There are no differences between the results of Tobit Regression and 
Pooled OLS Regression in both two models. Both industry and year dummies are included in 
this research to control for industry and time effect on earnings management in China. The T-
statistics use robust standard errors (clustered by company) that account for potential 
heteroskedasticity and time series autocorrelation within each company. *** (**,*) indicates 
statistical significance at the 0.01 (0.05, 0.1) level (two tail test). According to the test results 
from Table 2.7 in the Tobit and Pooled OLS regressions, the Discretionary Accrual model 
with performance-matched estimates has more explanatory power than the Discretionary 
Revenues Model.  
 
Guest (2008) and Petersen (2009) express their concerns about one possible problem in 
pooling data across years: that is the errors for a given firm are correlated across years. 
Correspondingly, the clustering errors are utilized here instead of the standard errors on each 
firm. According to the prior research, such as Guest (2008), the application of industry 
dummies and year dummies in this study are expected to reduce the possibility of 
endogeneity problem caused by dependent variables and independent variables which are 
jointly determined by unobservable factors. 
  
In both two measurements, Top 1 shareholding, Board meeting frequencies and firm age and 
leverage are all positively correlated with earnings management level, and firm size is 
negatively correlated with earnings management at the 1% significant level. Independent 
Directors’ meeting attendance rate is negatively correlated with earnings manipulation level, 
indicating that the more frequently the Independent Directors meet the higher probability that 
earnings are manipulated. There are several different findings between the discretionary 
accruals model and the discretionary revenue model. Firstly, the discretionary accruals model 
suggests that state-owned firms are more likely to manipulate earnings. This result is 
consistent with previous studies. Yuan, Zhang, and Zhang (2007) discover that Chinese state-
controlled listed firms prefer to carry out earnings management. This phenomenon can be 
interpreted as the evidence of a greater entrenchment effect than alignment effect from the 
majority shareholders of state-controlled listed firms. However, the discretionary revenue 
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model shows that state-owned firms are not correlated with earnings management at all. 
Secondly, the Discretionary Revenues model finds that a greater number of Board members 
and independent directors with official backgrounds will constrain earnings management in 
China. Thirdly, the more frequently the supervisors meet indicates a higher probability of 
earnings manipulation but only in the discretionary accruals model only. Lastly, there is a 
positive relationship between the variable of Return on Assets (ROA) and earnings 
management level in the Discretionary Accruals model at 1% significant level, illustrating 
that firms with higher ROA are more likely to engage in earnings manipulation. However, the 
Discretionary Revenue model reveals the opposite result: firms with lower ROA are more 
likely to participate in earnings management.  
 
To keep consistency and better examine the time effect on earnings management, each 
company has 6-year observations (2005-2010). Hence, they are strong-balanced panel data 
for both two measures. In this study, firm-specific fixed-effects are introduced to control for 
the possibility of endogeneity which may result from omitted unobserved factors. Since the 
sample data are panel data, following Yuan et al., (2008), the clustered standard errors are 
employed (clustered at the firm level) which are robust to unknown heteroscedasticity and 
within-firm serial correlation in computing corresponding p-values. According to the 
Hausman test results from the panel data in Table 2.8, Discretionary Accruals model and 
Discretionary Revenue model tell different stories respectively. In the Discretionary Accruals 
model, the Hausman test result of Chi square (probability) with industry effect is 20.68 
(0.2960). The probability (0.296) is greater than 0.05, indicating that the Discretionary 
Accruals model with fixed effects may be inconsistent. Hence, the random effects should be 
applied in this model. Nevertheless, Hausman test results of Chi square (probability) with 
industry effect is 50.68 (0.0001) in Table 2.8B. The probability (0.0001) is smaller than 0.05, 
proving that the random effects are inconsistent, therefore the fixed effects should be applied 
in the Discretionary Revenues model. 
 
Under the Modified Jones Model with random effects by controlling time and industry effect, 
the test results are consistent with Tobit regression results. Board meeting frequencies, Top1 
shareholdings (ownership concentration) and state-owned firms and firm age and return on 
assets (ROA) and leverage are all positively correlated with the level earnings management. 
The independent directors’ meeting attendance rate and firm size are negatively correlated 
with earning management level. 
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Table 2.7 Tobit Regression and Pooled OLS Regression: Discretionary Accruals vs. Discretionary Revenue 
 Discretionary Accruals Model Discretionary Revenue Model 
   N=6882 N=6882 N=6486 N=6486 
Dependent Variable  Tobit Regression Pooled OLS Regression Tobit Regression Pooled OLS Regression 
Residulas_abs (DAC) Coefficient Robust SE Coefficient Robust SE Coefficient Robust SE Coefficient Robust SE 
Constant 0.1600*** 0.031 0.1600*** 0.031 0.2510*** 0.028 0.2510*** 0.029 
State-owned 0.0060*** 0.002 0.0060*** 0.002 0.0020 0.001 0.0020 0.001 
Top1 (%) 0.0240*** 0.005 0.0240*** 0.005 0.0120*** 0.004 0.0120*** 0.004 
Board_Meet(times) 0.0004** 0.000 0.0004** 0.000 0.0010*** 0.000 0.0000*** 0.001 
IND_Meet Attendance - 0.0560** 0.026 - 0.0560** 0.026 - 0.0780*** 0.025 - 0.0780*** 0.026 
Number of Directors - 0.0002 0.000 - 0.0002 0.000 - 0.0010** 0.000 - 0.0010** 0.000 
No. of IND_expertise - 0.0003 0.001 - 0.0003 0.001 0.0010* 0.001 0.0010* 0.001 
No. of IND_official 0.0008 0.001 0.0008 0.001 - 0.0020*** 0.001 - 0.0020*** 0.001 
SB_Meet(times) 0.0010** 0.000 0.0010** 0.000 0.0000 0.000 0.0000 0.000 
No. of SBM_expertise - 0.0004 0.001 - 0.0010 0.001 0.0000 0.001 0.0000 0.001 
No. of SBM_official - 0.0010 0.002 - 0.0010 0.002 0.0000 0.001 0.0000 0.001 
Firm Age 0.0005** 0.000 0.0005** 0.000 0.0000* 0.000 0.0000* 0.000 
ROA 0.0840*** 0.016 0.0840*** 0.016 - 0.0350*** 0.013 - 0.0350*** 0.013 
SIZE  - 0.0040*** 0.001 - 0.0040*** 0.001 - 0.0080*** 0.001 - 0.0080*** 0.001 
Leverage 0.0280*** 0.004 0.0280*** 0.004 0.0240*** 0.004 0.0240*** 0.004 
Year √ √ √ √ 
Industry √ √ √ √ 
F 10.82 10.69  20.12 19.88  
Pseudo R-square -0.03    -0.04    
R-square   0.07    0.12  
Adjusted R-square   0.07   0.11  
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Table 2.8 Panel Data Analysis: Discretionary Accruals vs Discretionary Revenue 
 Discretionary Accruals Model Discretionary Revenue Model 
   N=6882 N=6882 N=6486 N=6486 
Dependent Variable  Fixed Effect Random Effect Fixed Effect Random Effect 
Residulas_abs (DAC) Coefficient Robust SE Coefficient Robust SE Coefficient Robust SE Coefficient Robust SE 
Constant 0.1480** 0.072 0.1550*** 0.033 0.0663  0.061 0.2410*** 0.032 
Board_Meet(times) 0.0010** 0.000 0.0010** 0.0002 0.0010*** 0.000 0.0010*** 0.000 
IND_Meet Attendance - 0.0490** 0.026 - 0.0510** 0.023 - 0.0860*** 0.030 - 0.0830*** 0.028 
SB_Meet(times) 0.0003  0.001 0.0008  0.0005 0.0000  0.000 0.0000  0.000 
Top1 (%) 0.0410*** 0.016 0.0270*** 0.007 0.0030  0.012 0.0110** 0.005 
State-owned    
 
0.0047** 0.002    0.0010  0.002 
Number of Directors - 0.0001  0.001 - 0.0002  0.001 0.0010  0.001 0.0000  0.000 
No. of IND_expertise - 0.0030*** 0.001 - 0.0020  0.001 0.0000  0.001 0.0010  0.001 
No. of IND_official - 0.0020  0.002 - 0.0001  0.002 - 0.0020  0.001 - 0.0020** 0.001 
No. of SBM_expertise 0.00140  0.002 0.0000  0.0011 0.0010  0.001 0.0000  0.001 
No. of SBM_official - 0.0010  0.003 - 0.0010  0.002 - 0.0030  0.002 - 0.0010  0.001 
Firm Age   
 
0.0005** 0.0003    0.0000  0.000 
ROA 0.0650*** 0.021 0.0764*** 0.0183 - 0.0260* 0.016 - 0.0350*** 0.014 
SIZE  - 0.0040  0.003 - 0.0039*** 0.0011 0.0020  0.002 - 0.0070*** 0.001 
Leverage 0.0400*** 0.007 0.0319*** 0.0049 0.0150*** 0.006 0.0220*** 0.004 
Trend (Year) Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
Industry Effect No Yes*** No Yes*** 
Wald chi2   238.25   431.12 
F 5.68   14.44   
R-square 0.03  0.07  0.07  0.12  
Hausman Test (chi2) 20.68 (0.2960)   50.68 (0.0001)   
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The significantly positive relationship between Top1 shareholdings (ownership concentration) 
and earnings management at the 1% significance level is consistent with prior literature. Ding 
et al. (2007) state that highly concentrated ownership determines the nature of the agency 
problem in Chinese listed companies. Following Ding et al.’s (2007) work, Hu et al. (2010) 
specify that the highly concentrated ownership structure in China causes the major problems 
called the one-dominant controlling shareholder phenomenon: a large proportion of shares 
are traded by controlling shareholders with extensive insider dealings and market 
manipulations often It also coincides with Shleifer and Vishny’s view (1997) that one of the 
two most effective solutions to the agency problem is concentrated ownership (the other is 
legal protection). Johnson et al. (2000) suggest that the controlling shareholders are more 
likely to pursue their own benefits at the expense of minority shareholders: a phenomenon 
referred to as ‘tunneling’. State ownership is positively correlated with discretionary accruals 
at the 5% significance level. It means that state-owned enterprises are more likely to 
manipulate earnings than the private companies. This is consistent with the evidence 
provided by Ding et al., (2007) that the earnings management activities of Chinese listed 
firms are affected by their ownership concentration measured by the largest shareholder. 
They find an alignment effect does exist when the ownership concentration reaches a high 
level; large shareholders become the ultimate owners of the firm, and are more likely to 
preserve its future growth through decreasing accounting earnings; large shareholders 
perhaps incline to adopt accounting policies that represent their own interests rather than the 
economic substance of the business transactions due to an entrenchment effect. 
 
Many studies in the US and UK and other European countries have tested whether board size, 
the percentage of independent non-executive directors, and frequency of board meetings are 
related to a firm’s earnings quality. The results of these studies are mixed. The unique 
characteristics of internal governance in the Chinese background will influence the earnings 
quality differently from that in the West. According to the test results, board meeting 
frequency is positively and significantly with earning management: the more frequently the 
board meetings are held, the more likely earning are to be manipulated under the modified 
Jones model with random effects when the year and industry factors controlled. There is no 
finding providing that a greater number of independent directors (exceeding 1/3 of the board 
directors) can constrain earnings manipulations. However, the test results show that the 
higher the attendance rate of the independent directors, the lower the earnings manipulated.  
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As expected, firm age and leverage are positively correlated with earnings management under 
modified Jones models with performance matched. It shows that firms with higher leverage 
level find it easier to manipulate earnings to avoid the debt covenants violation, which 
complies with the ‘debt hypothesis’ supported by Watts and Zimmerman (1990). In China, 
firms with longer history are normally state-owned enterprises or transformed or controlled 
by the State. They have more incentives to engage in earnings management activities.  
 
The Discretionary Accruals model provides evidence that firm size is positively correlated 
with earnings manipulation activities at the 1% significance level in China. It means that 
firms of larger size are more likely to participate in earnings manipulation. This is perhaps 
because the large-sized companies are owned or controlled by the State. They stand in the 
monopoly position in their industries with higher profitability without any pressures to 
continue rights issue or to avoid delisting from the capital market. Hence, it is unnecessary 
for large-sized firms to manipulate earnings. These results are robust to the control of firm 
characteristics and corporate governance variables, as well as industry and time effects. 
   
There is an interesting result worth mentioning here. In the model of discretionary accruals, 
ROA (return on assets) is positively correlated with the level of earning management at 1% 
significance level. It’s probably due to tax purposes or income smoothing. Different from 
Discretionary Accruals model, the Discretionary Revenues model shows that return on assets 
(ROA) is negatively correlated with earnings manipulation magnitude at a 10% significance 
level. It reflects that listed firms in China, with poor financial performance are more likely to 
inflate earnings to beat the very restricted profit benchmarks for rights issues and to avoid 
delisting regulated by Chinese CSRC.  
 
Most importantly, none of the Independent Directors and Supervisors variables is significant 
under both the discretionary accruals model with random effects and the discretionary 
revenue model with fixed effects. It provides the evidence that independent directors and the 
supervisor system are dysfunctional in monitoring the Board activities in China. Wang (2008) 
argues that the independent directors have made certain but limited contribution to corporate 
governance in China, compared with the Supervisory Board which is perceived as just a 
decoration to the boardroom. It is consistent with the findings of Chen, Fan and Wong (2004) 
who argue that although the proportion of outsider directors on the board is high, the level of 
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board independence and professionalism is not necessarily good. They report that in China, 
politicians and state controlling owners occupy most board seats with almost 50 percent of 
the directors appointed by state-controlling owners, and another 30 percent affiliated with 
various layers of governmental agencies. There are few professionals (lawyers, accountants, 
finance experts) on Chinese boards and almost no representation by minority shareholders. 
Top management typically own little of their companies’ shares, on average only 0.1 percent. 
Compensation incentive is unlikely to be an effective corporate governance mechanism in the 
Chinese listed companies. 
 
These findings are consistent with Dechow and Schrand (2004) who emphasize that earnings 
management cannot be uprooted despite the existence of the various monitors-auditors, 
institutional investors, board of directors and the audit committees and analysts. The 
effectiveness of Supervisory Directors in China is undermined by incorporating political 
officers, close friends and allies of senior managers (Dahya et al., 2003; Xiao et al., 2004; Xi 
2006; Hu et al., 2010). Consequently, the overall monitoring efficiency is destroyed (Xi 
2006). The environment of Chinese Guanxi (relationship) culture leads to the independence 
of the independent directors being questioned. According to Peng (2004) and Wang (2008), 
Independent Directors may affiliate themselves with the controlling shareholders even if they 
hold no other posts in the company. Such independent directors can’t be effective to reduce 
the controlling shareholders’ expropriation from minority shareholders. Moreover, many 
companies try to invite current or former politicians to serve as independent directors to build 
up close relationships with the government, severely weakening the function of the 
Supervisory Board (Tian and Lau 2001; Peng 2004; Xiao et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2011).  
 
In addition, CSRC clearly stipulates the number of concurrent posts for each independent 
director in the Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of 
Listed Companies33. ‘In principle, independent directors can only hold concurrently the post 
of independent directors in five listed companies at maximum. They shall have enough time 
and energy to perform the duties of the independent directors effectively.’ However, some 
independent directors hold concurrent posts with more than five listed companies. Their 
performance and independence is compromised and questioned. 
                                                 
33 http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release/200708/t20070810_69191.htm 
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The results show that, through pooled OLS regressions and panel data analysis for both two 
models comprising industry effects, some industries are strongly significantly correlated with 
earnings management, for instance, the industry of Mining, Manufacturing, and Construction 
and Information Technology. It may suggest that these industries are more likely to 
manipulate earnings. The sample distributions by industry for Discretionary Accruals and 
Discretionary Revenue Model are presented in Table 2.9A and Table 2.9B. The tables 
indicate that Chinese quoted companies are mainly concentrated in the manufacturing sector. 
Both industry and year dummies are included in this research to control for industry and time 
factors. 
 
Table 2.9A Distribution by Industry for Discretionary Accruals Model 
 
Industry Name 
Industry 
Code 
Frequency Percent 
Farming, Forestry, Animal husbandry A 162 2.35 
Mining B 156 2.27 
Manufacturing  C 4,074 59.20 
Construction E 150 2.18 
Transportation and warehousing F 300 4.36 
Information Technology G 396 5.75 
Wholesale and Retail Trade H 528 7.67 
Real Estate J 474 6.89 
Social Service K 222 3.23 
Communication and Cultural Industries L 54 0.78 
Conglomerates M 366 5.32 
Total 
 
6,882 100.00 
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Table 2.9B Distribution by Industry for Discretionary Revenue Model 
 
Industry Name 
Industry 
Code 
Frequency Percent 
Farming, Forestry, Animal husbandry A 156   2.41 
Mining B 138 2.13 
Manufacturing  C 3,816 58.83 
Construction E 144 2.22 
Transportation and warehousing F 276 4.26 
Information Technology G 360 5.55 
Wholesale and Retail Trade H 486 7.49 
Real Estate J 486 7.49 
Social Service K 222 3.42 
Communication and Cultural Industries L 42 0.65 
Conglomerates M 360 5.55 
Total 
 
6,486 100.00 
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2.10. Robustness Test  
 
One possible problem in pooling data across years is that errors for a given firm are also 
correlated across the years; thus the standard errors are replaced by clustering ones on each 
firm (Guest, 2008; Petersen, 2009). According to Guest (2008), the inclusion of industry 
dummies and year dummies should reduce the endogeneity problem caused by the possibility 
that the dependent variables and independent variables are jointly determined by 
unobservable factors. Another endogeneity problem concerns reverse causality, whereby the 
independent variables for control mechanisms, ownership structures, and firm value (included 
as independent variables) are determined by board size and/or structure, rather than vice versa 
(Guest, 2008). On this point, one of this study’s robustness checks re-estimates the models 
using the Instrumental Variable technique (IV) through the 2SLS procedure, with the first 
year lag for the endogenous variables as instruments. The results show that there is no 
endogeneity problem in this study. In order to check if results are robust across the period, the 
models are re-estimated on a yearly basis. To examine the effect of regulation, which it is 
believed should be captured by year dummies; this study runs the same regressions with and 
without year dummies. Finally, it re-tests the two models using Tobit Regression (since the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals and discretionary revenues are employed, greater 
than 0) and pooled OLS regression (details please see Table 2.7, p.84) instead of Panel Data 
Analysis (see Table 2.8, p.85), which deals well with outliers. There are no differences 
between the results of Tobit Regression and Pooled OLS Regression in both two models 
compared with those reported in Panel Data Analysis. Both industry and year dummies are 
included in this research to control for industry and time effect on earnings management in 
China. The T-statistics use robust standard errors (clustered by company) that account for 
potential heteroskedasticity and time series autocorrelation within each company. The 
findings accordingly have important implications for policy makers and managers, as well as 
contributing valuable comparisons and contrasts to the empirical findings and theoretical 
viewpoints to be found in the existing research literature. 
 
2.11. Summary 
 
This study investigates whether board of directors and supervisory directors effectively 
monitor and thus reduce earnings management. Ownership structure is crucial to the firm’s 
value maximization. Concentrated ownership gives the largest shareholders a substantial 
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discretionary power to use the firm’s resources for personal gain at the expense of other 
shareholders. To capture the ownership aspect of corporate governance, this analysis 
calculates the stake of the largest shareholder to evaluate both the largest shareholder’s 
interest in a company and its power over the board. The board independence and financial 
expertise of independent directors and supervisory directors as well as the number of 
independent directors required by CSRC are used as measures of corporate governance to 
evaluate the effective monitoring role of outside control of the board. This study considers 
one more variable to indicate whether or not the controlling shareholder is the government.  
 
It examines the ability of revenue and accrual models to detect the relationship between 
Independent Directors and Earnings Management in China during the period of 2005-2010. 
In terms of the background of independent directors in Chinese quoted companies, they are 
classified into several groups: (1) Independent Directors with financial or accounting 
expertise; (2) Independent Directors with law expertise; (3) Independent Directors with 
management expertise; (4) Independent Directors who are technicians or engineers and (5) 
Others. By investigating whether (a) firms with more independent directors and supervisors 
will be less likely to engage in earnings management; (b) firms with more independent 
directors and supervisors having financial/accounting expertise will be less likely to 
manipulate earnings; (c) firms with a greater number of independent directors and supervisors 
with government official backgrounds will be more likely to participate in earnings 
management.  
 
The test results suggest that all hypotheses have been rejected in China, suggesting that 
Chinese two-tier board structure comprising a board of directors of whom at least one third 
are independent directors and a supervisory board, fails to mitigate earnings management. 
This finding is inconsistent with the prior literature that outside directors contribute towards 
the integrity of financial statements. It shows that larger number of independent directors or 
supervisors with financial/accounting expertise do little to help constraining earnings 
management. Hence, the independent directors system and supervisory board have 
malfunctioned in monitoring and constraining earnings manipulation. Although Guidelines 
for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed Companies has 
been effective since the year of 2001, the performance and independence of independent 
directors have been questioned and compromised, has the supervisors’ function in controlling 
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earning manipulation activities. On the contrary, independent directors and supervisors 
probably incline to participate in manipulating earnings due to alignment effect or 
entrenchment effect. Furthermore, the Modified Jones Model with performance-matched 
gives more powerful explanation of the earnings management phenomenon in Chinese listed 
companies than the Discretionary Revenues model. 
 
One possible explanation is that independent directors and supervisory directors in China are 
often ‘vases’ and do not work as efficiently as in the developed countries. This indicates the 
independent directors and supervisory directors cannot voice for the minority shareholders; 
what they do is simply to agree with whatever the management or larger shareholders want, 
supporting the agency theory (conflict between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders) and stewardship theory. Since there is an extra agency relationship in state-
owned companies compared to privately-owned companies, as the controlling owners are 
themselves agents of the true owners: the state. It implies that the market regulators, policy 
makers and standard setters should pay more attention to enhance the authentic independence 
of independent directors and supervisory directors in Chinese firms. 
 
Although China has adopted many of the corporate governance mechanisms which are 
employed in developed countries, it has its own unique characteristics. The firm-specific 
factors, such as state ownership and the supervisory board, have great influence on the board 
independence and composition. The evidence manifests that the current corporate governance 
practice adopted by Chinese listed firms can be best described as a control-based model, 
which is remarkably distinct from the market-oriented model commonly employed in the US 
and UK. Under the control-based mode, the controlling shareholders (i.e. the State) in most 
cases tightly control the listed firms through concentrated ownership and management 
friendly boards. Prior literature also demonstrates that the control-based model is rooted in 
the ‘administrative governance’ approach adopted by the Chinese regulatory authorities, and 
is tailored to China’s specific institutional setting (Liu, 2006). Under the administrative 
governance approach, it is difficult to peel off business from politics, for instance, the stock 
market and foreign exchange market are strictly regulated. Consequently, the quality of 
public governance is of first-order importance in shaping the overall quality of corporate 
governance (Chen et al., 2004). More recent evidence shows that government regulations are 
also the source of many problems in the Chinese stock market. Therefore, concerns about the 
Chapter 2 Are Independent Directors and Supervisory Directors 
Effective in Constraining Earnings Management in China? 
 
93 
 
efficiency of the uniform rules/regulations imposed by Chinese government are raised. 
 
In addition, there is no hierarchical relationship between the board and supervisory board, 
which are both appointed by, and report to shareholders’ general meetings in Chinese listed 
firms. Under the German model, the supervisory board is superior to the board of directors. 
The supervisory board in China has been criticized for its dysfunction (Dahya, Karbhari and 
Xiao, 2002). Wang and Liu (2006) and Liu et al.(2010) argue that most of the staff 
supervisors are representatives of government cadres or labor models, whose remuneration 
and position decided by the Board of Directors. Therefore, the supervision independence of 
workers representatives has been weakened. Prior research suggests that board independence, 
as measured by the percentage of independent directors, can improve corporate governance 
although its effectiveness depends on the business and regulatory compliance environment 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Xie et al., 2003; Berghe and Baelden, 2005; Iwasaki, 2008; 
Cornett et al., 2009). 
 
This research make potential contribution to extend the existing literature linking Board 
monitoring (both Independent Directors and Supervisory Directors) and earnings 
management by examining changes in regulation in China with weak corporate governance. 
Furthermore, this study will provide important implications for the policy makers and the 
corporate governance reforms in China to protect the minority shareholders’ interests in the 
future. Finally, this analysis adds new insights to the existing corporate governance literature 
with a focus on a large, fast-growing, and transitional economy with large sample size. 
However, there are also some limitations in this research. One is the central criticisms 
associated with using discretionary accrual proxies to test for earnings management that may 
capture nondiscretionary accruals (i.e., differences in firm performance; see Dechow et al. 
1995; Guay et al. 1996; Kasznik 1999; McNichols 2000). Another is the very low 
significance (the low adjusted R-square, e.g., lower than 10%, implying the models in this 
analysis do not do a good job at explaining the dependent variables; it is normally the case in 
mainland China) of the empirical models can be recognized as a limitation of this study.   
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Chapter 3 
 
Earnings quality and Institutional incentives  
3.1. Introduction 
 
A firm’s various corporate governance practices shape its behavior and ultimately affect its 
stock market and accounting performance (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003). However, 
most empirical evidence is from US sample firms. Earnings management is identified to 
erode the quality of earnings. There is a gap in the literature linking earnings management 
with earnings quality in China. The explicit objective of the International Accounting 
Standard Board (IASB) is to develop a set of ‘high quality’ accounting standards. The 
development and implementation of a set of internationally accepted accounting standards 
has also stimulated growth in the Earnings Quality literature. There is no shortage of 
definitions of earnings quality. Analysts, investors, regulators, accounting standard-setters 
and academics have all made their contributions over several decades. Although earnings 
quality is extensively used in academic literature, there is neither a consensus on the 
definition of quality of reported earnings nor a generally accepted approach to measure all the 
attributes of earnings quality. This controversial phenomenon reflects the disagreements 
about various dimensions of earnings traits that are generally used to define its quality. 
 
A stream of previous studies observe that different ownership types, for instance, family 
ownership (Wang, 2006; Chen et al., 2010), private equity ownership (Katz, 2009), public 
share ownership (Givoly et al., 2010) and venture capitalist ownership (Morsfield and Tan, 
2006; Wongsunwai, 2013; Liu, 2014) affect financial reporting. In this paper, we will detect 
how reported earnings are impacted by another important ownership type, government 
ownership (or called ‘state ownership’). Government ownership is an important institutional 
incentive of financial reporting, which is prevalent in Asian economies34. A number of these 
economies have established entities to oversee their state-owned enterprises (SOEs), for 
instance, Temasek Holdings in Singapore, Khazanah Nasional in Malaysia, and the State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council in China. 
The term ‘SOEs’ refers to enterprises where the state has significant control, through full, 
                                                 
34 A number of these economies have established entities to oversee their state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
for instance, Temasek Holdings in Singapore, Khazanah Nasional in Malaysia, and the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council in China. 
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majority, or significant minority ownership (OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of 
State-owned Enterprises, 2005). Indeed, state-ownership is perhaps one of the defining 
characteristics of China, where the government held approximately 83.1% of market 
capitalisation in 2007. Contrasting with China, in other Asian markets individuals and their 
families are the dominant shareholders. The conglomerate ownership structure in Korean 
chaebols, for instance, sees a large grouping of companies, with in many cases a large 
dominant entity retaining a disproportionate interest in cash flows when compared to 
ownership interest (OECD, Reform Priorities in Asia, 2011). 
 
In China, State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) still represent a substantial segment of GDP, 
employment and market capitalisation. SOEs are pervasive in utilities and infrastructure 
industries, including electricity, energy, transport and telecommunication sector whose 
performance is of great importance to broad segments of the population and to other parts of 
the economy. Consequently, the governance of SOEs will be crucial to ensure their positive 
contribution to Chinese overall economic efficiency and competitiveness. In their analysis of 
the effect of institutional factors on properties of accounting earnings, Ball et al. (2000) 
choose the political system as the key discriminating factor. Weetman et al. (2004) conclude 
from their analysis that in China the government continues to act as the accounting regulator 
in order to retain political control. Generally, governments will face complex challenges in 
improving the governance of state-owned enterprises. One of the main challenges in doing so 
is to put in place appropriate accountability and transparency processes.    
 
The current transitional nature of the Chinese economy provides a valuable opportunity for 
examining the behaviour of companies with different ownership types, i.e. with state 
blockholders or private blockholders. Selecting a sample consisting of both privately-owned 
listed companies and state-owned listed companies for the purpose of comparison, this study 
is able to examine whether and how ownership concentration and ownership type affect firms’ 
earnings management practices. It raises the public interest and concern about the emerging 
Chinese stock market, because China is the largest emerging economy with the fastest-
growing stock market in the past ten years with some unique institutional features. Firstly, 
most listed firms in China are transformed from SOEs; hence Chinese government is usually 
the largest co-investor or controlling shareholder in these firms (Sun and Tong, 2003). Prior 
to an IPO, SOEs must go through a restructuring process in which an SOE is split in two 
parts: a subsidiary (state-owned listed firm) that goes IPO and a parent company that remains 
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an SOE. The subsidiary takes the productive assets and efficient employees. The parent 
company takes the non-productive assets and undertakes the responsibility for existing 
liabilities. Secondly, the government ownership is represented by various entities such as 
government agencies (the state asset management bureau at various levels), state asset 
holding/management companies, and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Chen et al., 2009). The 
parent company owns about one third of the listed firm’s shares which is called ‘legal person 
shares’ and not supposed to be traded in the stock market. Another one third of the shares is 
owned by the government in the form of non-tradable ‘state shares.’ A state-owned listed 
firm usually has only one third of its total shares as tradable and sells it to individual 
investors. With the government’s approval, non-negotiable shares can be transferred among 
different institutional shareholders, including state asset management bureaus, state holding 
companies, other SOEs, and legal persons. Non-state-owned firms emerged in the late 1990s 
after private ownership was allowed in China. 
 
It still remains an empirical question whether government ownership worsen the earnings 
management problem in China. Because Chinese government still retains a substantial 
portion of state ownership even after decades of privatization reforms. SOEs are more likely 
to be influenced by government mandates, whereas Non-SOEs might be more influenced by 
market forces and managerial discretion. This study focuses on investigating how state 
ownership shapes a firm’s incentives to report earnings that reflect economic performance. 
Government ownership is probably associated with higher earnings quality or lower earnings 
quality depending on how the listed firms view the nature of the government involvement. 
 
China as a dynamic emerging economy was and is undergoing a series of market 
liberalization reforms. For instance, foreigners are permitted to invest in A-shares via QFII 
(the qualified foreign institutional investors) system regulated by the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the People’s Bank of China. The first approved QFII 
traded in A-shares on 9th July, 2003. CSRC required all domestically listed companies to 
appoint at least one third independent directors on their board of directors by 30th June, 2003 
(CSRC, 2001). The most influential split share structure reform commenced from 2005, 
which in essence approved non-negotiable state and legal person shares to be gradually 
negotiable. In addition, the 2006 Chinese GAAP is introduced in an attempt to further 
improve the standardization process and narrow the existing gap, explicitly based on the 
current International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). To further enhance the quality of 
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financial reporting, the CSRC implemented new auditing standards, which became effective 
from 1st January 2007. The above changes are regarded to have significantly reduced 
information asymmetry in Chinese stock markets (Zhou, 2007). Ewert and Wagenhofer (2012) 
present that tightening accounting standards increases the ERC estimates. However, 
According to the report of the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness (2013-
2014), which evaluates the strength of auditing and reporting standards in the countries all 
over the world, China is ranked at the 82nd position35 (out of the 144 countries), which is 
lower than other Asian developing economies, e.g., Singapore (5th), Hong Kong (7th), Japan 
(11th), Malaysia (19th) and Taiwan (20th) etc. Hence, an investigation of the impact of state 
ownership on earnings quality will provide valuable insights into the understanding of 
corporate governance practices in mainland China.  
 
3.1.1 Definitions of Earnings Quality 
 
There is no shortage of definitions of earnings quality. Analysts, investors, regulators, 
accounting standard-setters and academics have all made their contributions over several 
decades. Although earnings quality is extensively used in academic literature, there is neither 
a consensus on the definition of quality of reported earnings nor a generally accepted 
approach to measure all the attributes of earnings quality. This controversial phenomenon 
reflects the disagreements about various dimensions of earnings traits that are generally used 
to define its quality (Schipper and Vincent, 2003). The analysis of Demski (1973) implies 
that a general definition of earnings quality is elusive. Nevertheless, a higher informativeness 
is arguably a desirable attribute of earnings reports and one which concerns standard setters 
and researchers. 
 
Penman and Zhang (2002) deem high-quality earnings as sustainable earnings and as a good 
indicator of future earnings. From a financial analysis perspective, Dechow and Schrand 
(2004) define high-quality earnings as persistent and permanent earnings that accurately 
reflect the fundamental intrinsic value of firms. Ball and Shivakumar (2008) suggest that 
high-quality earnings are conservative, while low-quality earnings are upwardly managed 
earnings. Adapted from the Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1 (SFAC No. 1), 
                                                 
35 According to the report of the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness (2011), which evaluates the 
strength of auditing and financial disclosures in individual countries, China is ranked at the 61st position (out of 
the 134 countries), which is lower than other Asian developing economies, e.g., Taiwan (3rd), Hong Kong 
(12th), and Malaysia (25th). 
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Dechow et al. (2010, p.344) identify that ‘higher quality earnings provide more information 
about the features of a firm’s financial performance that are relevant to a specific decision 
made by a specific decision-maker.’ It implies that the quality of reported earnings is a 
function of both the ability of the accounting system to evaluate the firm’s fundamental 
financial performance and how the accounting system is implemented. In general, accounting 
earnings that exhibit less earnings management and reflect losses on a timelier basis are 
interpreted as being of higher quality. Meanwhile, accounting numbers with great value 
relevance are explained as being of higher quality. Since Ball and Brown (1968), researchers 
have produced considerable studies providing the evidence on the association between 
accounting earnings and stock returns. While earlier studies focused on the U.S. market, more 
recent research has investigated the value-relevance of accounting information in non-U.S. 
markets because of increasing attention on the role of accounting information in global 
markets (e.g., Alford et al., 1993; Amir et al., 1993; Harris et al., 1994; Barth and Clinch, 
1996; Chan and Seow, 1996; Graham and King, 1998). The metrics for value relevance are 
the explanatory powers of net income and equity book value for prices, and stock return for 
earnings. Higher explanatory power is interpreted as evidence of more value relevance. All 
accounting quality measures are based on those used in prior research.  
 
The reported earnings are composed of two parts, cash flows and accruals, which are always 
the objectives to be managed or manipulated. Ronen and Yaari (2008) claim that 
understanding the underlying reason why earnings are managed is vitally important to both 
theoretical and empirical research. Naturally, it has attracted researchers’ attention on the 
issues relevant to earning quality. Based on the prevailing view from prior literature, Ronen 
and Yaari (2008, p.6) generalized the value of accounting information as ‘informativeness’ 
(from investors’ demand) and ‘stewardship’ (from management and shareholders’ demand). 
Consistently, Chaney et al. (2011) also document that when the reported earnings convey 
useful information and generate economic consequences, they are considered as a primary 
indicator of information quality. Accounting income (reported earnings) is a barometer for 
evaluating financial reporting, because any changes in balance sheet will flow through the 
income statement (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). Report earnings numbers will be affected by 
the manipulation of either accruals or cash flows. Although cash flows are generally regarded 
to be more difficult to be manipulated than earnings, cash flows can be managed by real 
transactions and this type of managed transactions is a form of earnings management. 
Earnings management is deemed to undermine the quality of reported earnings. Highly 
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managed earnings are normally considered as low-quality. However, the absence of earnings 
management is not sufficient to ensure high-quality earnings, because some other factors may 
contribute to the earnings quality (Lo, 2007). Dechow et al. (2010) also observe that there is 
no single measure of earnings quality that is superior for all decision models. 
 
3.1.2 The Determinants and Consequences of Earnings Quality  
 
Although the source of earnings quality is likely to have major influence on its consequences, 
most of the extant empirical papers test a prediction about either a determinant of quality or a 
consequence of quality, not both. A number of studies have returns (long- or short-window) 
as the dependent variable. The feature that the consequence studies have in common is that an 
earnings quality proxy is the independent variable (Dechow, 2010). 
 
In light of the prior literature, Dechow et al. (2010) review the determinant factors for 
earnings quality and classify them in six categories: (1) Firm characteristics (including firm 
performance, debt, growth and investment, and size). Firm performance: researchers suggest 
firms with weak performance are more likely to have incentives to engage in earnings 
management and hence lower earnings quality (Petroni, 1992; DeFond and Park, 1997; 
Balsam et al., 1995; Keating and Zimmerman, 1999; Doyle et al., 2007a; Kinney and 
McDaniel, 1989). Debt: there is substantial evidence showing that debt levels are associated 
with various measures of earnings quality, including income increasing accounting method 
choices (e.g., Bowen et al., 1981; Zmijewski and Hagerman, 1981; Daley and Vigeland, 1983; 
Johnson and Ramanan, 1988; Malmquist, 1990; Balsam et al., 1995; LaBelle, 1990; Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1986). Firm growth and investment: researchers have examined the role of 
growth and earnings quality and found that high growth firms (measured in terms of sales 
growth or net operating asset growth) have lower earnings persistence (Nissim and Penman, 
2001; Penman and Zhang, 2002). Firm size: early studies predict that firm size would be 
negatively associated with earnings quality because larger firms would make income-
decreasing accounting method choices in response to greater political/regulatory scrutiny 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). However, more recent studies 
observe that size is positively associated with earnings quality because of fixed costs 
associated with maintaining adequate internal control procedures over financial reporting, as 
suggested by Ball and Foster (1982); (2) Financial reporting practices. Three features of 
financial reporting practices affect earnings quality: accounting methods, broadly defined to 
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include principles (e.g., full cost versus successful efforts), estimates associated with 
accounting principles (e.g., straight-line versus accelerated depreciation), or estimates (e.g., 
pension accounting assumptions), and other financial reporting practices including financial 
statement classification and interim reporting, and principles based versus rules based 
methods. (3) Governance and controls: internal control mechanisms as monitors of the 
financial reporting system restrain the managers’ opportunistic behavior to manage earnings, 
while managerial ownership and managerial compensation are generally predicted to affect 
earnings quality because they provide incentives for earnings management. (4) Auditors: 
researchers assume that auditors are a determinant of earnings quality because of their role in 
mitigating intentional and unintentional misstatements (DeAngelo, 1981). (5) Capital market 
incentives: a large number of studies examine the impact of capital market incentives on 
firms’ accounting choices, making them potential determinants of earnings quality; And (6) 
External factors: considerable evidence supports that external factors, including capital 
requirements, political processes, and tax and non-tax regulation, are associated with 
accounting choices. 
 
Previous studies relevant to the consequences of earnings quality detect the impact of 
earnings quality on a financial outcome. Dechow et al. (2010) summarize the consequences 
of earnings quality as nine categories based on their extensive literature review: (1) Litigation 
propensity. Studies present restatements increase litigation propensity (Palmrose and Scholz, 
2004 and Lev et al., 2008); (2) Audit opinions. High-accrual firms are more likely to get 
modified audit opinions (Francis and Krishnan, 1999), but abnormally high working capital 
accruals are not associated with adverse audit opinions or auditor turnover (Bradshaw et al., 
2001); (3) Market valuations. Firms that consistently meet or beat prior period earnings 
targets or analyst expectations are rewarded with higher valuations (see Barth et al., 1999; 
Kasznik and McNichols, 2002; Myers et al., 2007), even if there is evidence of earnings 
management in order to achieve the results (Myers et al., 2007); (4) Real activities including 
disclosure. Researchers have documented an association between earnings quality proxies 
and investment efficiency. Biddle and Hilary (2006) and Biddle et al. (2009) propose that 
high accounting quality (i.e., conservatism, loss avoidance, and earnings smoothing) reduces 
information asymmetry between managers and outside suppliers of capital and therefore 
improves investment efficiency. Three studies suggest that voluntary disclosure decisions are 
endogenously determined by earnings quality (Lougee and Marquardt, 2004; Chen et al., 
2002; Lennox and Park, 2006); (5) Executive compensation.  (6) Labor market outcomes. (7) 
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Cost of equity capital. (8) Cost of debt capital. The cost of debt capital seems to be higher 
when earnings quality proxies indicate low earnings quality (see Anderson et al., 2004 and 
Francis et al., 2005a); and (9) Analyst forecast accuracy. This stream of studies hypothesize 
that analysts are unbiased and qualified predictors of future earnings. Under this hypothesis, 
variation in analyst forecast accuracy reflects the earnings attributes that are related to quality. 
This methodology is akin to inferences about earnings quality from returns-based studies 
based on an assumption of market efficiency and analyst efficiency (for instance, Brown, 
1983; Elliott and Philbrick, 1990; Ashbaugh and Pincus, 2001; Bhattacharya et al., 2003a; 
and Kim and Schroeder, 1990). 
 
3.1.3 Earnings Quality and Corporate Governance 
 
There are two seemingly contradictive perspectives in the literature on the relation between 
corporate governance and earnings quality. One perspective predicts that firms compensate 
inherent limitations in the ability of accounting information to reflect underlying economics 
(i.e., poor earnings quality) with stronger governance mechanisms. The other perspective 
predicts that stronger governance structures constrain earnings management, leading to better 
earnings quality (Olsson and Athanasakou, 2010). A stream of previous studies observe that 
different ownership types, for instance, family ownership (Wang, 2006; Chen et al., 2010), 
private equity ownership (Katz, 2009), public share ownership (Givoly et al., 2010) and 
venture capitalist ownership (Morsfield and Tan, 2006; Wongsunwai, 2013; Liu, 2014) affect 
financial reporting. This study will detect how reported earnings are impacted by another 
important ownership type, government ownership, or ‘state ownership’. 
 
Various corporate governance practices in a firm shape its behaviour and influence on its 
stock market performance and accounting performance. For example, independent directors 
should ensure all financial decisions represent the best interests of all shareholders and should 
not result in earnings or cash flows that are biased towards the managers or controlling 
shareholders (CSRC, 2002). CSRC relies on accounting numbers to regulate the listed 
companies (i.e. decide whether to grant them the rights to issue new shares, or delist them 
due to consecutively poor performance). Some studies on Chinese firms emphasize the 
relation between state ownership and firm performance. Xu and Wang (1999) demonstrate 
Chinese listed firms’ accounting performances are negatively related to the degree of state 
ownership. Not surprisingly, the low level of corporate governance practiced by the Chinese 
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listed companies has made earnings management or even distorting financial reports easily 
accessible. To a great extent, this will undermine the reported earnings quality. The relation 
between corporate governance and earnings quality is an issue that has proved elusive and 
often contentious among accounting researchers. Part of the reason is that the empirical 
literature that examines earnings quality and corporate governance has found weak and 
inconsistent results (Larcker, Richardson and Tuna 2007). A more fundamental reason is the 
difficulty in establishing linkages and main causal relations in situations where various 
information structures, such as earnings quality, can both affect governance structures and be 
affected by them. Several studies recognize that earnings quality and corporate governance 
can affect each other (for example, Armstrong, Guay and Weber 2010; Ferreira, Ferreira and 
Raposo 2011). Olsson and Athanasakou (2010) argue that the source of earnings quality is in 
innate firm characteristics or product of managerial incentives.  
 
Prior studies suggest that good corporate governance practices serve as the effective 
mechanisms to ensure the fairness among different stakeholders in the listed firms (Collier 
and Esteban, 1999; Jensen, 2005; Matten and Crane, 2005) and to constrain earnings 
management, leading to better earnings quality (Olsson and Athanasakou, 2010). Improving 
transparency and accountability is regarded as a key priority to improve the corporate 
governance of SOEs and considered as politically more feasible and less costly than drafting 
new regulations (OECD, 2005). Transparency refers to the amount, scope, quality, accuracy 
and timeliness of information which is accessible to relevant stakeholders. By mitigating 
information asymmetry, thus solving the principal-agent problem, transparency enhances the 
competence of outsider directors to monitor and evaluate the behaviours of managers and 
other insiders. Transparency is not an end in itself but a powerful tool to improve 
accountability and the overall corporate governance mechanism. Transparency without 
accountability is meaningless and they supplement each other.  
 
Prior literature on earnings quality has measured several dimensions of corporate governance 
including firm size and composition of board of directors, existence of audit committee, and 
the level of institutional ownership (for instance, Brown and Caylor, 2006; Larcker et al., 
2007; Jiang et al., 2008). The relationship between typical measures of corporate governance 
and earnings quality has been examined. However, these empirical studies present an 
inconsistent set of results. The mixed results are probably attributable to the difficulty in 
generating reliable and valid measures for the complex construct that is termed ‘corporate 
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governance’. By analyzing a sample of 2,106 firms and 39 structural measures of corporate 
governance (e.g., board characteristics, stock ownership, institutional ownership, activist 
stock ownership, existence of debt-holders, mix of executive compensation, and anti-takeover 
variables), Larcker et al. (2007) conclude that 14 governance factors of corporate governance 
have a mixed association with abnormal accruals, little relation to accounting restatements, 
but some ability to explain future operating performance and future excess stock returns. 
 
3.1.4 Earnings Management and Earnings Quality 
 
As Healy and Wahlen (1999) and Schipper (1989) defined, ‘Earnings management occurs 
when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter 
financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers.’ When managers attempt to manipulate earnings, they are deliberately 
trying to hide current performance; the result is that current earnings are not indicative of 
future performance or intrinsic value (Dechow and Schrand, 2004). Given the definitions of 
earnings management by Schipper (1989) and Healy and Wahlen (1999) and Dechow and 
Schrand’s (2004) definition of earnings quality—that earnings reflect current performance, 
that earnings data are useful for predicting future performance, and that the earnings data 
accurately annuitize intrinsic firm value—clearly, earnings management undermines earnings 
quality. Beyer et al. (2014) propose that earnings quality is a measure of the information 
asymmetry caused by earnings management and other reporting distortions. Thus, reported 
earnings that exhibit less earnings management are explained as being of higher quality. 
 
Lo (2008) suggests that earnings management has a lot in common with earnings quality. A 
consensus among accounting researchers is that highly managed earnings have low quality. 
However, the absence of earnings management is not sufficient to guarantee high-quality 
earnings (or high-quality accounting numbers more generally), because other factors 
contribute to the quality of earnings. For example, accountants following a poor set of 
accounting standards will generate low-quality financial reports. While there are other 
interpretations of earnings quality, Ball and Shivakumar (2008) deem high-quality earnings 
as conservative, while low-quality earnings are upwardly managed earnings. Two alternative 
definitions of earnings quality come to mind. The first is the sustainability of the earnings. 
The second is the lack of bias or neutrality of the earnings and of the accounting policies and 
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estimates used to generate those earnings.  
 
The determination of earnings requires estimation and judgment. It will generate a problem 
with the reliability of accounting earnings because accruals are likely to be estimated with 
errors which tend to reduce the persistence of reported earnings relative to that of true 
economic earnings. Estimation errors are irrelevant to evaluate current performance and to 
predict future performance, because they will be amended in the future period. Earnings 
quality can be enhanced when accruals smooth out value-irrelevant changes in cash flows, 
but it may also be lowered when accruals attempt to hide value-relevant changes in cash 
flows. Reliability is an essential characteristic for accounting information to be useful for 
decision making. Reliability represents the extent to which the information is unbiased, free 
from error, and representationally faithful (FASB, 1980). 
 
3.1.5 Accounting Standards Convergence with IFRS in China  
 
Dechow et al. (2010) imply that the quality of reported earnings is a function of both the 
ability of the accounting system to evaluate the firm’s fundamental financial performance and 
how the system is implemented. Accounting standards that require firms to provide more 
complete disclosures related to underlying economic constructs represented by accounting 
information can help users better assess accounting information quality. The evidence on the 
impact of principles-based vs. rules-based standards on earnings quality is mixed.  
 
Conceptually, a potential advantage of principles-based standards is that removing alternative 
accounting treatments for a transaction in favour of a single principle that reflects underlying 
performance would result in a more informative and relevant earnings number because it 
limits management’s opportunistic discretion in determining accounting numbers. For 
instance, Barth and Landsman and Lang (2008) address the question whether adoption of the 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) combined with effects of features of the financial 
reporting system, such as standards, interpretation, enforcement, and litigation, is associated 
with higher accounting quality. They find that firms applying IAS from 21 countries 
generally provide evidence for a higher accounting quality (e.g. less earnings management, 
more timely loss recognition, and greater value relevance). However, some studies conclude 
that principles-based standards will not diminish opportunistic earnings management (Cuccia 
et al., 1995; Nelson et al., 2002); some studies also document that the mandatory adoption of 
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the IFRS has not improved the earnings quality of Chinese listed firms (see Chen and Cheng, 
2007; He et al., 2009). Since the inherent flexibility in principles-based standards may give 
greater opportunity for firms to manipulate earnings thereby lowering accounting quality. 
Furthermore, findings in Bradshaw and Miller (2007) suggest that the regulatory and 
litigation environment is also important in the application of accounting standards. Daske et 
al. (2008) show that IFRS simply has impact on those countries where there is high 
transparency and strong legal enforcement. It will eliminate any improvement in accounting 
quality arising from higher quality accounting standards if the enforcement of accounting 
standards is lax. Leuz et al. (2003) find that earnings smoothing is less pronounced in 
common law countries; the IAS are based on a conceptual framework similar to those of 
common law countries. China is under the civil law jusrisdiction (Corporate Governance in 
Asia, OECD, 2014). Ewert and Wagenhofer (2012) present that tightening accounting 
standards will increase the ERC, which is also an important attribute of earnings quality. 
 
The Chinese government started the first accounting reform in 1993. The initial and further 
harmonization with international accounting and corporate governance practices took place in 
1998 and 2001 respectively, which further brought Chinese accounting standards in line with 
international accounting standards and significantly improved the quality of corporate 
accounting disclosures. The 2006 Chinese GAAP promulgated by the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) and China Accounting Standards Committee (CASC) is introduced to further improve 
the standardization process and to enhance the comparability of accounting standards, to 
assist Chinese enterprises in going abroad, and to facilitate overseas financing and 
international exchange and cooperation. It covers a new Basic Standard and 38 Specific 
ASBEs which have been largely converged with IFRS with some differences, indicating that 
China moved from a ‘rules-based’36 to a more ‘principles-based’37 regime. China, with the 
successful establishment of the Chinese Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises and 
its convergence with the IFRS, is among the leading jurisdictions making efforts to move 
towards a single set of high quality, globally accepted standards. These changes were 
                                                 
36 The ICAS definition of a rule: A rule is a means of establishing an unambiguous decision-making method. 
There can be no doubt about when and how it is to be applied. (ICAS, 2006, p. 4) 
 
37 The ICAS definition of a principle: A principle is a general statement, with widespread support, which is 
intended to support truth and fairness and acts as a guide to action. Principles-based accounting standards are 
based on a conceptual framework, consist of a clear hierarchy of over-riding principles and contain no “bright-
line” or anti-abuse provisions. Such an approach requires the use of judgment by preparers, auditors and 
regulators. (ICAS, 2006, p. 1-2) 
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accompanied by some remarkable reforms in corporate ownership structure, corporate 
governance, and market infrastructure. 
 
On the other hand, the same set of accounting standards will yield different accounting 
outcomes when different preparer incentives are provided. The application of accounting 
standards involves the use of judgment and discretion by corporate insiders through the use of 
reported earnings to provide more information about a firm’s economic performance or to 
serve other less benign interests (Burgstahler et al., 2006; Leuz et al., 2003). Thereby, the 
reporting incentives and the forces shaping them are likely to determine earnings quality.  
 
3.1.6 Contribution and Frame Structure 
 
Many countries have state-owned firms and non-state-owned firms. However, which type of 
firm is actually the driving force to the economy under a specific accounting practice is still 
unknown. A less investigated but controversial topic is the effect of state ownership on the 
corporate earnings quality. The sweeping size of state intervention has made China an ideal 
research context. The more recent secondary privatisation has made state ownership a less 
effective/informative measure for government intervention, which has not been addressed 
properly by the prior literature. This research focuses on investigating how government 
ownership shapes a firm’s incentives to report earnings that reflect economic performance. It 
makes the potential contributions to the existing research in several respects as follows. 
 
First, since ownership structure is the primary determinant of agency cost, this study attempts 
to link companies’ ownership structure with their earnings management behavior. We track 
the ultimate controllers instead to grade government intervention and examine the effect of 
government ownership and its associated institutional incentives on firms’ earnings quality 
based on large samples of Chinese firms (10-year data with 6750 firm-specific observations) 
during 2004 and 2013 in which a series of policies and regulations related to market 
liberalization were introduced into Chinese listed firms. Second, it contributes to the 
accounting literature by examining firm-level evidence in China, through fully capturing the 
earnings attributes related to the concept of earnings quality rather than a single attribute of 
earnings quality, from the perspective of both accounting-based (including accrual quality, 
persistence, predictability and smoothness) and market-based earnings attributes (including 
value relevance, timeliness and conservatism). Earning Response Coefficient (ERC) is 
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extended as a function of ‘market-based’ earnings quality via detecting earnings surprise, 
which is measured by: (a) the deviation of actual earnings from a predicated amount based on 
a time-series model of earnings and (b) the deviation of actual earnings from the consensus 
(median) analyst forecast (analyst forecast error), computed using each analyst’s latest 
forecast before the earnings announcement. This analysis also tests whether analysts' 
forecasts are more accurate than forecasts based on time-series predicted statistics with 
random walk. Finally, consistent with the conventional belief that state ownership is a major 
barrier to corporate efficiency, Chinese SOEs are found to have lower earnings quality than 
Non-SOEs. The empirical findings shed light on the contemporary corporate governance 
literature regarding to the debate over the impact of government ownership.  
 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 explains the theoretical 
framework for this empirical chapter. Section 3.3 reviews the literature related to earnings 
quality. Section 3.4 makes hypotheses development. Section 3.5 explains our research 
methodology. Section 3.6 describes the sample selection and empirical results. Section 3.7 
presents the robustness test results. Section 3.8 summarizes and concludes. 
 
3.2. Theoretical Framework  
 
3.2.1 Information Asymmetry 
 
‘Information perspective’ provided by Healy and Palepu (1993) discuss the information 
asymmetry between management who have superior information and other stakeholders. 
When information asymmetry is high, stakeholders do not have sufficient resources or access 
to relevant information to oversee managers’ behavior, which causes rampant practice of 
earnings management (Schipper, 1989; Warfield et al., 1995). Different ownerships lead to 
different information asymmetry and demand for accounting information transparency. Healy 
and Palepu (2001) argue that demand for financial reporting and disclosure are attributable to 
information asymmetry and agency conflicts between managers and outside investors. They 
suggest that the potential solution to the information asymmetry problem is to set regulation 
or rules that require managers to fully disclose their superior private information. Biddle and 
Hilary (2006) describe that high reported earnings quality (e.g., conservatism, loss avoidance, 
and earnings smoothing) reduces information asymmetry between managers and outsiders. 
Bhattacharya et al. (2012) propose that poor earnings quality conveys distorted information 
about firms’ future cash flows and show that poor earnings quality is associated with higher 
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information asymmetry from the perspective of indirect links. Two recent studies have found 
timely loss recognition alleviating information asymmetry mitigates negative market 
reactions to bad economic news (Francis et al., 2013; Kim et al., 2013).  
 
Ownership structure is regarded as the primary determinant of agency cost. Following Berle 
and Means (1932), Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Roe (1994) indicate the agency problem 
stem from the conflict of interests between the shareholders and managers when ownership is 
diffuse such as in the USA and the UK. However, if ownership is highly concentrated such as 
the circumstances in East Asia, the agency problem stem from the conflicts between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. More importantly, there is one more type 
of agency cost in state-owned enterprises, i.e. the agency cost between the state and the 
controlling owner, and this type of agency cost cannot be addressed simply by ownership 
concentration, it is predicted that the entrenchment effect of ownership concentration on 
earnings management is more serious in state-owned enterprises than in private enterprises.  
 
Agency problems are more serious in SOEs than in Non-SOEs because of the multiple types 
of conflicts of interest including those between the state and minority shareholders and 
between owners and managers. Higher managerial ownership is regarded to reduce the 
agency cost of information asymmetry, and therefore reduces earnings management. 
However, management, employee, and foreign shares account for a very small proportion of 
Chinese firms’ issued share capital (Firth et al., 2002 and Xu, 2004 as cited in Firth et al., 
2007). Hence, controlling the conflicts among different interest groups in SOEs is difficult 
because of a highly layered organizational hierarchy in SOEs where information is more 
likely to be distorted as it moves from one level to the next. In addition, monitoring tasks 
often performed by government officials who are in fact agents of the state are ineffective in 
SOEs. The multiple interest conflicts result in more information asymmetry and more 
managerial opportunistic behaviors (i.e. earnings management). Shleifer and Vishny (1989) 
argue that concentrated ownership often promotes managerial self-dealing and magnifies 
private control benefits. Since state ownership is highly significant in most Chinese state-
owned firms, Leuz et al. (2003) suggest managers are more likely to mask firm performance 
and limit information disclosure for the benefit of controlling parties in SOEs. Since there is 
an extra type of agency relationship in SOEs compared with Non-SOEs, i.e. the conflicts 
between the state and controlling shareholders, as the controlling owners are themselves 
agents of the true owners: the state. However, recent developments in corporate governance 
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have highlighted another form of conflict of interests-the controlling shareholders seek for 
their own benefit at the expense of minority shareholders. This has been called ‘tunnelling’ 
(Johnson et al., 2000). La Porta et al. (1999) conclude, ‘the central agency problem in large 
corporations around the world is that of restricting expropriation of minority shareholders by 
controlling shareholders’. Corporate governance has a direct impact on firms’ profit reporting 
incentives. If the mangers or the largest shareholders want to expropriate the minority 
shareholders and tunnel firms’ resources, they have incentives to hide the true performance of 
the firms. Liu and Lu (2004) also provide evidence that the purpose of earnings management 
in China mainly is to tunnel, that is, to facilitate the controlling shareholder’s expropriation of 
the minority shareholders. 
 
Analytical evidence provides that the greater the information asymmetry between 
management and its shareholders, the more likely the firm is to manipulate accruals and 
reported earnings. Previous empirical results suggest a significantly positive relationship 
between measures of information asymmetry and earnings management. One measure of 
information asymmetry between management and shareholders is the dispersion in analysts' 
forecasts (e.g., Healy et al., 1995; Richardson, 2000). Outside investors are not well informed 
about the manager's incentives or reporting distortions driven by accounting rules, resulting 
in an equilibrium which is characterized by ex-post information asymmetry between the 
manager and the capital market. Brown and Han (1992) argue that when the amount of 
information asymmetry decreases, there is more likely to be a higher consensus among 
financial analysts about the future performance of the firms.  
 
3.2.2 Political Costs Hypothesis  
 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978, 1986) suppose that political cost is one of the important 
incentives that stimulate managers’ accounting choices and reporting practices. Healy and 
Wahlen (1999) consider political cost as one of the incentives for earnings management 
(opportunistic behavior). Bushman and Piotroski (2006) also argue that managers manipulate 
financial reported numbers in response to government intervention. Consistent with the 
political theories of North (1990) and Olson (1993), Liu et al. (2014) provides empirical 
evidence supporting the political theories in which government manipulates the accounting 
numbers of state-owned listed firms for its self-serving purposes. If the management of state-
owned listed firms regards tunneling by their parent companies as detrimental expropriation 
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by the government, they may not be motivated to report aggressively to avoid a high political 
cost (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). They may even report the numbers conservatively to disguise 
profits rather than smooth the reported earnings or manage towards a positive income to meet 
the needs of the parent companies. On the other hand, if managers consider government 
engagement as a necessary intervention to eliminate poor performing firms, they will report 
earnings aggressively, and the firms will look much healthier. Jian and Wong (2003) find that 
group-controlled firms, where controlling owners are companies rather than individuals or 
families, in China are more likely to use connected transactions to manipulate earnings and 
tunnel firm value.  
 
Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) was criticized by asymmetrically 
favoring state-owned firms regarding new rights issues and IPO quota (Chen et al., 2003). 
Various studies have argued that governmental and non-governmental companies create 
incentives for companies to manage reported earnings because they can impose costs on 
companies that are ‘too profitable.’ High profits can bring attention to a company that would 
otherwise like to stay off the regulatory radar screen. More importantly, high profits may be 
used as evidence that the company is gouging its customers. Agencies that serve to protect 
consumer interests may attempt to regulate prices charged by companies that show high 
profits. The unusual feature of this political cost argument to explain earnings management is 
that it predicts that companies will manage earnings down. 
 
The factors like government intervention (bureaucratic interference), weak incentives, and the 
lack of market competition, state ownership has been frequently associated with poor 
corporate governance, less corporate efficiency, misallocations of resources, and unethical 
behaviors such as corruption and fraud (Boardman and Vining, 1989; Megginson et al., 1994; 
and Shleifer, 1998). In such an environment with ineffective corporate governance 
mechanisms and inadequate market discipline, managers from the state-owned enterprises are 
more likely to exercise discretion in accounting information. Bushman and Piotroski (2006) 
compare accounting conservatism in countries with more government interventions with 
accounting conservatism in countries with less government interventions in the economy. 
They find that the extent of the government involvement in a country’s economy is associated 
with conservative accounting in countries with weak investor protections (civil law country) 
and is associated with aggressive accounting in countries with strong investor protections 
(common law country).  
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Prior literature argues that government control and intervention are likely to influence the 
financial reporting quality. Watts (2003a) proposes that one factor influencing accounting 
conservatism is regulations. He argues that standard setters may be confronted with political 
pressure and public criticism. To reduce their political costs and protect the interests of 
investors, these authorities prefer conservative accounting (Bushman and Piotroski, 2006).   
As Xia and Zhu suggested (2009), accounting conservatism is greater among SOEs, which 
implies that the managers’ concerns about their promotion (political careers) and 
governmental pressures specific to SOEs likely play an important role in shaping accounting 
practices. Under the government pressure for good earnings performance and with 
government regulations supporting earnings management, state-owned listed firms may have 
more incentives to engage in earnings management than non-state-owned firms via multiple 
earnings management choices such as earnings smoothing, managing toward positive income, 
and aggressive accounting to meet the target of parent companies.  
 
3.2.3 Market Efficiency Hypothesis 
 
In this study, market return is used to deduce earnings quality based on prior literature.  
Inference about earnings quality from return-based (market-based) attributes of earnings 
relies on the assumption of market efficiency. On the basis of previous studies, earnings are 
judged to be of higher quality when they are (1) more persistent and less volatile; (2) more 
strongly associated with future cash flows realizations, and (3) more strongly associated with 
contemporaneous stock price performance or market value. The 3rd criterion as a benchmark 
for judging earnings quality assumes that markets are efficient and that stock prices quickly 
reflect all publicly available information. Fama (1970) defines efficiency as the ability of the 
market to rapidly digest new information so that stock prices would at every point in time 
incorporate all relevant available information. This has become known as ‘Efficient Market 
Hypothesis’ and an arbitrage argument is used to show that the EMH implies the absence of 
predictability of asset prices—if prices were predictable, profits could be made on the basis 
of the predictability and arbitrage would eliminate these profits in an efficiently operating 
market. 
 
Kawakatsu and Morey (1999) investigates the relationship between financial liberalization 
and the Efficient Markets Hypothesis and find little evidence that deregulation improves the 
efficiency of the markets. If the stock market is efficient in anticipating analysts’ rational 
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behavior, the market should adjust for the skewness-induced bias in analyst forecasts. Larger 
earnings surprises lead to larger stock market reactions. Drummen and Zimmerman (1992) 
and Eftekhari and Satchell (1999) all find that country characteristics predominated over 
other factors (e.g. world factors and industry trends) in the determination of stock returns. 
Bekaert and Harvey (1997) observed that volatility tends to decrease following market 
liberalizations, and that more open economies are less volatile. Claessens et al. (1995) also 
found significant first-order correlations, as well as noting that diversification effects exist 
among emerging markets. They observed that the returns in emerging markets are associated 
with positive skewness and excess kurtosis, and higher volatility than developed markets. 
However, Heckman et al. (1999) found that country factors were of reduced importance in 
determining returns, while industry factors had remained constant.  
 
Emerging markets have very distinctive characteristics and are structurally different from 
both developed markets and each other. The Chinese A-shares market is deemed not as 
efficient as the U.S. stock market (Morck et al., 2000; Wang et al., 2009). Bekaert et al. (1998) 
and Claessens et al. (1995) find that the returns distributions of emerging markets are highly 
abnormal, with significant (usually positive) skewness and excess kurtosis that vary through 
time. These characteristics may become less pronounced as a market’s economy comes to 
more closely resemble a developed market through increased openness and liberalization. To 
the extent that at least certain investors rely on financial statement information in making 
their investment decisions, it creates enough incentives for the stock market to reward high 
quality earnings. The assumption is that if the earnings numbers generated by the accounting 
system are informative then it should be reflected in stock returns. In testing for those return-
based earnings attributes, it is assumed that the market is efficient in China so that the stock 
returns effectively capture the underlying firm-specific economic performance. For example, 
the Basu model captures conditional conservatism and relies heavily on the efficient market 
hypothesis, as it assumes that negative returns proxy for the bad news of firms. However, 
China’s stock market is questioned due to high synchronicity where stock returns capture low 
amounts of firm specific information (Morck et al., 2000).  
 
3.2.4 Analyst Efficiency Hypothesis 
 
Financial analysts have long been believed to make sophisticated and unbiased judgements, 
to incorporate all publicly available (firm-specific, industry, financial and market) 
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information and to be well informed about the arrival of any new information. Inferences 
about earnings quality by examining analyst forecast accuracy are subject to the assumption 
of analyst efficiency. Under this assumption, analysts are presumed to be rational experts who  
predict future earnings and make recommendations on an unbiased basis; they are considered 
to be less likely to misunderstand the implications of financial information than normal 
investors. Therefore, variation in analyst forecast accuracy reflects the earnings attributes that 
are related to earnings quality. Similar to inferences about earnings quality from returns-
based studies that are subject to the caveat that they rely on an assumption of market 
efficiency, inferences about earnings quality from analyst forecast tests are subject to the 
caveat that they rely on an assumption of analyst efficiency. 
 
Dechow et al. (2010) review four studies which examine analyst forecasts as a function of 
earnings quality in their paper (e.g., Brown, 1983 and Elliott and Philbrick, 1990; Ashbaugh 
and Pincus, 2001; Bhattacharya et al., 2003 and Kim and Schroeder, 1990), which assume 
that analysts are unbiased and qualified predictors of future earnings. For instance, Brown 
(1983) and Elliott and Philbrick (1990) provide evidence on specific accounting methods that 
improve predictability (i.e., reduce analyst forecast error); Kim and Schroeder (1990) suggest 
that analysts are not misled by discretionary accruals. While some studies provide evidence 
that analysts (1) make biased forecasts and (2) tend to misinterpret new information. For 
example, analysts are considered to produce upwardly biased forecasts (Fried and Givoly, 
1982; O'Brien, 1988; Butler and Lang, 1991; Brous, 1992; Brous and Kini, 1993; Francis and 
Philbrick, 1993; Kang, O'Brien and Sivaramakrishnan, 1994; and Dreman and Berry, 1995). 
Analysts are supposed to systematically underreact to bad news (Lys and Sohn, 1990; 
Abarbanell, 1991; Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992; Ali, Klein, and Rosenfeld, 1992; Elliot, 
Philbrick, and Wiedman, 1995; and Teoh and Wong, 1997). Moreover, DeBondt and Thaler 
(1990) and Brown (1993) conclude that analysts systematically overreact to good news. 
Analysts’ under-reaction to bad news or overreaction to good news implies that analysts are 
systematically optimistic when they consider the implications of new information. Overall, 
neither under-reaction nor over-reaction is consistent with rational forecasts and an efficient 
market for expert information. 
 
Ruch and Taylor (2015) review the literature on conservatism’s effect on analyst forecast 
accuracy and find mixed results when using both conditional and unconditional conservatism. 
For example, Mensah et al. (2004) show that conservative accounting increases analyst 
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forecast error38 and dispersion by measuring unconditional conservatism. Helbok and Walker 
(2004) argue that analyst forecasts are optimistically biased under conditionally conservative 
accounting practices. Because analysts fail to efficiently incorporate the implications of 
conservative treatment of economic news into their forecasts until that news becomes 
available (Pae and Thornton, 2010). It implies that accounting conservatism results in noisy, 
biased, and inefficient earnings forecasts. Louis et al. (2014) find a significantly negative 
relationship between conditional conservatism and the optimistic bias of analysts contrary to 
Mensah et al.’s result (2004). Prior literature summarizes some explanations for the forecast 
optimism (Kothari, 2001). The strategic reporting bias explanation (Francis and Philbrick, 
1993; Dugar and Nathan, 1995; Das et al., 1998; Lim, 2001) for optimistic forecasts is to 
promote revenue-generating businesses for the brokerage firms and to facilitate information 
access to the management. Under the selection bias explanation (McNichols and O’Brien, 
1997), analysts are both rational forecasters and truthful reporters; but they report their beliefs 
selectively only when they hold favorable views of the firm. The cognitive bias explanation 
(Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992; Elgers and Lo, 1994) posits that analysts are irrational 
forecasters who systematically err in their processing of publicly available information. 
 
Using analyst forecasts to detect earnings quality rather than using market prices has the 
advantage that the analyst forecast relates only to earnings, while a market price reflects 
information other than earnings. Hence, tests that infer earnings quality using market prices 
and assuming market efficiency confound interpretation of the impact of earnings quality 
alone on decision usefulness. A disadvantage of using analyst forecasts, however, is the 
necessary assumption that analysts are unbiased and expert forecasters, given that evidence 
on the validity of these assumptions is questionable. Several studies conclude that when 
analysts can rationally anticipate accruals management, they appropriately incorporate the 
implications of accruals into their forecasts (Kim and Schroeder, 1990; Coles et al., 2006; 
Burgstahler and Eames, 2003). On the contrary, Bradshaw et al. (2001) and Elliott and 
Philbrick (1990) provide contradictory evidence. Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) possibly 
reconcile these results. They show that analysts fundamentally understand the implications of 
accruals for earnings predictability, as evidenced by their recommendation decisions, but that 
forecasts are nonetheless biased. 
                                                 
38 Forecast error refers to the absolute value difference between the actual EPS and forecasted EPS, scaled 
by the beginning of stock price. Higher conservatism results in a more negative forecast error. A negative 
error reflects the optimistic bias in initial forecasts.  
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3.3. Empirical Literature Review 
 
Prior research on the association between ownership structure and earnings quality mainly 
focuses on three areas: (1) Managerial ownership and earnings quality (Warfield et al., 1995; 
Gabrielsen, 2002; Yeo, 2002); (2) Institutional ownership and earnings quality (Dobrzynski 
etc, 1986; Coffee, 1991; Jiamba. lvo, 2002) and (3) Ownership concentration and earnings 
quality (La Porta etc., 1998; Fan and Wong, 2002). There are mutually exclusive conclusions 
for the relationship between institutional ownership and earnings quality. It shows that the 
higher the listed company's ownership concentration, the lower the firms’ earnings quality. 
For instance, Larcker et al. (2007) find a positive association between block ownership and 
abnormal accruals. It is ambiguous in the emerging economies whether the managers in state-
owned firms would behave in the same way as their counterparts in private companies 
regarding financial reporting. In a cross-country setting Leuz et al. (2003) conclude that 
ownership concentration leads to more earnings management. Fan and Wong (2002) find that 
concentrated ownership of firms in East Asian countries is associated with lower value 
relevance. Taken together this evidence suggests that concentrated ownership leads to poorer 
earnings quality. Several studies on Chinese SOEs document that state ownership is 
associated with earnings management in the form of tunneling (Aharony et al., 2010; Chen 
and Yuan, 2004; and Liu and Lu, 2002). However, there is also evidence that state-owned 
firms in China have lower levels of abnormal accruals than non-state-owned firms (Ding et 
al., 2007). The elusive evidence in existing research suggests that a better understanding of 
the impact of state ownership on the earnings quality in China is required. 
 
Ownership structure undoubtedly plays a very critical role. Inevitably, corporate earnings 
quality is affected by the controlling shareholders, because controlling shareholders can take 
advantage of their privileged position to significantly influence and control the accounting 
earnings. From the motivation perspective, the controlling shareholders will seek their own 
private benefits by ‘Tunneling’ to transfer corporate resources and in essence impact on the 
earnings quality (Gilson and Gordon, 2003; Liu and Lu, 2003; Dyck and Zingales, 2004; 
Haw, 2004; Kim, 2005 and Liu and Lu, 2007). As argued by Liu and Lu (2002), tunnelling 
via transfer pricing manipulation is believed to be more prominent in emerging markets 
where corporate governance mechanisms are inefficient. Manipulating accounting accruals 
will shift profits from one fiscal year to another; however, manipulating the transfer prices of 
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related-party transactions is permanent earnings manipulation conducted during a year will 
not affect the profits of future years (Lo et al., 2007; 2010).  
 
Earnings quality will be influenced by many factors. Prior literature documents that a 
country’s institutional factors, such as its legal/judicial system, dispersed vs. concentrated 
ownership, political connections, investor protections, and political economy, may create 
financial reporting incentives (Ball et al., 2000; Fan and Wong, 2002; Ball et al., 2003; Leuz 
et al., 2003; Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Bushman et al., 2004; Bushman and Piotroski, 2006; 
Burgstahler et al., 2006; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Chaney et al., 2011; Srinidhi et al., 
2014; Guedhami et al., 2014). Firms in countries with stronger investor protection have been 
documented to report less smooth earnings and earnings with greater accruals quality and 
predictability power. For example, Leuz et al. (2003) find that earnings smoothing is less 
pronounced in common law countries; the IAS are based on a conceptual framework similar 
to those of common law countries. China is under the civil law jusrisdiction (Corporate 
Governance in Asia, OECD, 2014). Ewert and Wagenhofer (2012) present that tightening 
accounting standards will increase the ERC, which is also an important attribute of earnings 
quality. Gaio (2010) provides evidence that firm characteristics have more incremental 
explanatory power for accounting-based earnings attributes worldwide. For the market-based 
earnings quality measures, he acquires two interesting findings. Firstly, he observes that the 
adjusted R2 are on average much lower than those of the accounting-based measures. 
Secondly, contrary to the accounting-based measures, the adjusted values of R2 of 
considering the entire unobserved country heterogeneity is slightly higher than the adjusted 
R2 of considering firm characteristics alone, which implies that the country environment is as 
important as firm characteristics in explaining the variation in market-based earnings 
attributes. In a financial reporting context, Ball et al. (2000; 2003) provide that timeliness and 
conditional conservatism vary with legal origin (a proxy for political influences on financial 
reporting). 
 
Regarding timely loss recognition, higher-quality earnings are expected to exhibit a higher 
frequency of large losses. This is consistent with Ball et al. (2000), Lang et al.(2003), Leuz, et 
al. (2003), Ball and Shivakumar (2005, 2006), and Lang et al. (2006), who suggest that one 
characteristic of higher quality earnings is that large losses are recognized as they occur 
rather than being deferred to future periods. This characteristic is closely related to earnings 
smoothing in that if earnings are smoothed, large losses should be relatively rare. If higher 
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quality accounting is predicted to generate a higher frequency of larger losses, the opposite 
could be true. Therefore, a higher frequency of large losses could be indicative of ‘big bath’ 
earnings management. Ball et al. (2008) using the R2 and b1 coefficient estimate from the 
Basu (1997) reverse regression, find that loss recognition is timelier for firms in countries 
with greater prominence of debt markets relative to equity markets. Ball et al. (2003) also 
find that East Asian countries except China, which share a common law origin but are 
asserted to have lower equity capital markets incentives, do not have more timely loss 
recognition than code law countries39. 
 
The higher level of accounting conservatism in SOEs compared to non-SOEs may be due to 
downward earnings management by the former to hide abnormal profits accruing from a 
government monopoly. In China, firms are more likely to report higher earnings because of 
the goals or planned objectives that government has set for them. Both SOEs and non-SOEs 
tend to report higher earnings, but the former are a little more conservative than the latter. 
Another issue is that the accounting practices of SOEs are more conservative than those of 
non-SOEs, perhaps because the former have less incentive to manage earnings to ‘fool’ the 
market. Chen et al. (2008) find that in China, the accounting reports of privately owned firms 
are more conservative than those of SOEs, indicating that incentives matter. Argued by Basu 
(1997), conservative accounting recognizes bad news in earnings more quickly than good 
news; thus it leads to lower persistence of negative earnings changes.  
 
Referring to value relevance, prior empirical research suggests that higher quality earnings 
are more value relevant (Lang et al., 2003; Leuz et al., 2003; and Lang et al., 2006). It 
indicates that firms with higher quality accounting are hypothesized to have a higher 
association between stock prices and reported earnings because higher quality earnings 
reflect a firm’s underlying performance (Barth, Beaver, and Landsman, 2001). Ewert and 
Wagenhofer (2005) document that accounting standards could constrain opportunistic 
managerial discretion and result in accounting earnings that have higher value relevance. 
Maines and Wahlen (2006, p.417) summarize value-relevance studies are joint tests of: (1) 
the capital markets’ perception of relevance of a specific piece of accounting information for 
the future cash flows of the firm; (2) the capital market’s perception of the reliability of that 
accounting information; and (3) market efficiency. 
                                                 
39 In code-law countries, such as Germany and China, the stock markets are less active and have relatively 
low litigation rates (Maijoor and Vanstraelen 2006). 
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Some studies examine the value relevance of accounting numbers reported under IFRS and 
Chinese GAAP40. For example, Bao and Chow (1999), Sami and Zhou (2004), and Liu and 
Liu (2007) find that earnings and book values of shareholders’ equity reported under IFRS 
are generally more value-relevant than those reported under Chinese GAAP. Using a sample 
of firms from 21 countries that converted to IFRS during 1994-2003, Barth et al. (2008) 
compare several accounting quality metrics, including earnings management, timely loss 
recognition, and value relevance, before and after IFRS adoption. They find that accounting 
quality significantly enhanced after the adoption of IFRS in those countries. Hung and 
Subramanyam (2007) document that firms applying IFRS provide timelier information and 
have less earnings persistence because IFRS emphasizes on fair values and is more likely to 
incorporate the effects of economic events in the financial statements. However, through an 
international study across 51 countries including China, Daske et al. (2008) show that IFRS 
simply has impact on those countries where there is high transparency and strong legal 
enforcement. Given the consensus that China has weak investor protection and weak legal 
enforcement, its mandatory IFRS adoption is not expected to have an immediate and 
systematic impact on listed firms (Chen and Cheng, 2007). In addition, through investigating 
the effects of convergence with IFRS on the timeliness of earnings recognition, Wu et al. 
(2014) conclude that the timeliness of earnings recognition reported under Chinese GAAP 
worsened after a series of harmonization and convergence with IFRS in China. Their findings 
imply that the convergence with IFRS in emerging capital markets may not necessarily 
improve the accounting quality, consistently with He et al.’s results (2009). 
 
Turning finally to Earnings Response Coefficient, previous studies provide the evidence that 
there is a significantly negative relationship between ownership and the earnings response 
coefficient. It indicates that the higher the dominant shareholder’s ownership stake is, the less 
informative earnings becomes. When earnings are more value relevant, stronger investor 
response will be expected (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). The relationship between stock return 
and earnings has been examined since the publication of Ball and Brown (1968). Hayn (1995) 
finds a larger earnings response coefficient (ERC) for profits than for losses. Early research 
by Kormendi and Lipe (1987), Collins and Kothari (1989), and Easton and Zmijewski (1989) 
provide evidence that more persistent earnings have a stronger ERC. 
 
                                                 
40  Chinese companies prepared their financial statements in accordance with both IFRS and Chinese 
GAAP if they issued both A- and B- shares before 2007. 
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Referring to the correlation between the earnings quality attributes, empirical tests generally 
confirm that less reliable accruals lead to lower earnings persistence. Some studies find that 
conservatism reduces earnings persistence and predictability, facilitates earnings management, 
reduces analyst forecast accuracy, and may decrease the value relevance of earnings (e.g., 
Basu, 1997; Ball et al., 2008; Dichev and Tang, 2008; and Chen et al. (2014). These findings 
indicate that accounting conservatism has more negative effects on earnings quality. Ball et al. 
(2008) show that the timelier recognition of losses is often associated with a conservative 
accounting system. Hayn (1995) finds a larger earnings response coefficient (ERC) for profits 
than for losses. Their tests are based on the implication that losses are less persistent than 
profits and thus are expected to be associated with a smaller earnings response coefficient. 
This suggestion is consistent with Feltham and Ohlson (1995) frameworks where the value of 
the firm is a function of the persistence of abnormal earnings. Early research by Kormendi 
and Lipe (1987), Collins and Kothari (1989), and Easton and Zmijewski (1989) provide 
evidence that more persistent earnings have a stronger stock price response. According to the 
survey conducted by Graham et al. (2005), their results imply the widely held managerial 
beliefs that earnings volatility is negatively related to earnings predictability. They find that 
the consideration of earnings volatility brings substantial improvements in the prediction of 
both short- and long- term earnings. Dichev and Tang (2009) consider that two main factors 
result in earnings volatility: (a) economic shocks and (b) problems in the accounting 
determination of income, and both of these factors reduce the predictability of earnings. 
Therefore, low-volatility earnings have much higher persistence compared with high-
volatility earnings which incorporate extreme and transitory earnings. Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) argue that large magnitudes of estimation errors in accruals signal lower quality of 
earnings and lower predictability of earnings. Hence, the earnings are smoothed by the 
managers will provide a more predictable measure of firm performance.  
 
Since the publication of Jones (1991), the empirical literature has examined extensively the 
manipulation of financial reporting and its impact on the time series of reported earnings as 
well as the stock price reaction to earnings announcements. The Jones model and its 
variations have been utilized for both valuation purposes and for testing different measures of 
‘accounting quality’ (see Dechow et al., 2010). Yet, the theoretical literature lacks a dynamic 
theory of reporting bias and earnings quality to provide insights and guidance to the empirical 
research on this topic based on the Chinese stock market. Therefore, the aim of this research 
is to focus on the relationship between government (state) ownership and earnings quality 
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depending on the unique characteristic of ownership structure in China. It will contribute 
useful insights into how to improve the quality of reported earnings in China both from 
theoretical and empirical perspectives.  
 
3.3.1. SOEs vs. Non-SOEs 
 
The influence of state (government) ownership on the quality of accounting numbers has 
been examined in limited contexts in prior literature. In China, state-owned and non-state-
owned listed firms are subject to the same accounting standards but subject to different 
political interference and supportive policy. Non-state-owned listed firms are either owned by 
entrepreneurs and their families or by foreign joint ventures. Management incentives and 
pressures differ depending on the type of firm. Bushman et al. (2004) find that concentrated 
ownership and financial transparency are negatively related, where concentrated ownership is 
a composite measure constructed using institutional ownership, blockholders, and average 
holdings per shareholder. Ajinkya et al. (2005) consistently discover a negative relation 
between concentrated institutional ownership and information transparency, as measured by 
the frequency of voluntary earnings forecasts. The interpretation for the results is that state-
owned firms’ suppress information transparency (because of expropriation activities) or do 
not require information transparency disclosure and have a preference for maintaining an 
information advantage over other investors. Several studies on Chinese SOEs document that 
state ownership is associated with earnings management in the form of tunneling (Aharony et 
al., 2010; Chen and Yuan, 2004; and Liu and Lu, 2002). However, there is also evidence that 
state-owned firms in China have lower levels of abnormal accruals than non-state-owned 
firms (Ding et al., 2007). Yuan et al. (2007) provide evidence of greater earnings 
management among Chinese state-controlled listed firms. They interpret this as evidence of a 
greater entrenchment effect rather than incentive alignment effect from the large shareholders 
of state-controlled firms. The elusive evidence in existing research suggests that a better 
understanding of the impact of state ownership on the earnings quality in China is required. 
 
Research on the timeliness of reported earnings can be traced back to the 1968 seminal paper 
by Ball and Brown, where they describe accounting income numbers in terms of ‘relevance’ 
and ‘timeliness’. Timely disclosure can reduce the magnitude of periodic earnings surprises, 
and hence reduces stock price volatility. The relationship between ownership type and 
conservatism is examined by Ball and Shivakumar (2005). Ball et al. (2003) suggest that 
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management incentives significantly influence the extent of accounting conservatism. Lim et 
al. (2014) examine how corporate ownership relates to the timeliness of earnings. The 
commonly accepted view is that government-owned firms adopt a more opaque information 
environment in order to hide their inefficiency (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Gul et al. (2010) 
state that Chinese-listed firms with government as the largest shareholder have less firm-
specific information incorporated into their stock price, hence the timeliness of earnings of 
government-owned firms is lower. On the contrary, Cheng and Courtenay (2006) discover 
that government-owned firms in Singapore are related to greater transparency, in line with the 
government’s support for better disclosure policies. Xia and Zhu (2009) find that political 
concerns and pressures among state-owned firm (SOEs) are more influential than those 
among non-state-owned firms (Non-SOEs), which lead to more conservative accounting in 
SOEs. In addition, they find that among the determinants of conservatism in China, debt is 
the most important, followed by ownership; the Board of directors has little influence. 
 
Liu et al. (2014) exhibit Chinese state-owned listed firms have lower quality of earnings. 
Particularly, state-owned firms have more earnings smoothing, more frequently managed 
earnings toward target, have significantly higher discretionary current accruals, less frequent 
timely recognition of losses, and less value relevance, relative to non-state-owned firms. 
They conclude that the Chinese government, through its controlling ownership of state-
owned firms, creates incentives and regulatory backing for self-serving purposes that 
negatively influence these listed firms’ financial reporting. Another significant difference 
between SOEs and non-SOEs is that management in the former must deal with greater 
political pressure and more constraints. However, managers in non-SOEs face fewer political 
and legal restrictions than do those in SOEs, and they can handle many problems through 
unofficial channels or illegal means, which managers in SOEs dare not and cannot do. It 
appears that in non-SOEs, managers are well monitored by principals, namely, entrepreneurs, 
and have incentives to improve corporate governance and maximize firm value. Corporate 
governance seems to be work better for non-SOEs than for SOEs.  
 
On the other hand, Ding et al. (2007) show that privately-owned listed companies tend to 
increase their accounting earnings more than state-owned listed companies in China. To 
obtain external financing, both SOEs and non-SOEs have incentives to manipulate 
accounting information. However, the former are affiliated with the government and their 
objectives are more diverse, which makes them less eager to pursue opportunistic benefits 
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through manipulation compared to the latter. Non-SOEs face more financing constraints than 
SOEs, and conservative accounting may lead to less profitable accounting earnings, which 
will result in the further restriction of external financing, both debt and equity. Therefore, the 
incentive for non-SOEs to pursue maximum profits will offset the incentive to practice 
conservative accounting. Unlike Non-SOEs, most local and central SOEs have the advantage 
to receive subsidies (or known as ‘bailout’) from the government, when they have financial 
problems evidenced by Wang et al. (2008). The Chinese government has such an incentive to 
provide this kind of bailout because the large-scale financial distress in SOEs might lead to 
civil unrest. Thus, there is little pressure for most SOEs to meet the profitability requirement 
and to face the delisting risk.  Further investigation by Wang and Yung (2011) suggests that 
the protection of SOEs by Chinese government might have played an important role in 
mitigating the pressure on managers to manipulate firm-specific information. They find that 
the divergence in earnings quality between state-owned and privately-owned firms becomes 
less distinct as the economy becomes more and more market driven.  
 
3.3.2. Proxies for earnings quality  
 
Dechow et al. (2010) review various proxies of ‘earnings quality’ in academic literature and 
classify them into three broad groups: (1) attributes of earnings (e.g. earnings persistence and 
accruals; earnings smoothness; asymmetric timeliness and timely loss recognition and 
benchmark beating); (2) investors’ response to earnings (such as earnings response 
coefficient (ERC) or the R2 from the earnings-returns model) and (3) external indicators of 
earnings misstatements (for instance, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases 
(AAERs), financial restatements and the weakness of internal control).  
 
Persistence is regarded as a proxy for earnings quality because of the maintained assumption 
that more persistent earnings are more decision useful for equity valuation (Dechow et al., 
2010). Under accrual-based earnings system, earnings smooth random fluctuations in the 
timing of cash payments and receipts making earnings more informative about performance 
than cash flows. Smoothness is an outcome of an accrual-based system assumed to improve 
decision usefulness. The metrics including Earnings Response Coefficients (ERC) and the 
contemporaneous R2 between earnings and returns (popularized by Lev, 1989) are applied to 
capture important fundamental properties of financial reporting, such as relevance, timeliness 
and conservatism. Barth et al. (2001) consider the value relevance is one trait of reported 
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earnings utilized to evaluate information quality. Association studies measure the 
contemporaneous relation between financial statement variables and stock returns assuming 
market efficiency. Both earnings persistence and timely loss recognition have impact on the 
decision usefulness of earnings. Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) No. 2 
defines conservatism as ‘a prudent reaction to uncertainty to try to ensure that uncertainties 
and risks inherent in business situations are adequately considered’ (FASB, 1980). 
Accounting scholars have identified two forms of conservatism: (1) conditional 
conservatism41, and (2) unconditional conservatism42. The primary difference is conditional 
conservatism depends on economic news events, while unconditional conservatism does not 
(Ruch and Taylor, 2015). Conservatism is regarded as one of the most fundamental features 
of accounting information (Basu, 1997; Watts, 2003a). The Basu’s (1997) metric is the most 
widely accepted proxy for conservatism. However, some researchers argue that conservatism 
biases accounting information and compromises neutrality to result in inefficient decision-
making (Gigler et al., 2009; Guay and Verrecchia, 2006; FASB, 2010).  
 
Dechow et al. (2010) argue that there is no single measure of earnings quality that is superior 
for all decision models. It is difficult to conclude that one or the other measure is a ‘better’ 
metric for earnings quality. However, an insight from Ewert and Wagenhofer (2011) provides 
that accounting-based measures seem to be inferior to market-based measures simply because 
they cannot capture the sophisticated inferences by rational investors on the price-relevant 
information incorporated in reported earnings. Therefore, to fully capture the earnings 
attributes, on the basis of Francis et al. (2004), this analysis classifies accrual quality, 
persistence, predictability, and smoothness as ‘accounting-based’ earnings attributes and to 
categorize value relevance, timeliness, and conservatism as ‘market-based’ earnings 
attributes. More importantly, Earnings Response Coefficient (ERC) is extended as a function 
of ‘market-based’ earnings quality via detecting earnings surprise according to Dechow et 
al.’s influential paper (2010). The return-based measures assume market is efficient. Figure 
3.1 and Table 3.1 show the summary of proxies for earnings quality in existing literaure.  
                                                 
41 Conditional conservatism, i.e., asymmetric income timeliness (Basu, 1997), occurs when negative economic 
news is recognized in accounting earnings in a timelier manner than positive economic news. 
 
42 Unconditional conservatism (Beaver and Ryan, 2005) also called news-independent conservatism (Chandra et 
al., 2004), occurs through the consistent under-recognition of accounting net assets. Unlike conditional 
conservatism, unconditional conservatism does not depend on news events.  
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Figure 3.1 Proxies for Earnings Quality 
 
 
Accounting-based 
Earnings Attributes 
Market-based Earnings 
Attributes 
  
 Accrual quality  
 Persistence  
 Predictability  
 Smoothness  
  
 
 Value relevance 
  Timeliness 
  Conservatism  
  ERC (Earnings 
Response Coefficient)
 
 
Function of earnings is 
the effective allocation 
of cash flowss to 
reporting periods via 
the accruals process 
Function of earnings 
is to reflect 
economic income as 
represented by stock 
returns 
Transparency 
A strong earnings 
response coefficient is 
an indication of higher-
quality earnings 
(Imhoff, 1992). 
 
Source: based on Dechow et al. (2010) and Francis et al. (2004) 
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Table 3.1 Proxies for Earnings Quality 
Empirical proxy Theory Strengths and Weaknesses 
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1,𝑗𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 
 
𝛽1,𝑗 measures persistence 
Firms with more persistent 
earnings have a more 
‘sustainable’ earnings 
Pros: Fits well with a Graham and Dodd view of earnings as a 
summary metric of expected cash flows useful for equity valuation. 
 
Cons: Persistence depends both on the firm’s fundamental 
performance as well as the accounting measurement system. 
Persistence may be achieved in the short run by engaging in earnings 
management 
 
 
Residuals from accrual models 
(Error term from regressing accruals on their 
economic drivers) 
 
Residuals from accrual 
models represent managers’ 
discretion or estimation errors, 
both of which reduce decision 
usefulness 
Pros: The measure tries to distinguish the managed or error component of 
accruals. The use of these models has become the accepted methodology 
in accounting to capture discretion  
 
Cons: Tests of the determinants/consequences of earnings management 
are joint tests of the theory and the abnormal accrual metric as a proxy 
for earnings management  
 
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑆𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜎(𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑗,𝑡)/𝜎(CFOj,t)  
 
A lower ratio indicates more smoothing of 
the earnings stream relative to cash flows 
Smoothing transitory cash flows 
can improve earnings persistence 
and earnings informativeness. 
However, smoothing permanent 
changes in cash flows will lead to 
a less timely and less informative 
earnings number 
Pros: Income smoothing appears to be a common corporate practice in 
many countries around the world 
 
Cons: It is difficult to disentangle smoothness of reported earnings 
that reflects smoothness of the (1) fundamental earnings process; 
(2)accounting rules; and (3) intentional earnings manipulation 
Timeliness  
𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼0,𝑗 + 𝛼1,𝑗𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽1,𝑗𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝛽2,𝑗𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑗,𝑡𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 
A higher 𝛽1,𝑗 implies more timely recognition of 
the incurred losses in earnings. 
 
There is a demand for TLR to 
combat management’s natural 
optimism. TLR represents 
high quality earnings 
Pros: assuming that returns appropriately reflect fundamental information  
 
Cons: because TLR results in lower persistence during bad news periods 
than during good news periods (Basu, 1997). Both persistence and TLR 
affect the decision usefulness of earnings. TLR is a return-based metric. 
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(Source: based on Dechow et al. (2010). Understanding earnings quality: A review of the proxies, their determinants and their consequences, 
Exhibit 1) 
 
 
Benchmarks  
 
Kinks in earnings distribution 
Changes in earnings distribution  
Kinks in forecast error distribution 
String of positive earnings increases 
 
 
Unusual clustering in earnings 
distributions implies earnings 
management around targets. 
Observations at or slightly 
above targets have low quality 
earnings 
Pros: The measure is easy to calculate, the concept is intuitively 
appealing, and survey evidence suggests earnings management around 
targets  
 
Cons: In addition to statistical validity issues, evidence that kinks 
represent opportunistic earnings management is mixed, with credible 
alternative explanations including non-accounting issues. It is difficult 
to distinguish firms that are at kinks by chance versus those that have 
manipulated their way into the benchmark bins 
 
ERCs 
 
𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑗,𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝑏 ∗ (𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑗,𝑡)
+ 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 
More informative components of earnings will have a 
higher b. 
 
More value relevant earnings will have a 
higher R2 
 
 
Investors respond to 
information that has value 
implications. A higher 
correlation with value implies 
that Earnings better reflect 
fundamental performance. 
 
Pros: This measure directly links earnings to decision 
usefulness, which is quality, albeit specifically in the context of 
equity valuation decisions. 
 
Cons: Assumes market efficiency. In addition, inferences are impaired 
by correlated omitted variables that affect investor reaction (including 
endogenously determined availability of other information), 
measurement error of unexpected earnings, and cross-sectional 
variation in return-generating processes 
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3.4. Hypotheses Development 
 
There is a debate whether state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have more incentives to manipulate 
earnings than in non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs). With the government’s approval, non-
negotiable shares can be transferred among different institutional shareholders, including 
state asset management bureaus, state holding companies, other SOEs, and legal persons. It 
still remains an empirical question whether government ownership deteriorates the earnings 
management problem in China. Following Berle and Means (1932), Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and Roe (1994) indicate the agency problem stem from the conflict of interests 
between the shareholders and managers when ownership is diffuse such as in the USA and 
the UK. However, if ownership is highly concentrated such as the circumstances in East Asia, 
the agency problem stem from the conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders. One distinctive feature of Chinese listed companies is that ownership is highly 
concentrated, which determines the nature of the agency problem in Chinese corporations. 
Since ownership structure is regarded as the primary determinant of agency cost. It is more 
difficult to address the agency problem in state-owned companies than in privately-owned 
companies because there is an extra agency relationship in state-owned companies compared 
to privately-owned companies, as the controlling owners are themselves agents of the true 
owners: the state. Ding et al. (2007) show that companies with private ownership thus have a 
less serious agency problem. Several studies on Chinese SOEs document that state ownership 
is associated with earnings management in the form of tunneling (Aharony et al., 2010; Chen 
and Yuan, 2004; and Liu and Lu, 2002). Meanwhile, there is also evidence providing that 
state-owned firms in China have lower levels of abnormal accruals than non-state-owned 
firms (Ding et al., 2007). The elusive evidence in existing research suggests that a better 
understanding of the impact of state ownership on the earnings quality in China is required. 
 
Ball et al. (2003) suggest that management incentives and pressures differ depending on the 
type of firm in China. To obtain external financing, both SOEs and non-SOEs have incentives 
to manipulate accounting information. However, the former are affiliated with the 
government and their objectives are more diverse, which makes them less eager to pursue 
opportunistic benefits through information manipulation compared with the latter. As 
discussed in Wang et al. (2008), most local and central SOEs have the advantage to receive 
subsidies (or known as ‘bailout’) from the government, when they have financial problems. 
The Chinese government has such an incentive to provide this kind of bailout because the 
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large-scale financial distress in SOEs might lead to civil unrest. Thus, there is little pressure 
for most SOEs to meet the profitability requirement and to face the delisting risk. In contrast, 
without the protection of government, Non-SOEs are under more pressure to hire reputable 
(large or non-local) auditors to mitigate the agency problem and provide an early warning of 
any possible financial distress. Hence, Non-SOEs face more financing constraints than SOEs. 
It appears that in non-SOEs, managers are well monitored by principals and have incentives 
to improve corporate governance and maximize firm value. Corporate governance seems to 
be work better for non-SOEs. However, managers in non-SOEs face fewer political and legal 
restrictions than do those in SOEs, and they can handle many problems through unofficial 
channels or illegal means, which managers in SOEs dare not and cannot do. In non-SOEs, 
compliance with accounting principles and regulations is determined by the integrity of the 
management or the ultimate shareholders. Because punishments for accounting standard 
violations are inadequate and other regulations are not strongly enforced, the cost of violation 
is low for entrepreneurs. This problem is more severe in countries with a weak legal and 
institutional environment, such as China. Therefore, the political cost for non-SOEs is much 
lower than that for SOEs. The political pressure on managers in SOEs is much greater as they 
are constrained by restrictive rules and regulations. Compliance with these directives is the 
most important consideration for SOE management, as their violation will lead to criticism of 
management by regulatory authorities and the public, damage the reputation of managers and 
in extreme cases, ruin the political career of managers.  
 
Regarding timely loss recognition, higher-quality earnings are expected to exhibit a higher 
frequency of large losses (see Ball et al., 2000; Lang et al., 2003; Leuz et al., 2003; Ball and 
Shivakumar, 2005; 2006). Ball et al. (2008) using the R2 and b1 coefficient estimate from the 
Basu (1997) reverse regression, find that loss recognition is timelier for firms in countries 
with greater prominence of debt markets relative to equity markets. Ball et al. (2003) also 
find that East Asian countries except China, which share a common law origin but are 
asserted to have lower equity capital markets incentives, do not have more timely loss 
recognition than code law countries. The higher level of accounting conservatism in SOEs 
compared to non-SOEs may be due to downward earnings management by the former to hide 
abnormal profits accruing from a government monopoly. In China, firms are more likely to 
report higher earnings because of the goals or planned objectives that government has set for 
them. Both SOEs and non-SOEs tend to report higher earnings, but the former are a little 
more conservative than the latter, perhaps because the former have less incentive to manage 
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earnings to ‘fool’ the market. Nevertheless, Chen et al. (2008) find that in China, the 
accounting reports of privately owned firms are more conservative than those of SOEs.   
 
Referring to value relevance, prior empirical research suggests that higher quality earnings 
are more value relevant (Lang et al., 2003; Leuz et al., 2003; Lang et al., 2006). Ewert and 
Wagenhofer (2005) document that accounting standards could constrain opportunistic 
managerial discretion and result in more value-relevant accounting earnings. Some studies 
examine the value relevance of accounting numbers reported under IFRS and Chinese GAAP 
and find that earnings and book values of shareholders’ equity reported under IFRS are 
generally more value-relevant than those reported under Chinese GAAP.  Barth et al. (2008) 
and Hung and Subramanyam (2007) document that accounting quality significantly enhanced 
after the adoption of IFRS, for instance, providing timelier information. However, by an 
international study across 51 countries including China, Daske et al. (2008) show that IFRS 
simply has impact on those countries where there is high transparency and strong legal 
enforcement. Given the consensus that China has weak investor protection and weak legal 
enforcement, its mandatory IFRS adoption is not expected to have an immediate and 
systematic impact on listed firms (Chen and Cheng, 2007). In addition, through investigating 
the effects of convergence with IFRS on the timeliness of earnings recognition in the 
emerging Chinese market, Wu et al. (2014) conclude that the timeliness of earnings 
recognition reported under Chinese GAAP worsened after a series of harmonization and 
convergence with IFRS in China. When earnings are more value relevant, stronger investor 
response will be expected (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). Regarding Earnings Response 
Coefficient (ERC), previous studies provide the evidence that there is a significantly negative 
relationship between ownership and the ERC. It indicates that the higher the dominant 
shareholder’s ownership stake is, the less informative earnings becomes.  
 
 To sum up, according to financial distress theory, SOEs have the advantage to receive 
financial subsidies from government while NSOEs face more financing constraints. 
Therefore, incentives for NSOEs to manipulate earnings are stronger than in SOEs (Wang et 
al., 2008). The agency theory, however, argues that state ownership in SOEs creates 
incentives and regulatory backing for self-serving purposes, thus motivating SOEs to 
manipulate accounting numbers (Liu et al., 2014). The political cost hypothesis complements 
the agency theory and illustrates that SOEs’ managers manipulate accounting numbers in 
response to government intervention. Government ownership is probably associated with 
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higher earnings quality or lower earnings quality depending on how the listed firms view the 
nature of the government involvement. When governments aim to expropriate the benefits of 
firms, SOEs would report conservatively to disguise the profits. However, when governments 
impel firms to enhance performance via stringent government regulations, SOEs would report 
aggressively to meet specific thresholds.  
 
Hence, this study hypothesizes that there is no difference in the quality of accounting 
information reported by state-owned vs. non-state-owned firms in China. The null hypothesis 
is expressed as:  
Ho: There is no difference in the quality of reported accounting information between state-
owned listed and non-state-owned listed firms. 
H1: State-owned listed firms have higher quality of reported accounting information than the 
Non-state-owned listed firms. 
3.5. Empirical Modeling 
 
A number of attributes have been explained by previous research as the notion of earnings 
quality. Although Dechow et al. (2010) emphasize that they could not draw a conclusion 
about the single best measure of earnings quality for all decision models, in recent years there 
are two abnormal accruals proxies that have gained general acceptance in the academic 
literature. One is introduced by Dechow and Dichev (2002); another is developed by Francis 
et al. (2005). The former attempts to more explicitly map cash flows into the accruals 
generating process on the basis of Jones model (1991) which was originally designed to 
capture earnings management. The Dechow and Dichev model (2002) was also designed 
from the outset as a proxy for both intentional and unintentional factors affecting earnings 
quality. Francis et al. (2005) primarily split the variation in earnings quality into the portion 
resulting from the innate application of the accounting system and the portion attributable to 
management discretion. Dechow and Schrand (2004) document that earnings-based models 
outperform cash flows-based models for measuring firm value based on large sample size.   
 
Earnings quality has multiple dimensions of attributes, such as accrual persistence, estimation 
errors in the accrual process, and the absence of earnings manipulation as well as the 
reporting conservatism, which have been frequently discussed in prior literature. Besides, 
more diverse measures of earnings quality are employed. For example, Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) introduce the strength of the correlation between current accruals and past, present, 
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and future cash flows. Penman and Zhang (2002) regard ‘sustainable earnings’ as high-
quality earnings. Sloan (1996) and Richardson et al. (2005) deem the reliability of accruals 
captured by earnings persistence as one trait of earnings quality. Consistent with Lang et al. 
(2006) and Barth et al. (2008), this study considers the measures which are important to the 
informativeness of accounting data, i.e., earnings smoothing, tendency to manage earnings 
towards a target, timely loss recognition, and value relevance. Multiple measures are 
employed to mitigate the potential biases that may affect some of the measures. Following 
prior literature, accrual quality, persistence, predictability, and smoothness are classified as 
accounting-based earnings attributes, which consequently are simply measured by employing 
accounting information. According to Francis et al. (2004, p.969), ‘accounting-based 
earnings attributes derive from an implicit assumption that the function of earnings is the 
effective allocation of cash flows to reporting periods via the accruals process, while market-
based attributes derive from an implicit assumption that the function of earnings is to reflect 
economic income as represented by stock returns.’  
 
Ewert and Wagenhofer (2011) argue that accounting-based measures seem to be inferior to 
market-based measures simply because they cannot capture the sophisticated inferences by 
rational investors on the price-relevant information incorporated in reported earnings. 
Therefore, to fully capture the earnings attributes, on the basis of Francis et al. (2004), this 
analysis categorizes value relevance, timeliness, and conservatism as ‘market-based’ earnings 
attributes. More importantly, Earnings Response Coefficient (ERC) is extended as a function 
of ‘market-based’ earnings quality via detecting earnings surprise according to Dechow et 
al.’s influential paper (2010). The return-based measures assume market is efficient. 
 
3.5.1. Accounting-Based Earnings Attributes  
 
3.5.1.1 Accrual quality 
 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) test a measure of earnings quality via capturing the mapping of 
current accruals into last-period, current-period, and next-period cash flows, and Francis et al. 
(2004) demonstrate that this measure (which they term accrual quality) is associated with 
measures of the cost of debt and equity capital. Dechow et al. (2010) imply that the abnormal 
accruals generated from various accruals models as a measure of earnings quality tends to be 
positively correlated with the level of accruals. It means that a firm with extreme accruals 
tends to have extreme abnormal accruals. This is very important for interpreting results in the 
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literature. Large values of Accrual Quality indicate poor accrual quality, whereas small 
values indicate good accrual quality. 
 
Total Accruals is defined as the difference between earnings and cash flows from operations.  
｜Accruals｜is the absolute value of Total accruals.  
𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑗,𝑡
= 𝜑0,𝑗 + 𝜑1,𝑗
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑗,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝜑2,𝑗
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝜑3,𝑗
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 
(Equation 3.1) 
Where 
 𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑗,𝑡= firm j's total current accruals in year t, is defined as the difference between earnings 
and cash flows from operations 
 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑗,𝑡= firm j's total assets in year t 
 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜎(𝜀𝑗,𝑡)   equals to the standard deviation of firm j's estimated residuals.  
 
Abnormal accruals have been the focus of much empirical research in the accounting area. It 
has been used as a proxy for earnings quality to test predictions in almost all of the 
determinants and consequences categories. One disadvantage of this model is that it cannot 
be used to identify distortions induced by long-term accruals, such as impairments of PPE 
and goodwill, which are likely to reflect earnings management or accounting distortions. 
 
3.5.1.2 Earnings Persistence 
 
It is assumed that firms with more persistent earnings have more sustainable earnings and 
more persistent earnings will yield more decision useful inputs to equity valuation models. As 
a part of earnings, accruals are the most studied determinant of persistence. Dechow et al. 
(2010) show that high accrual firms are more likely to have high ‘discretionary’ accruals, 
tend to have less persistent earnings. Persistence and variability of earnings are accepted 
widely as indicators of earnings quality (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeny, 1995; Schipper and 
Vincent, 2003). Persistence detects earnings sustainability; hence, persistent earnings indicate 
recurring earnings (e.g., Penman and Zhang 2002; Revsine et al. 2002, 245; Richardson 
2003). Recurring earnings are a desirable element for the analysts to predict the companies’ 
future earnings.  
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Based on previous studies (e.g., Lev, 1983; Ali and Zarowin, 1992; Francis et al., 2004), this 
study measures earnings persistence as the slope co-efficient from auto-regression of current 
earnings on lagged earnings (i.e., using an AR1 model with drift of annual earnings), rather 
than a higher order specification suggested by Finger (1994) and Baginskie et al. (1999). This 
measurement is used as this research expects to estimate firm-specific persistence measures 
for a broad sample of firms over rolling five-year windows 43 . Using higher-order 
specifications increases the number of parameters to be estimated and, therefore, increases 
the length of the time-series needed for the estimation; in turn, it restricts the sample to firms 
with the necessary data. 
 
   𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1,𝑗𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡                                              
                                                                                                                                 (Equation 3.2) 
For each firm-year, Equation 3.2 is estimated by using maximum likelihood estimation and 
rolling five-year windows. This procedure produces firm- and year-specific estimates of slope 
coefficient𝛽1,𝑗 , which capture the persistence of earnings. Values of 𝛽1,𝑗  close to 1 imply 
highly persistent earnings, while values of 𝛽1,𝑗 close to 0 imply highly transitory earnings. In 
order to conform this variable to our ordering of attributes, this study employs the negative of 
the AR1 parameter, Persistence=- 𝛽1,𝑗 , so that larger (smaller) values of persistence 
correspond to less (more) persistent earnings.  
 
The lower persistence of the accrual component does not imply that accruals are not useful. 
The outcome simply informs us that when earnings are composed predominantly of accruals, 
they will be less persistent than when earnings are composed predominantly of cash flows. 
Researchers have clarified that earnings produce smaller forecast errors than cash flows in 
valuation models; that earnings are more strongly associated with stock returns than are cash 
flows; that earnings are more persistent than cash flows, and that earnings are less volatile 
than cash flows (Dechow et al., 2010). 
                                                 
43 A rolling analysis of a time series model is often used to assess the model’s stability over time. When 
analysing financial time series data using a statistical model, a key assumption is that the parameters of the 
model are constant over time. However, the economic environment often changes considerably, and it may 
not be reasonable to assume that a model’s parameters are constant. A common technique to assess the 
constancy of a model’s parameters is to compute parameter estimates over a rolling window of a fixed size 
through the sample. If the parameters are truly constant over the entire sample, then the estimates over the 
rolling windows should not be too different. If the parameters change at some point during the sample, 
then the rolling estimates should capture this instability (Zivot, E. and Wang, J., 2006, Modelling Financial 
Time Series with S-PLUS, Springer). 
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As stated in Collins and Kothari (1989), a key question that remains is whether time series 
persistence estimates fully and accurately capture economic growth opportunities. It is 
deemed as problematic in the existing literature for at least two reasons. Firstly, time series 
analysis cannot distinguish correlation in successive earnings numbers caused by mere 
expansion (i.e., earnings reinvestment through time or increases in external financing) versus 
economic growth. Secondly, ARIMA models typically assume parameter stability. Hence, 
any trend term that embodies earnings expansion and/or growth is constrained to be a 
constant. This is a limiting assumption, particularly when estimates are based on annual data 
for a 20-30-year time span (see Kormendi and Lipe, 1987). It implies that the persistence 
estimates from time series models are deficient in accurately reflecting current growth 
opportunities.  
 
3.5.1.3 Earnings Predictability 
 
Following Lipe (1990), earnings predictability is the ability of earnings to predict itself. 
Predictability is an element of relevance in FASB's Conceptual Framework, and is therefore a 
desirable earnings attribute from the perspective of standard setters. Based on Francis et al. 
(2004) and Lipe (1990), the square root of the estimation error variance from Equation 3.2 
(the firm- and year-specific AR1 model) is adopted to measure Earnings Predictability 
=√𝜎2(𝜀). Large (small) values of Predictability imply less (more) predictable earnings. 
 
3.5.1.4 Earnings Smoothness 
 
Dechow et al. (2010) deem ‘smoothness’ an outcome of an accrual-based system assumed to 
improve decision usefulness; it is not the ultimate goal of the measurement system. The 
assessment of smoothness as a measure of earnings quality is the impact of a firm’s 
accounting choices (see Lambert, 1984; Demski, 1998; and Kirschenheiter and Melumad, 
2002). Earnings smoothness is a desirable earnings attribute. Managers generally use their 
private information about future income to smooth out earnings volatility and thereby achieve 
a more favorable reported earnings number. Smoothness is typically seen as a desirable 
attribute of earnings. Financial analysts and investors regard volatility of earnings as 
undesirable and indicative of low quality of earnings. Smoothness is a natural result of 
accrual accounting. This study follows the definition of smoothness by Francis et al. (2004) 
as the ratio of firm i's standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items scaled by 
total assets, to its standard deviation of cash flows from operations scaled by total assets.  
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 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑆𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜎(𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑗,𝑡)/𝜎(CFOj,t)                               
                                                                                                                                  (Equation 3.3) 
 
Where 𝐶𝐹𝑂 is cash flows from operations (measured as income from continuing operations 
less total accruals, where total accruals equal total current accruals minus the depreciation 
and amortization expense). Larger values of Smoothness indicate less earnings smoothness. 
Previous studies predicated that losses are less persistent than profits because companies are 
more likely to abandon or restructure operations which generate losses. Defined by Basu 
(1997), conservative accounting recognizes bad news in earnings more quickly than good 
news; it leads to lower persistence of negative earnings changes. 
 
3.5.2. Return-Based Earnings Attributes  
 
Beaver et al. (1980) argue that prices and earnings can be characterized as joint signals from 
a larger set of publicly available information regarding the economic state of a firm. Ball et al. 
(2009) find that the common factors of earnings and returns are highly correlated and 
interpret this as evidence that earnings and returns are jointly determined. Earnings Response 
Coefficients (ERC) and the contemporaneous R2 between earnings and returns (popularized 
by Lev, 1989) are applied to capture important fundamental properties of financial reporting. 
Association studies measure the contemporaneous relation between financial statement 
variables and stock returns assuming market efficiency. 
 
Generally speaking, the returns/earnings relation is investigated by using either an ‘events’ 
study 44 or an ‘association’ study method (Collins and Kothari, 1989). In essence, the ‘event’ 
study focuses on whether earnings announcements convey information about future cash 
flows. On the other hand, in an association study, returns over relatively long periods (fiscal 
quarters or years) are regressed on unexpected earnings or other performance measures such 
as cash flows (e.g. Raybum, 1986) or replacement cost earnings (see Beaver, Griffin, and 
Landsman, 1982). Association studies assume that market agents learn much about earnings 
                                                 
44 The event studies infer whether the earnings announcement, per se, causes investors to revise their cash 
flows expectations as revealed by security price changes measured over a short time period (typically, 2-3 
days) around the earnings announcement. Examples include Foster (1977), Hagerman, Zmijewski, and 
Shah (1984), and Wilson (1986, 1987). The justification for using shorter windows is that they reduce the 
effects of confounding information. These studies seek evidence concerning the market’s response to the 
actual release of earnings data. 
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and valuation-relevant events from non-accounting information throughout these long periods. 
Hence, association studies concentrate on examining whether the earnings determination 
process captures the valuation relevant events in a meaningful and timely manner. 
 
The analysis of Collins and Kothari (1989), argues that association studies that use a holding 
period corresponding to a firm’s fiscal period (or between earnings announcement dates) 
understate the earnings/returns association. Holding periods with a longer time horizon can 
enhance the earnings/returns association relative to the conventional twelve-month holding 
periods, particularly for larger firms. Prior literature documents that the association is 
maximized when returns are measured over 15 months. Varying the return window will 
ensure the unexpected earnings proxy matching up closely with the true, but unobservable, 
market earnings expectation. It will ensure the estimated response coefficient fully captures 
the market’s valuation of unexpected earnings. Different return intervals will give the 
opportunity to assess how they affect the earnings/returns association as measured by 
adjusted R2 across firm size. Therefore, this study attempts to use a holding period that ranges 
from 12 to 18 months.   
 
Major accounting standard setting bodies such as the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) and the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) have adopted this 
investor oriented information usefulness perspective and specifically stated that the primary 
purpose of accounting is to meet the needs of capital markets (FASB, 1978; IASC, 1994). 
Consequently, it is not surprising that an important objective of the Chinese accounting 
reform is to improve the usefulness of financial reporting in the stock market (Winkle et al., 
1994; Xiang, 1998; Chen et al., 1999). Since Ball and Brown (1968), accounting researchers 
have produced numerous studies documenting the association between accounting earnings 
and stock returns. Differences in country characteristics are an important element of returns. 
Drummen and Zimmerman (1992) and Eftekhari and Satchell (1999) all discover that country 
factors predominated over other factors (e.g. world factors and industry trends) in the 
determination of stock returns. The current study extends this line of inquiry into the 
emerging Chinese stock market. Because of the unique institutional setting of the Chinese 
market, the results of this study have implications for both theory and practice in China and 
beyond.  
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3.5.2.1. Value relevance 
 
Value-relevance studies generally examine the strength of association between accounting 
numbers and share prices/stock returns to infer whether capital market participants consider 
accounting information to be sufficiently relevant and reliable to make effective investment 
decisions. These studies rely on share prices/stock returns as proxies for expected future cash 
flows providing indirect evidence on accounting information reliability. Maines and Wahlen 
(2006, p.417) summarize value-relevance studies are joint tests of: (1) the capital markets’ 
perception of relevance of a specific piece of accounting information for the future cash flows 
of the firm; (2) the capital market’s perception of the reliability of that accounting 
information; and (3) market efficiency. 
 
Higher values of relevance imply lower value relevant earnings and therefore poorer earnings 
quality. The value relevance of earnings (that is, the ability of earnings to explain variations 
in returns or prices) is a desirable attribute as it is usually seen as a direct measure of the 
decision usefulness of earnings. This construct is often measured as the ability of earnings to 
explain variation in returns, where greater explanatory power is viewed as desirable. One 
stream of this research interprets value relevance as a direct measure of decision usefulness 
(e.g., Joos and Lang 1994; Collins et al. 1997; Francis and Schipper 1999; Lev and Zarowin 
1999). This interpretation rests on the view that value relevance measures capture combined 
relevance and reliability, two significant concepts in the FASB's Conceptual Framework. The 
measure of value relevance is the explanatory power of earnings level and change for returns 
as follows. 
 
 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0,𝑗 + 𝛽1,𝑗𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2,𝑗∆𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 
                                                                                          (Equation 3.4) 
                                                                                                             
 
Where: 
 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑗,𝑡= firm j's 13-month return, 15-month return and 18-month return ending one month, 
three months and six months respectively after the end of fiscal year t; 𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑗,𝑡 = firm j’s 
income before extraordinary items in year t (NIBE), scaled by market value at the end of year 
t-1; and ∆𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑗,𝑡 = change in firm j's NIBE in year t, scaled by market value at the end of 
year t-1.  
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Value relevance is estimated for each firm over rolling five-year windows. To conform this 
variable to our ordering scheme, this study takes the negative of the adjusted R2 from 
Equation 3.4, Relevance = -R2j,t (Equation 3.4). Large (small) values of Relevance imply less 
(more) value relevant earnings. 
 
3.5.2.2. Timeliness and Conservatism 
 
Higher values of timeliness imply less timely earnings and poorer earnings quality. Earnings 
that reflect the information incorporated in stock returns more quickly are seen by investors 
as being of higher quality. Earnings conservatism is measured in terms of the asymmetric 
incorporation into earnings of economic losses (measured as negative stock returns) and 
economic gains (measured as positive stock returns). Conservative accounting is expected to 
reveal information that managers might have incentives to hide otherwise (Martı´nez-Jerez, 
2008), so investors usually see conservatism as a desirable attribute of earnings. 
Conservatism is also considered a desirable attribute for monitoring and contractual purposes. 
The degree of reporting conservatism is another attribute of financial reporting. This measure 
has been employed by a number of studies (e.g., Basu 1997; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005).  
 
𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼0,𝑗 + 𝛼1,𝑗𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽1,𝑗𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2,𝑗𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑗,𝑡𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 
     (Equation 3.5)  
Where 𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑗,𝑡= 1 if 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑗,𝑡< 0 (indicating economic losses, i.e. bad news) and 0 otherwise 
(indicating economic gains, i.e. good news); all other variables are as previously defined. Ball 
et al. (2008) and Chan (2014) indicate that the coefficient 𝛽1,𝑗 on stock return measures the 
timeliness of gain recognition (timely gain recognition coefficient); the coefficient 𝛽2,𝑗 on the 
product of stock return and the return dummy measures the incremental timeliness of loss 
recognition (incrementally timely loss recognition coefficient); timely loss recognition is 
measured by (𝛽1,𝑗+𝛽2,𝑗) and asymmetrically timely loss recognition implies 𝛽2,𝑗>0. Overall 
income timeliness, for both gains and losses combined, is measured by the adjusted R2 of the 
regression. Although the Basu (1997) model has been criticized in several studies (e.g. 
Dietrich et al., 2007; Givoly et al., 2007), the asymmetric timeliness of earnings is the most 
direct indicator of earnings conservatism and Basu-based-conservatism measure still best 
captures conditional conservatism and has been widely used in empirical studies (Ball and 
Shivakumar, 2005; Ball et al., 2008; Chung and Wynn, 2008; Dechow et al., 2010; Ettredge 
et al., 2012; Francis and Wang, 2008; and Garcı´a Lara et al., 2009 and Ruddock et al., 2006). 
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Equation 3.5 is also estimated on a firm- and year-specific basis, using rolling five-year 
windows. Following Basu (1997) and Ball et al. (2008) and Bushman et al. (2004) and 
Dechow et al. (2010), the measure of Timeliness is based on the explanatory power of 
Equation 3.5; similar to Relevance, the negative of the adjusted R2 is derived from Equation 
3.5, Timeliness = -R2j,t  (Equation 3.5). Following Basu (1997), Pope and Walker (1999), 
Givoly and Hayn (2000) and Ball et al. (2008) and Chan (2014), the measure of 
Conservatism in this research is the negative of the ratio of the coefficient on bad news to the 
coefficient on good news, Conservatism =−(𝛽1,𝑗+𝛽2,𝑗)/𝛽1,𝑗 . Larger values of Timeliness and 
Conservatism imply less timely and less conservative earnings, respectively.  
 
3.5.2.3. Earnings Response Coefficient (ERC) 
 
A measure of investor responsiveness to earnings mainly includes studies that examine an 
earnings response coefficient (ERC). Extant studies explicitly state that investor 
responsiveness to earnings is a straight-forward proxy for earnings quality (Holthausen and 
Verrecchia, 1988; Liu and Thoma, 2000). Academic accounting researchers have employed a 
return-based earnings response coefficient as a measure of earnings quality (e.g. Beaver, 
1968; and Ball and Brown, 1967; 1968). Imhoff (1992) suggests that a strong earnings 
response coefficient is an indication of higher-quality earnings by using judgments obtained 
from security analysts who were members of the Financial Analysts Federation. The results 
of DeFond and Park (2001) are also consistent with the interpretation of the ERC as a 
measure of earnings quality. They conclude higher ERCs when abnormal accruals restrain the 
magnitude of earnings surprises and lower ERCs when abnormal accruals exaggerated the 
magnitude of earnings surprises.  
 
In accounting research, there is a basic premise that earnings with more persistency and 
relevant value will have stronger ERCs. Some significant results on ERCs provide insights 
into earnings persistence. It is noteworthy that Liu and Thomas (2000) recognize the extent to 
which the ERC captures decision usefulness is influenced by the degree of heterogeneity in 
the correlation between unexpected earnings and earnings forecast revisions within the 
sample: this heterogeneity results in low values of the regression R2. Therefore, sample 
specific characteristics, such as growth, that affect within- sample heterogeneity, are crucial. 
Consistent with the findings from Liu and Thomas (2000), Dechow et al. (2010) conclude 
that a correlation between ERCs and its availability indicates that the ERC can be viewed as a 
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reasonable proxy for earnings quality only when the availability of other information is 
homogeneous within the sample. Dechow et al. (2010) emphasize that ERC as a proxy for 
earnings informativeness potentially suffer from an omitted variable bias if the variable of 
interest is correlated with a firm’s information environment.  
 
ERC is defined as the estimated b from the firm-level regression of annual returns on 
earnings:  
𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑏 ∗ (𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑗,𝑡) + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 
(Equation 3.6)                          
Where α  is the intercept 
            𝒃 = firm j’s earnings response coefficient (ERC); 
            Abnormal Return = Stock abnormal return as the market-adjusted return 
            𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝑺𝒖𝒓𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒋,𝒕 =Firm-specific unexpected earnings, equals to firm j’s fiscal      
year-end reported earnings per share minus the consensus (median) analyst forecast 
EPS at the period of t, scaled by stock closing price at the end of period t-1; or using a 
time series expectation of annual earnings to obtain Earnings Surprise; 
             𝜺𝒋,𝒕  is a disturbance term. 
 
All earnings per share are adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends. More informative 
components of earnings will have a higher b, indicating that earnings surprise has greater 
valuation implication. Earnings Response Coefficient (ERC) measures the weight of earnings 
in price movements, which is regarded as a function of ‘market-based’ earnings quality via 
detecting earnings surprise.  (scaled by stock closing price at the end of 
period t-1) is measured in two ways: (a) the deviation of actual earnings from a predicated 
amount based on a time-series model of earnings and (b) the deviation of actual earnings 
from the consensus (median) analyst forecast (analyst forecast error). The median analyst 
forecast is computed using each analyst’s latest forecast before the earnings announcement. 
Collins and Kothari (1989) suppose that the ERC varies cross-sectionally with the holding 
period return interval and conclude that a conventional 12-month return period understates 
the earnings/returns association, particularly for larger firms. The association is maximized 
when returns are measured over 15 months. Hence, all further analysis is performed using 
returns measured over the 13-month, 15-month and 18-month intervals correspondently in 
ERC model for comparison (i.e. 1 month, 3 months and 6 months after the fiscal year end). 
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Kothari and Sloan (1992) indicate that the limitation of a time-series predicted earnings is 
that the market’s expectation is based on a richer information set. Therefore, earnings surprise 
will be measured with error and the slope coefficient on earnings surprise will be biased 
towards zero. Because ‘stock price adjustment to some factors reflected in annual earnings 
may have occurred in previous years’. This is supported by previous studies (e.g., Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986). According to Collins and Kothari (1989), if firm size is a proxy for 
information environment differences, then different size firms will exhibit different ERCs on 
measuring  over a fixed holding period for all firms. Many previous 
studies suggest a relationship between firm size and several earnings attributes but with 
mixed results. Some predict that firm size is negatively associated with earnings quality 
because larger firms would make income-decreasing accounting method choices in response 
to greater political and regulatory scrutiny (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; and Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986). Therefore, this study controls firm size (natural logarithm of total assets) 
which may affect earnings quality in this analysis in Equation 3.6. Earnings Response 
Coefficient (ERC) measures the weight of earnings in price movements. When earnings are 
more value relevant, stronger investor response will be expected (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). 
The relationship between stock return and earnings has been examined since the publication 
of Ball and Brown (1968). A larger ERC indicates that a dollar of earnings surprise has 
greater valuation implications.   
 
3.6. Sample Selection and Empirical Results 
 
The sample is selected from listed A-share firms in China from 2004 to 2013. A firm is 
classified as an SOE if it is ultimately controlled by the government, including central 
government, local government at the provincial, municipal, and county level, and other 
governmental institutions. A firm is considered to be a non-SOE when its ultimate controlling 
shareholder is an individual or a non-state entity, including a town–village enterprise, foreign 
enterprise, or other non-state-controlled enterprise. The state ownership information is 
defined by CCER and CSMAR database.  
 
The sample firms in this study are listed in the A-share stock market, which are required to 
report under Chinese GAAP.45  B shares, H shares, overseas shares; firms that are dual-
                                                 
45 A shares market is open to domestic investors. B shares market is open to foreign investors and is traded 
in foreign currencies. H shares are firms listed in the Hong Kong stock exchange. Firms listed as B shares 
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listed/cross-listed are excluded because they are subject to either different accounting 
standards or different listing regulations. This study focuses on the A shares market only 
because the small sample sizes in either B shares market or H shares market does not allow 
for a reasonably powerful test. Meanwhile, financial, insurance and banking firms are 
excluded from the samples because their accounting standards and earnings properties are 
different from the rest of firms and thus non-comparable. In order to keep the consistency and 
better examine the time effect on firm-specific earnings quality, the sample firms do not 
include the new entry and delisted firms between 2004 and 2013. It implies that each sample 
firm in our sample has ten consecutive years of observations. Hence, it is a strong-balanced 
panel data. The financial data are obtained from the China Stock Market and the Accounting 
Research (CSMAR) Database, for example, earnings forecasts and actual earnings obtained 
from CSMAR database, all per share data adjusted for splits and stock dividends using the 
CSMAR adjustment factors and stock price and return data collected from CSMAR monthly 
tape. 
 
After eliminating missing values, a total of 9860 firm-year observations are collected 
between the fiscal year of 2004 and 2013. Following prior research (e.g., Lev 1983; Ali and 
Zarowin 1992; Francis et al., 2004), earnings persistence is evaluated as the slope coefficient 
estimate from an autoregressive model of order one (AR1 with drift)46  for annual split-
adjusted earnings per share (EPS). Augmented Dickey-Fuller test is employed for testing unit 
root and First Order Difference Transformation for Stationary Test, and 311 firm-specific 
observations with non-stationary earnings in terms of p value (p>0.05) have been removed. 
The final sample size for this study, except return/earnings model for ERC, is 675 firms 
which are listed in the A-shares market for ten consecutive years from 2004 to 2013. All the 
earnings attributes tested by this analysis, except ERC, are measured on a firm- and year-
specific basis using rolling five-year windows. Regarding to the return/earnings model for 
ERC, there are only 626 firms in our sample. The time span ranges from 2008 to 2013, 
because there is insufficient data or missing information on analysts’ forecast before 2008 in 
                                                                                                                                                        
are required to report under international accounting standards. Firms listed as H shares are required to 
report under Hong Kong GAAP. 
 
46 We use an AR1 model (with drift) of annual earnings, rather than a higher order specification suggested 
by Finger( 1994) and Baginskie t al. (1999), because we wish to estimate firm-specific persistence 
measures for a broad sample of firms over rolling 5-year windows. In addition, Francis et al. (2004, p.980) 
point out that ‘using higher-order specifications increases the number of parameters to be estimated and 
increases the length of the time-series needed for the estimation; in turn, this restricts the sample to firms 
with the necessary data.’ 
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the CSMAR database. The securities analyst industry in China has a low starting point. For 
instance, until December 2002, Securities Analysts Committee was established in Beijing 
under Securities Association of China. 
 
In China, state-owned listed firms and non-state-owned listed firms are subject to the same 
accounting standards but to differing government intervention. This allows us to examine the 
effects of institutional incentives on different types of firms while holding the accounting 
standards constant. Tables 3.2a and 3.2b describe the sample firm-year distributions by year 
and by industry respectively. Table 3.2a presents that the state-owned enterprises’ (SOE) and 
non-state-owned enterprises’ (Non-SOE) distribution between 2004 and 2013. SOEs accounts 
for 73.33% of the sample size, almost three time of the number of Non-SOEs (26.67%). 
Tables 3.2b shows the sample firms’ distribution by industry according to Industry 
Classifying Guidelines of Listed Companies (2001) released by the CSRC. Manufacturing 
Industry has the largest number of firms (with 415 firms each year) while Conglomerates has 
the lowest number (with 27 firms each year). From the ownership nature of the ultimate 
controller, SOEs within each industry category is over 60% of the firm observations.  
 
Table 3.3 presents descriptive statistics on firm-year characteristics by ownership type. As 
shown in Table 3.3, state-owned firms and non-state-owned firms are, on average, very close 
in firm size as measured by the log of market value. There is no significant difference 
between the two types of firms according to the market value variable. However, with respect 
to their total accruals, the state-own firms are much larger than the non-state owned firms. 
This is also evident on the earnings per share (EPS), which is 0.2573 for state-owned firms 
slightly lower than non-state-owned firms with the value as 0.2832. Regarding the abnormal 
return with three different return windows, only 15-month returns are positive for both SOE 
and Non-SOEs; and non-state-owned firms outperform state-owned firms. In summary, it 
appears that non-state-owned firms have higher market value, earnings per share, stock 
abnormal returns and operating cash flows than state-owned firms, but lower total accruals. 
The total accruals are negative for both SOEs and non-SOE in Table 3.3, but the figure in 
SOEs is approximately 150 times larger in size, indicating SOEs are more likely to 
manipulate down the earnings than non-SOEs, manifesting the government generally 
expropriates the benefits of SOEs, according to Political Cost Hypothesis. According to 
Givoly and Hayn (2000) and Sohn (2012), a consistent predominance of negative accruals of 
a firm over a long period is an indication of conservatism. The rationale behind using 
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negative accruals is that accounting conservatism uses the mechanism of accruals to defer the 
recognition of economic gains and accelerate the recognition of economic losses. Through 
such a process of delaying gains and accelerating losses, the level of accumulated accruals in 
a firm gradually becomes more negative (Givoly and Hayn, 2000). The higher level of 
accounting conservatism in SOEs compared to non-SOEs may be due to downward earnings 
management by the former to hide abnormal profits accruing from a government monopoly.  
  
Table 3.2a Firm-year distribution by year 
 
 
Year 
 
Observation 
 
State-owned 
Percentage of 
total observation 
(%) 
 
Non-state-
owned 
Percentage of 
total 
observation (%) 
2004 675 495 73.33 180 26.67 
2005 675 495 73.33 180 26.67 
2006 675 495 73.33 180 26.67 
2007 675 495 73.33 180 26.67 
2008 675 495 73.33 180 26.67 
2009 675 495 73.33 180 26.67 
2010 675 495 73.33 180 26.67 
2011 675 495 73.33 180 26.67 
2012 675 495 73.33 180 26.67 
2013 675 495 73.33 180 26.67 
Total 6750 4950 73.33 1800 26.67 
 
 
Table 3.2b Firm-year distribution by industry 
 
Industry 
Code 
Industry Name Observations SOEs Percentage 
(%) 
Non-
SOEs 
Percentage 
(%) 
2 Utilities 710 490 69.01  220 30.99  
3 Real Estate 830 510 61.45  320 38.55  
4 Conglomerates 270 190 70.37  80 29.63  
5 Manufacturing 4150 3080 74.22  1070 25.78  
6 Trade 790 680 86.08  110 13.92  
 Total 6750 4950 73.33  1800 26.67  
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Table 3.3 Descriptive statistics on firm-year characteristics by ownership type 
 
 State-owned  Non-state-owned 
 Mean. SD 
  
Median 
 
Mean. SD Median 
Market 
Value  
7310.512 13164.120 3963.398  7342.667 9859.695 4593.794 
Total 
Accruals 
-324.9972  3597.172 -52.6856    -1.9381 915.0891 -21.2980 
EPS      0.2573       0.4962      0.2000     0.2832     0.4417    0.1890 
Firm size    22.2064       0.8841    22.1004   22.2748     0.8847  22.2480 
Abnormal 
Return_13 
    -0.0085       0.3608     -0.0256     0.0040     0.3906   -0.0088 
Abnormal 
Return_15 
     0.0302       0.3647       0.0111     0.0458     0.4023    0.0278 
Abnormal 
Return_18 
    -0.0223       0.3954     -0.0268    -0.0109     0.4307   -0.0132 
 
*Market Value is the market capitalization of the firm (in millions RMB). 
*Total Accruals is defined as net income minus operating cash flows (in millions RMB). 
*EPS is the annual earnings per share deflated by the price at the beginning of the period. 
*The abnormal return is defined as the market-adjusted return; Abnormal Return_13 represents firm j's market-
adjusted 13-month return ending one month after the end of fiscal year t; Abnormal Return_15 represents firm 
j's market-adjusted 15-month return ending three months after the end of fiscal year t; Abnormal Return_18 
represents firm j's market-adjusted 18-month return ending six months after the end of fiscal year t. 
 
 
Tables 3.4 and Table 3.5 illustrate descriptive statistics on the earnings attributes (four 
accounting-based earnings attributes and three market-based earnings attributes measured on 
the basis of 13-month/15-month/18-month stock return) and other variables employed in this 
analysis. The values of each attribute are winsorized at the tails of 99 percent and 1 percent to 
avoid outlier concerns. Table 3.4 presents descriptive statistics on the variables used in our 
analyses. The mean (median) value of Accrual Quality is 1.2016 (0.6395). Compared with 
Francis et al.’s result (2004) which is 0.026 (0.019), it implies that the accrual quality in 
China is much worse than that in the USA. After removal of the outliers, consistent with 
Francis et al. (2004), this study captures earnings persistence as the negative value of slope 
coefficient estimate, i.e. Earnings Persistence= –β. Hence, larger (smaller) values of 
persistence correspond to less (more) persistent earnings. The mean (median) value obtained 
here is 0.3101 (0.3551). Contrasted with Francis‘s findings (2004) on earnings persistence, 
which correspondently is -0.482 (-0.520), the test results are larger standing for less persistent 
earnings in Chinese samples.  
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Based on Francis et al. (2004) and Lipe (1990), the square root of the estimation error 
variance from the abovementioned Equation 3.2 is measured as Earnings Predictability 
=√𝜎2(𝜀) . Here, the empirical results for earning predictability with the value of mean 
(median) 0.4009 (0.2180) show that the earnings from the large sample of Chinese listed 
companies are more predictable that the U.S. samples with mean (median) value of 0.876 and 
0.536. This is because large values of predictability imply less favorable outcomes. Finally, 
for earnings smoothness test, which captures the variability of income relative to the 
variability of cash flows, Francis et al. (2004) obtain the mean (median) value of 0.640 
(0.578). Leuz et al. (2003) report a mean smoothness measure of 0.765 (for all U.S. firm-year 
observations, 1990-1999) and Hunt et al. (2000) report descriptive data implying a mean ratio 
of income volatility to cash volatility of 0.51. However, based on this study’s samples which 
are listed in the A-shares stock market firm- and year- observations for ten consecutive years, 
a mean value of smoothness measure is reported as 4.6992, larger than the US samples. 
Larger values of Smoothness indicate less earnings smoothness in China. 
 
Referring to the market-based earnings attribute measures, which follow Francis et al., (2004) 
with one difference: one more return-based proxy, i.e. Earnings Response Coefficient (ERC), 
is extended as one dimension of Earnings Quality in the regression of abnormal stock returns 
on earnings surprise according to Liu and Thomas (2000) and Dechow (2010). Meanwhile, 
the stock price 1 months, 3 month and 6 month after the fiscal year end are utilized as 
alternative measures for stock return (that is firm j's 13-month, 15-month and 18-month 
return correspondently). In table 3.4, Value Relevance (the negative of the adjusted R2 in a 
returns-earnings regression) has a mean (median) value of -0.6158 (-0.6717), -0.6271 (-
0.6779) and -0.6260 (-0.6845) correspondently with the 13-months, 15-month and 18-month 
stock market return. Francis et al. (2004) define their 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑗,𝑡  as the firm j's 15-month return 
ending three months after the end of fiscal year t and present their mean (median) value of 
adjusted R2  as -0.423 (-0.416). Large (small) values of Relevance imply less (more) value 
relevant earnings. All the three groups of smaller value relevance of Chinese listed firms 
indicate that the earnings are more value relevant. The mean (median) values of Timeliness 
(the negative of the adjusted R2 in a reverse regression of earnings on returns) are -0.7641 (-
0.8725), -0.7467 (-0.8596) and -0.7175 (-0.8317) respectively with 13-month, 15-month and 
18-month stock return, close to Francis et al.’s results, and better than the US samples. With 
respect to Conservatism, the negative of the ratio of the coefficients on negative returns to the 
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coefficient on positive returns in a reverse regression of earnings on returns, our measure for 
conservatism derived from firm-specific regressions get a mean (median) value of -1.3308 (-
1.3197), -1.3809 (-1.2707) and -1.2268 (-1.2059) correspondently based on the 13-months, 
15-month and 18-month stock market return. These results are much smaller in magnitude 
than the value of -0.547 (-1.000) reported by Francis et al. (2004), suggesting that the 
Chinese listed sample firms’ earnings are more conservative.  
 
From the perspective of different stock return windows (13-month, 15-month and 18-month), 
for both the value relevance and conservatism of Chinese listed firms’ reported earnings with 
15-month stock return are better than other two return windows. It might be because 15-
month abnormal returns are positive for both SOEs and Non-SOEs. It is consistent with 
Collins and Kothari’s conclusion (1989), that a conventional 12-month return period 
understates the earnings/returns association, particularly for larger firms and the association is 
maximized when returns are measured over 15 months. Regarding the timeliness in China, it 
shows that its value for the 13-month return window is superior to others.  
 
Kothari (1992) using firm-specific time-series price-earnings regressions over a one-year 
return interval estimates ERC with a mean of 2.61 and median of 2.00 via utilizing earnings 
scaled by stock closing price at t-1. Penman’s (1990, table 2) estimate using annual 
returns/earnings data is 0.894, whereas Kormendi and Lipe (1987, table 1) report a median 
coefficient of 2.5. Ali and Zarowin (1992), who control for the effect of serial correlation in 
earnings, report a median earnings response coefficient of 1.59. Use of analysts’ earnings 
forecasts as better proxies for the market’s expectation yields coefficients of similar size (for 
instance, Easton and Zmijewski, 1989a, b; and Brown et al., 1987). Correspondently, ERC 
results (maximized) are based on the earnings surprise calculated on the basis of the 
consensus median analyst forecast with 13-month return interval with mean (median) value 
of 1.3638 (1.4025) (details see Table 1.4 continued). Earnings response coefficients reported 
in the literature, however, are considerably smaller than implied by the time-series predicted 
earnings. Collins and Kothari (1989) suppose that the ERC varies cross-sectionally with the 
holding period return interval and conclude that a conventional 12-month return period 
understates the earnings/returns association, particularly for larger firms. The association is 
maximized when returns are measured over 15 months. This is only applicable to our ERC 
results which are based on time-series predicted earnings.  Table 1.4 continued shows that 
ERC_p_18 is maximized based on longer returns intervals with 18 months.  
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Table 3.4 Summary Statistics of Earnings Attributes 
 
 
Earnings Quality 
 
Mean 
(Median) 
SD 
(Variance) 
Skewness 
(Kurtosis) 
25% 
(75%) 
Minimum 
(Maximum) 
 Accrual Quality 
1.2016 
(0.6395) 
1.3974 
(1.9527) 
1.9229 
(5.9169) 
0.2882 
(1.4503) 
0.1484 
(5.5031) 
Earnings 
Predictability 
0.4009 
(0.2180) 
0.5713 
(0.3263) 
6.3383 
(87.8000) 
0.1067 
(0.4826) 
-0.0614 
(12.8696) 
Earnings Persistence 
0.3101 
(0.3551) 
0.3978 
(0.1583) 
-0.6165 
(2.7622) 
0.0724 
(0.6296) 
-0.8009 
(0.9854 ) 
Earnings 
Smoothness 
4.6992 
(2.3785) 
5.5452 
(30.749) 
1.9209 
(5.8261) 
1.1906 
(5.5333) 
0.5186 
(21.623) 
Value Relevance_13 
-0.6158 
(-0.6717) 
0.2789 
(0.0778) 
0.4927 
(2.1076) 
-0.8514 
(-0.4021) 
-1.0000 
(-0.0003) 
Value Relevance_15 
-0.6271 
(-0.6779 ) 
0.2774 
(0.0769) 
0.5327 
(2.1739) 
-0.8691 
(-0.4225 ) 
-1.0000 
(-0.0009) 
Value Relevance_18 
-0.6260 
(-0.6845) 
0.2831 
(0.0801) 
0.5370 
(2.1512 ) 
-0.8725 
(-0.4178) 
-1.0000 
(0.0000) 
Conservatism_13 
-1.3308 
(-1.3197) 
2.3824 
(5.6756) 
0.8927 
(19.2839) 
-1.8364 
(-0.9348) 
-12.4895 
(12.1467) 
Conservatism_15 
-1.3809 
(-1.2707) 
2.5100 
(6.3002) 
-0.3992 
(17.1128) 
-1.8461 
(-0.9289) 
-14.1407 
(11.0081) 
Conservatism_18 
-1.2268 
(-1.2059) 
2.4039 
(5.7789) 
1.2377 
(18.0206) 
-1.7470 
(-0.8983) 
-11.8583 
(12.1377) 
Timeliness_13 
-0.7641 
(-0.8725) 
0.2631 
(0.0692) 
1.1051 
(3.1321) 
-0.9812 
(-0.6121) 
-1.0000 
(0.0000) 
Timeliness_15 
-0.7467 
(-0.8596) 
0.2738 
(0.0750) 
1.0216 
(2.8922) 
-0.9772 
(-0.5745) 
-1.0000 
(-0.0001) 
Timeliness_18 
-0.7175 
(-0.8317) 
0.2922 
(0.0854) 
0.8682 
(2.4962) 
-0.9724 
(-0.5127) 
-1.0000 
(0.0001) 
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Table 1.4 Summary Statistics of Earnings Attributes (Continued) 
 
 
Earnings Quality 
 
Mean 
(Median) 
SD 
(Variance) 
Skewness 
(Kurtosis) 
25% 
(75%) 
Minimum 
(Maximum) 
Erc_p_13 0.9870 
(0.8373) 
0.5720 
(0.3272) 
0.3402 
(1.5443) 
0.5642 
(1.6116) 
0.3339 
(1.7373) 
Erc_a_13 1.3638 
(1.4025) 
0.7721 
(0.5961) 
-0.148 
(1.6360) 
0.6643 
(2.1451) 
0.3185 
(2.2501) 
Erc_a1_13 1.1453 
(1.3157) 
0.6146 
(0.3777) 
-0.358 
(1.5120) 
0.5256 
(1.5986) 
0.3078 
(1.8083) 
Erc_p_15 1.0454 
(0.8562) 
0.6208 
(0.3854) 
0.4278 
(1.5406) 
0.5716 
(1.7841) 
0.3677 
(1.8366) 
Erc_a_15 1.1326 
(1.0454) 
0.6378 
(0.4068) 
-0.031 
(1.7955) 
0.7642 
(1.8514) 
0.2279 
(1.8615) 
Erc_a1_15 0.9047 
(0.9344) 
0.4996 
(0.2496) 
-0.067 
(1.6143) 
0.4989 
(1.2747) 
0.2379 
(1.5481) 
Erc_p_18 1.0472 
(0.6548) 
0.7828 
(0.6128) 
0.6840 
(1.6872) 
0.5859 
(1.8572) 
0.3199 
(2.2109) 
Erc_a_18 0.8822 
(0.9126) 
0.7341 
(0.5389) 
0.0441 
(1.6895) 
0.1138 
(1.4613) 
0.0097 
(1.8832) 
Erc_a1_18 0.6213 
(0.7371) 
0.6639 
(0.4408) 
-0.133 
(1.8944) 
0.0652 
(0.9756) 
-0.310 
(1.5234) 
(Three Different Return Interval: 13-month window, 15-month window, 18-month window) 
 
* The return-based earnings quality proxies (such as value relevance, conservatism and timeliness and ERC) 
are based on earnings/returns association with abnormal returns which are measured in three holding periods 
with a 13-month, 15-month and 18-month abnormal return correspondently. Because Collins and Kothari 
(1989) conclude that a conventional 12-month return period understates the earnings/returns association, 
particularly for larger firms and the association is maximized when returns are measured over 15 months. 
Hence, three different abnormal return periods allow for comparison. 
* ERC_p indicates ERC based on earnings surprise measured by the deviation of actual earnings from a 
predicated amount based on a time-series model of earnings;   
* ERC_a indicates ERC based on earnings surprise measured by the deviation of actual earnings from the 
consensus (median) analyst forecast (analyst forecast error); 
* ERC_a1 indicates ERC based on earnings surprise measured by the deviation of actual earnings from the 
single most recent analyst forecast (analyst forecast error). 
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As in the aforementioned Table 3.2, it shows that the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are 
predominant in our sample size between 2004 and 2013, accounting for 73.33% of the whole 
sample firms. Liu et al. (2014) suggest that if the management of the state-owned listed firms 
recognizes that tunneling not only hurts minority shareholders but also hurts itself by draining 
off its cash, they will not align with their parent companies in earnings manipulation. 
Consistent with the political theories of North (1990) and Olson (1993), if managers of state-
owned listed firms deem tunneling by the parent companies as disadvantageous expropriation 
by the government, they may report earnings numbers conservatively to avoid a high political 
cost (Healy and Wahlen, 1999).  
 
For instance, Kothari (1992) using firm-specific time-series price-earnings regressions over a 
one-year return interval estimates ERC with a mean of 2.61 and median of 2.00 via utilizing 
earnings scaled by stock closing price at t-1. Correspondently, the empirical results are close 
to Kothari’s when the earnings surprise is calculated on the basis of the consensus median 
analyst forecast with 13-month return interval (details see Table 3.5a). The earnings quality 
literature typically controls for industry when measuring earnings quality, but surprisingly the 
estimates of earnings quality by industry are rarely reported. 
 
Earnings response coefficients reported in the literature, however, are considerably smaller 
than implied by the time series properties of earnings. For example, Penman’s (1990, table 2) 
estimate using annual returns/earnings data is 0.894, whereas Kormendi and Lipe (1987, table 
1) report a median coefficient of 2.5. Ali and Zarowin (1992), who control for the effect of 
serial correlation in earnings, report a median earnings response coefficient of 1.59. Use of 
analysts’ earnings forecasts as better proxies for the market’s expectation also yields 
coefficients of similar size (for instance, Easton and Zmijewski (1989a, b) and Brown, Griffin, 
Hagerman, and Zmijewski (1987) who use Value Line’s quarterly earnings forecasts). 
 
Using analyst forecasts to infer earnings quality rather than using market prices has the 
advantage that the analyst forecast relates only to earnings, while a market price reflects 
information other than earnings. Hence, tests that infer earnings quality using market prices 
and assuming market efficiency confound interpretation of the impact of earnings quality 
alone on decision usefulness. A disadvantage of using analyst forecasts, however, is the 
necessary assumption that analysts are unbiased and expert forecasters, and evidence on the 
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validity of these assumptions is questionable. Several studies conclude that when analysts can 
rationally anticipate accruals management, they appropriately incorporate the implications of 
accruals into their forecasts (Kim and Schroeder, 1990; Coles et al., 2006; Burgstahler and 
Eames, 2003).  However, Bradshaw et al. (2001) and Elliott and Philbrick (1990) provide 
contradictory evidence. Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) possibly reconcile these results. They 
show that analysts fundamentally understand the implications of accruals for earnings 
predictability, as evidenced by their recommendation decisions, but that forecasts are 
nonetheless biased. Furthermore, Table 3.5a ERC by year (six groups data in total) clearly 
demonstrates that ERC based on time-series predicted earnings group is stronger than that 
based on the analyst forecasts. It may be explained that the analyst forecast efficiency is 
challenged compared to the information relying on historical earnings during 2008 and 2009. 
From 2010, things become slightly different. ERC based on analysts’ forecasts is found 
overall to be stronger than the time-series predicted earnings group.  
 
Table 3.5a presents an overall uptrend for ERC year by year from the perspective of both 
time-series predicted earnings and analysts’ forecast earnings. The ERC based on the analyst 
forecast in 2013 is obviously higher than that in other years. This suggests a potential forecast 
quality-based explanation for the increase in slope of the relation between earnings surprises 
and returns. Easton, Harris and Ohlson (1992), who focus on the explanatory power of price-
earnings regressions, suggest that a longer window is expected to be more effective than a 
shorter one in reducing the bias stemming from earnings anticipation. Longer windows for 
both returns and earnings yield less biased earnings response coefficient estimates. This is 
supported by the results based on time-series predicted earnings in this analysis. In the 
process of testing return-based metrics, the stock market is hypothesized as efficient in China 
and the stock returns are assumed to effectively capture the underlying firm-specific 
economic performance. However, as Morck et al. (2000) point out, China’s stock market is of 
high synchronicity where stock returns capture low amounts of firm-specific information. 
This may lead the observed R2 not to reliably measure value relevance. Table 3.5a compares 
how the explanatory power of the earnings/returns relation is enhanced by varying the return 
interval. However, the high volatility of Chinese stock prices and the great uncertainty 
concerning earnings would make the earning price ratio a rather noisy measure, thus 
explaining the low observed R2 in the regression.  
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Table 3.5a Descriptive Statistics of Earnings Response Coefficient by year with R2 
 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
ERC_p_13 1.7373 0.3340 1.6117 0.9657 0.7091 0.5643 
 0.0870 0.0576 0.0923 0.0524 0.0408 0.0429 
ERC_a_13 1.3975 0.3186 2.2501 1.4077 0.6643 2.1451 
 0.0470 0.0292 0.0797 0.0364 0.0336 0.0828 
ERC_a1_13 1.0919 0.3078 1.5986 1.5396 0.5256 1.8083 
 0.0403 0.0278 0.0630 0.0420 0.0198 0.0656 
ERC_p_15 1.8367 0.3677 1.7841 0.8515 0.8609 0.5716 
 0.1111 0.0644 0.1061 0.0330 0.0488 0.0474 
ERC_a_15 0.9532 0.2280 1.8615 1.1377 0.7642 1.8515 
 0.0514 0.0282 0.0725 0.0198 0.0370 0.0759 
ERC_a1_15 0.7269 0.2379 1.1419 1.2748 0.4989 1.5482 
 0.0478 0.0283 0.0585 0.0249 0.0169 0.0609 
ERC_p_18 1.8573 0.3199 2.2109 0.5859 0.7012 0.6086 
 0.0866 0.0595 0.1153 0.0126 0.0325 0.0488 
ERC_a_18 0.0098 0.1138 1.4613 0.9561 0.8692 1.8833 
 0.0191 0.0256 0.0517 0.0106 0.0387 0.0664 
ERC_a1_18 -0.3102 0.0652 0.9756 0.9116 0.5627 1.5234 
 0.0196 0.0251 0.0451 0.0102 0.0197 0.0531 
 
Table 3.5b Earnings Response Coefficient by year SOEs vs Non-SOEs 
 
 State-owned 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
ERC_p_13 1.5123 0.2776 1.5870 0.7331 0.9497 0.2588 
ERC_a_13 1.5902 0.3205 2.3277 1.1004 0.5520 1.8800 
ERC_a1_13 1.3794 0.2837 1.8175 1.3212 0.5000 1.5750 
ERC_p_15 1.5822 0.3069 1.8179 0.5603 1.1003 0.2844 
ERC_a_15 1.0093 0.2238 1.9602 0.7820 0.6663 1.5668 
ERC_a1_15 0.9361 0.2072 1.4300 0.9070 0.5227 1.2900 
ERC_p_18 1.6006 0.2426 2.3054 0.3164 0.8750 0.2965 
ERC_a_18 -0.1395 0.1438 1.7203 0.6624 0.7590 1.4535 
ERC_a1_18 -0.2966 0.0647 1.3531 0.6230 0.6285 1.1008 
 Non-State-owned 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
ERC_p_13 3.8737 0.6192 1.9464 1.4545 0.2589 1.8710 
ERC_a_13 1.0241 0.2973 1.6537 3.2054 1.3921 4.6758 
ERC_a1_13 0.6043 0.5139 0.4395 2.5662 0.7001 3.3716 
ERC_p_15 4.2658 0.6808 1.7547 1.4848 0.4018 1.8040 
ERC_a_15 0.7536 0.2507 1.1785 3.3880 1.3991 4.5788 
ERC_a1_15 0.3427 0.5114 -0.1904 3.1978 0.4024 3.2402 
ERC_p_18 4.3015 0.4286 1.8264 1.2205 0.3297 1.9469 
ERC_a_18 0.7239 -0.0586 -0.4116 2.6155 1.6020 5.7619 
ERC_a1_18 -0.4727 0.0964 -0.8904 2.3533 0.2411 3.8952 
 (Three Different Return Interval: 13-month window, 15-month window, 18-month window) 
*ERC_p indicates ERC based on earnings surprise measured by the deviation of actual earnings from a 
predicated amount based on a time-series model of earnings;  ERC_a (ERC_a1)indicates ERC based on 
earnings surprise measured by the deviation of actual earnings from the consensus median analyst forecast (the 
single most recent analyst forecast). 
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Prior literature discusses the earnings response coefficient’s sensitivity to the return-earnings 
measurement window. This section reports results of estimating earnings response 
coefficients using a longer, contemporaneous window for stock returns. The motivation is to 
assess the effectiveness of longer measurement windows in reducing bias in earnings 
response coefficient estimates. The pooled regressions constrain the ERC to be a cross-
sectional constant and yield coefficient estimates similar to the cross-sectional average 
coefficient from the firm-specific time-series regressions. Ordinary least squares coefficients 
are estimated without making an adjustment for auto-correlated errors since the ordinary least 
squares estimates are unbiased (see Kothari and Sloan, 1992). Table 3.5b shows that Non-
SOEs with overall higher ERC than SOEs in the stock return/earnings model indicating 
higher-quality earnings for Non-SOEs in China during 2008 and 2013.  
 
Table 3.7 shows that both predicted earnings per share based on the time-series model and 
analyst forecast earnings per share are biased upwards (negative forecast error) resulting in 
right skewness of the forecast error. According to prior literature, if the actual change in 
earnings is large, then analysts' forecasts will tend to be less accurate. Generally, it is 
hypothesized that financial analysts should be able to make far better forecasts than those 
from simple statistical extrapolations. Analysts use the simple no-change model as one input 
into their forecasts. In fact, the random walk prediction is probably the starting point in many 
analysts' forecasting processes. Financial analysts have advantages over time series models in 
terms of information used, knowledge of forecasts made by other analysts, and timing. In 
Table 3.7, predicted EPS from time-series statistical model is much closer to actual EPS than 
analyst consensus forecast earnings (both median and single most recent analyst forecast) 
during 2008 and 2013. This result is correspondent with the results shown in Table 3.9A and 
Table 3.9B. It fully reflects that analyst forecast earnings is less accurate than time-series 
statistical model predictions in China between 2008 and 2013. This result conflicts with 
findings in prior literature based on western developed countries, such as the US and the UK, 
indicating the malfunction of financial analysts in mainland China. It may be due to Chinese 
listed companies with high ‘discretionary’ accruals result in less persistent earnings. 
Persistent earnings imply recurring earnings which are a desirable element for the analysts to 
predict the firms’ future earnings. Meanwhile, this analysis finds that single most recent 
analyst forecast EPS outperforms consensus median analyst forecast EPS in Table 3.7 and 
Figure 3.3.  
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Table 3.6   Descriptive Statistics of other variables 
 
 
Earnings Quality 
 
Mean 
(Median) 
SD 
(Variance) 
Skewness 
(Kurtosis) 
25% 
(75%) 
Minimum 
(Maximum) 
Actual EPS 
(adjusted) 
0.2639 
(0.1998) 
0.4830 
(0.2333) 
0.6993 
(19.9809) 
0.0600 
(0.4100) 
-4.2100 
(5.8900) 
 
Predicted EPS 
0.2126 
(0.1067) 
0.8658 
(0.7496) 
1.9068 
(31.9208) 
-0.0835 
(0.4151) 
-7.8767 
(11.8939) 
Analysts EPS 
(Consensus Forecast) 
0.4711 
(0.3700) 
0.4267 
(0.1820) 
2.4041 
(13.9233) 
0.1950 
(0.6270) 
-0.7100 
(4.535) 
 
｜TCA_ASSETS｜ 
0.0783 
(0.0510) 
0.1085 
(0.0118) 
6.3288 
(70.2602) 
0.0221 
(0.0967) 
0.0000 
(1.8756) 
 
TCA_ASSETS 
-0.0327 
(-0.0258) 
0.1298 
(0.0168) 
6.3288 
(70.2602) 
-0.0746 
(0.0163) 
-1.7956 
(1.8756) 
LagCFO_ASSETS 
0.0456 
(0.0446) 
0.0995 
(0.0099) 
-3.0218 
(144.8918) 
0.0075 
(0.0860) 
-2.8399 
(1.6370) 
LeadCFO_ASSETS 
0.0609 
(0.0531) 
0.1411 
(0.0199) 
2.6441 
(92.6299) 
0.0064 
(0.1132) 
-2.0754 
(3.4441) 
LagEarnings_Assets 
0.0083 
(0.0239) 
0.1876 
(0.0352) 
-12.1241 
(245.5097) 
0.0070 
(0.0470) 
-4.9891 
(1.6703) 
LeadEarnings_Assets 
0.0387 
(0.0320) 
0.1104 
(0.0122) 
1.5218 
(40.7052) 
0.0085 
(0.0683) 
-1.2004 
(1.7641) 
CFO_ASSETS 
0.0542 
(0.0506) 
0.0926 
(0.0086) 
0.1316 
(13.9095) 
0.0090 
(0.0999) 
-1.0207 
(0.9014) 
 
   NIBE_Assets 
0.0236 
(0.0286) 
0.0996 
(0.0099) 
-4.3170 
(60.9929) 
0.0086 
(0.0557) 
-1.7985 
(1.0927) 
 
Firm Size 
21.4770 
(21.4140) 
1.0180 
(1.0360) 
0.3240 
(3.0300) 
20.7460 
(22.1360) 
18.6650 
(24.8460) 
Leverage 0.5520 
(0.5490) 
0.2240 
(0.0500) 
0.5070 
(4.5480) 
0.4010 
(0.6970) 
0.0210 
(1.9840) 
State Ownership 
(Percentage) 
0.2180 
(0.1440) 
0.2330 
(0.0540) 
0.5760 
(1.9290) 
0.0000 
(0.4230) 
0.0000 
(0.9710) 
Sales Growth (Sales-
AR) change/TA 
0.0940 
(0.0730) 
0.2130 
(0.0460) 
1.1160 
(11.035) 
-0.0030 
(0.1730) 
-0.8870 
(1.8790) 
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Table 3.7 Summary statistics for actual earnings per share, predicted earnings per share and 
analyst forecast earnings per share 
 
  
Period: 2008-2013 
  
Actual EPS 
Predicted 
EPS 
Analyst 
Forecast 
EPS_Median 
Analyst 
Forecast 
EPS_Single 
Most Recent 
Number of observations 3014 3014 3014 3014 
Mean 0.2639 0.3402 0.4711 0.4205 
Median 0.1998 0.1905 0.3700 0.3105 
Standard Deviation 0.4830 0.8962 0.4267 0.4378 
Variance 0.2333 0.8032 0.1820 0.1916 
Skewness 0.6993 2.7350 2.4041 2.6434 
Kurtosis     19.9809     30.1586       13.9233       16.6185 
 
As shown in Figure 3.2, it presents the distribution of stock abnormal return with 13-month, 
15-month and 18-month return windows respectively. Earnings Surprise is calculated by (1) 
the deviation of actual earnings from a time-series predicated earnings and (2) the deviation 
of actual earnings from the consensus (median) analyst forecast, this study compares actual 
reported EPS with time-series predicted EPS and consensus analyst forecast EPS through 
plotting the related graph to detect which one is closer to actual reported EPS (see Figure 3.3). 
The empirical results reveal that the deviation of actual earnings from time-series predicted 
earnings is smaller than the deviation of actual earnings from the consensus analyst forecast. 
Collins et al. (1987) suggest that measurement error in Earnings Surprise proxy weakens the 
ERC and makes it difficult to detect the influences of the ERC’s determinants. The bias in an 
estimated ERC can be substantial and influential. For example, Beaver et al. (1980) document 
ERCs estimated at the individual security level using a time-series earnings expectation proxy 
for unexpected earnings understate the ‘true’ or theoretical ERCs by as much as 70-80%, on 
average. Brown et al. (1987a, b) also consider analysts’ forecasts are better than time series 
proxies. However, one interesting finding in this study is that earnings forecasts based on the 
time-series statistical model with drift is more accurate than the consensus analyst forecast 
(details see Table 3.9A and Table 3.9B). It produces an inconsistent result with Beaver et al. 
(1980) and Brown et al.’s (1987a, b) via comparison with the two metrics for earnings 
surprise. This finding conflicts with prior literature, and indicates the malfunction of financial 
analysts in mainland China.  
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Figure 3.2 Abnormal Stock Returns  
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Figure 3.3  Actual EPS vs. Predicted EPS vs. Analyst Forecast EPS vs. Single most recent EPS 
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Table 3.8 describes the comparison test results among earnings quality measures except ERC 
between state-owned and non-state-owned firms. The last two columns report the two-tailed 
p-value for the difference between state-owned and non-state-owned companies in means and 
medians respectively. T-tests (Wilcoxon rank tests) are used to test the difference in means 
and medians (*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01). As shown in Table 3.8, the empirical result 
clearly states that the SOEs are inferior to Non-SOEs in earnings persistence at the 1% 
significance level, but perform better than Non-SOEs in accruals quality and earnings 
smoothness at 1% significant level. It indicates that the earnings are more persistent in Non-
SOEs than that in SOEs. The value relevance, predictability, conservatism and timeliness for 
SOEs and Non-SOEs are very close with no substantial difference. Simply according to the 
values, there are slightly higher value relevant earnings and more predictable earnings and 
less conservative earnings (with 13-month and 18-month return interval) in Non-SOEs 
reflecting higher earnings quality; but less timely earnings in Non-SOEs. It is consistent with 
previous studies that conservatism reduces earnings persistence and predictability, facilitates 
earnings management, reduces analyst forecast accuracy, and may decrease the value 
relevance of earnings (e.g., Basu, 1997; Ball et al., 2008; Dichev and Tang, 2008; and Chen 
et al., 2014). Compliant with the political theories of North (1990) and Olson (1993), if 
managers of state-owned listed firms deem tunneling by the parent companies as 
disadvantageous expropriation by the government, they may report earnings numbers 
conservatively to avoid a high political cost (Healy and Wahlen, 1999), which supports 
political cost hypothesis. However, the conservatism with 15-month adjusted market return 
for SOEs is obviously inferior to that for Non-SOEs at 10% significance level, which means 
Non-SOEs’ reported earnings are more conservative than SOEs in China. Table 3.5b exhibits 
Non-SOEs with overall higher ERC (earnings response coefficient) than SOEs based on both 
predicted earnings and consensus analyst forecast earnings, indicating higher earnings quality 
in Non-SOEs in China during 2008 and 2013. It is consistent with prior literature, which 
provides evidence that earnings with more consistency and relevance will have stronger ERC 
(Kormendi and Lipe, 1987; Collins and Kothari, 1989; and Easton and Zmijewski, 1989). To 
sum up, this study concludes that SOEs overall exhibit a lower earnings quality than Non-
SOEs, rejecting the null hypothesis. It supports the agency theory, which argues that state 
ownership in SOEs creates incentives and regulatory backing for self-serving purposes, thus 
motivating SOEs to manipulate accounting numbers (e.g., Liu et al., 2014). 
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Table 3.8 Earnings Quality Comparison_ SOEs vs. Non-SOEs 
 
Variables State-owned Non-state-owned P-Value 
 mean sd median mean sd median mean median 
Earnings Predictability 0.4055  0.5756  0.2198  0.3883  0.5592  0.2135  0.3963  0.6960  
Earnings Persistence 0.3202  0.3944  0.3633  0.2824  0.4060  0.3294  0.0075 *** 0.0360  
Value Relevance_13 -0.6159  0.2767  -0.6658  -0.6156  0.2850  -0.6862  0.9781  0.1100  
Value Relevance_15 -0.6282  0.2747  -0.6792  -0.6240  0.2847  -0.6771  0.6672  0.9150  
Value Relevance_18 -0.6284  0.2806  -0.6847  -0.6193  0.2897  -0.6843  0.3633  0.9720  
Conservatism_13 -1.3387  2.4394  -1.3267  -1.3095  2.2221  -1.2987  0.7498 0.4370 
Conservatism_15 -1.3328  2.5112  -1.2841  -1.5138  2.5035  -1.2297  0.0737* 0.1040 
Conservatism_18 -1.1837  2.4596  -1.1881  -1.3413  2.2468  -1.2656  0.1115 0.0370 
Timeliness_13 -0.7649  0.2608  -0.8703  -0.7619  0.2696  -0.8778  0.7490 0.5700 
Timeliness_15 -0.7471  0.2728  -0.8579  -0.7455  0.2767  -0.8657  0.8707 0.5220 
Timeliness_18 -0.7151  0.2910  -0.8262  -0.7243  0.2953  -0.8462  0.3772 0.1550 
Accrual Quality  1.1533 1.3606  0.6046  1.3345 1.4865   0.7281 0.0003*** 0.0010 
Smoothness  4.5586 5.4321  2.3236  5.0858 5.8302   2.5930 0.0075*** 0.0600 
 
Accrual Quality = the standard deviation of firm j’s residuals from a regression of current accruals on 
lagged , current and future cash flows from operations; Large (small) values of Accrual Quality indicate 
poor(good) earnings quality.  
 
Earnings Persistence = the negative of firm j’s slope coefficient from an AR1 model of annual earnings 
with drift; larger (smaller) values of persistence correspond to less (more) persistent earnings. 
 
Earnings Predictability = the square root of the error variance from firm j’s AR1 model; Large (small) 
values of Predictability imply less (more) predictable earnings. 
 
Earnings Smoothness = the ratio of firm j’s standard deviation of earnings before extraordinary items 
(scaled by assets) to the standard deviation of cash flows from operations (scaled by assets); Larger values 
of Smoothness indicate less earnings smoothness. 
 
Relevance = the negative of the adjusted R2 from a regression of 13-month, 15-month and 18-month 
returns on the level and change in annual earnings (before extraordinary items); Large (small) values of 
Relevance imply less (more) value relevant earnings. 
 
Timeliness = the negative of the adjusted R2 from a reverse regression of annual earnings (before 
extraordinary items) on variables capturing positive and negative 13-month, 15-month and 18-month 
returns; Larger values of Timeliness and Conservatism imply less timely and less conservative earnings, 
respectively. 
 
Conservatism = the negative of the ratio of the coefficient on bad news (negative returns) to good news 
(positive returns) in the reverse regression 
 
The abnormal return for each firm is measured in three holding periods with a 13-month, 15-month and 
18-month abnormal return. 
 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 3.9A Earnings Surprise Based on Predicted EPS and Analyst Forecasts 
 
Group ES_1 N Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
-1 1500 -0.0421 0.0687 -6.112 69.22 
1 1500 0.0500 0.135 12.38 223.5 
Total 3000 0.0052 0.117 9.668 221.7 
Group ES_2 N mean sd skewness kurtosis 
-1 2400 -0.0349 0.0669 -8.461 116.9 
0 41 0 0 . . 
1 582 0.0149 0.0303 6.805 66.62 
Total 3000 -0.0248 0.0642 -7.742 115.4 
Group ES_22 N mean sd skewness kurtosis 
-1 2100 -0.0316 0.0670 -9.092 129.00 
0 68 0 0 . . 
1 798 0.0140 0.0286 6.518 62.94 
Total 3000 -0.0188 0.0619 -8.464 134.90 
 
Notes:   Group ES_1= Actual Reported EPS – Predicated EPS based on a time-series model                    
Group ES_2=Actual Reported EPS – Consensus (median) analyst forecast 
             Group ES_22=Actual Reported EPS – Single most recent analyst forecast 
             -1 here means Negative Earnings Surprise  
0 here means Actual EPS just meet Analyst Forecast Benchmark 
1 here means Positive earnings Surprise 
 
 
Table 3.9B Earnings Surprise Based on Predicted EPS and Analyst Forecasts by year 
 
Stats Year es1 es2 es22 
Mean 2008 -0.0147 -0.0207 -0.0175 
 2009 0.0238 -0.0335 -0.0230 
 2010 0.0052 -0.0089 -0.0069 
 2011 -0.0001 -0.0196 -0.0155 
 2012 0.0025 -0.0413 -0.0301 
 2013 0.0145 -0.0256 -0.0210 
SD 2008 0.0549 0.0365 0.0352 
 2009 0.2360 0.1089 0.1051 
 2010 0.0467 0.0288 0.0299 
 2011 0.0647 0.0369 0.0370 
 2012 0.0868 0.0788 0.0756 
 2013 0.0969 0.0483 0.0475 
Median 2008 -0.0140 -0.0111 -0.0075 
 2009 0.0017 -0.0102 -0.0044 
 2010 0.0044 -0.0053 -0.0027 
 2011 0.0033 -0.0115 -0.0077 
 2012 0.0037 -0.0215 -0.0098 
 2013 0.0072 -0.0131 -0.0092 
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Figure 3.4 demonstrates the distribution of earnings surprises and exhibits a high frequency 
of just missing analysts’ forecasts (a high frequency of negative earnings surprises) rather 
than meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts in Chinese listed firms. In terms of prior research, 
earnings management that responds to analysts’ forecasts gives rise to an asymmetric 
distribution of earnings surprises with a disproportionately large number of positive earnings 
surprises and a disproportionately small number of negative earnings surprises. In this 
analysis, earnings surprises depend on three variables, actual EPS vs. analysts’ forecast EPS 
and actual EPS vs. time-series predicted EPS. By comparing earnings surprises derived from 
analysts’ forecasts and earnings surprises derived from the predicted earnings generated by a 
time-series AR1 model, it is clear that analysts’ forecasts are likely contribute to the 
asymmetric distribution of earnings surprises from the above figures. Table 3.10 reports the 
earnings surprise in SOEs and Non-SOE and finds no substantial differences from the 
perspective of analyst forecast EPS; however, the earnings surprise in Non-SOEs are much 
smaller than in SOEs from the perspective of time-series predicted EPS. 
 
Table 3.10   Earnings surprise in State-Owned vs. Non-State-Owned 
 
                 State-owned       Non-State-owned 
Group ES_1 N Mean SD N Mean SD 
-1 1100 -0.0407 0.0621 385 -0.0460 0.0844 
 1 1200  0.0507 0.1260 380  0.0479 0.1610 
Total 
2200  0.0068 0.1100 765  0.0007 0.1370 
Group ES_2 N Mean SD N Mean SD 
-1 1800 -0.0357 0.0725 616 -0.0323 0.0470 
 0 29  0 0 12  0 0 
 1 445  0.0151 0.0308 137  0.0141 0.0289 
Total 2200 -0.0252 0.0690 765 -0.0235 0.0475 
Group 
ES_2A N Mean SD N Mean SD 
-1 1600 -0.0320 0.0723 556 -0.0303 0.0488 
0 50  0 0 18  0 0 
1 607  0.0144 0.0305 191  0.0124 0.0214 
Total 2200 -0.0188 0.0662 765 -0.0189 0.0468 
 
Notes:    Group ES_1= Actual Reported EPS – Predicated EPS based on a time-series model 
       Group ES_2=Actual Reported EPS – Consensus (median) analyst forecast 
              Group ES_2A=Actual Reported EPS – Single most recent analyst forecast 
              -1 here means Negative Earnings Surprise  
               0 here means Actual EPS just meet Analyst Forecast Benchmark 
               1 here means Positive earnings Surprise 
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Figure 3.4 Distribution of Earnings Surprise 
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Table 3.11 presents Spearman Correlations between different Earnings Quality Proxies. The 
Correlations between the earnings properties demonstrate that Earnings Predictability is 
positively related with Earnings Persistence and Earnings Smoothness at the 5% significance 
level. Earnings persistence is significantly negative with both value relevance 13-month 
return window and conservatism with 18-month return windows. The value relevance is 
strongly positive with Timeliness with all three different return windows. Meanwhile, 
Accruals Quality is positively correlated with Earnings Smoothness at the 5% significance 
level. As noted, while the proxies represent properties of the same reported earnings number, 
the quality proxies measure different attributes of earnings. The point of presenting the 
correlations is to emphasize that the empirical tests should exploit variation across the 
measures to make predictions about the specific features of earnings that make them decision 
useful. Early research by Kormendi and Lipe (1987), Collins and Kothari (1989), and Easton 
and Zmijewski (1989) provide evidence that more persistent earnings have a stronger stock 
price response, indicating there is a positive relation between earnings persistence and ERC. 
A series of early papers following Ball and Brown (e.g., Kormendi and Lipe, 1987; Collins 
and Kothari, 1989) show that ERCs are positively related to earnings persistence. The 
motivation for this research is an assumption that more persistent earnings have greater 
implications for expected future cash flows associated with the firm’s fundamental 
performance. Turning finally to Earnings Response Coefficient, previous studies provide the 
evidence that there is a significantly negative relationship between ownership and the 
earnings response coefficient. It indicates that the higher the dominant shareholder’s 
ownership stake is, the less informative earnings becomes. In terms of Ronen and Yaari 
(2008), Earnings Response Coefficient (ERC) measures the weight of earnings in price 
movements. When earnings are more value relevant, stronger investor response will be 
expected. The correlation matrix is largely consistent with findings reported in prior literature. 
Analyst Forecast errors are highly correlated with their contemporaneous abnormal returns, 
confirming the general earnings/return relationship. 
 
3.7. Robustness Test 
 
Earnings quality is a multidimensional concept and difficult to measure. To mitigate the 
potential effects of measurement errors and omitted variables, this research fully measures 
the earnings quality through both accounting-based and market-based earnings attributes: 
accruals quality, persistence, predictability, smoothness, value relevance, timeliness, 
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conservatism and earnings response coefficient (ERC).  
 
To check the robustness, all market-based earnings attributes in this empirical analysis further 
presents and summarizes how the explanatory power of the earnings/returns relation is 
enhanced by varying the return interval (13-month, 15-month and 18-month window, details 
see Table 3.5a, Table 3.5b and Table 3.8). There are no substantial differences. Besides 
consensus median analyst forecasts, the single-most recent analyst forecast issued prior to the 
earnings announcement is applied as an alternative of consensus analyst forecasts in this 
study. O’Brien (1988) and Brown (1991) and Ayer (2006) argue that the single-most recent 
analyst forecast is more accurate in predicting actual earnings than the consensus mean 
forecast (details see Table 3.10, Table 3.9A and Table 3.9B and Table 3.7). 
 
Based on O’Brien (1988) and Brown (1991) and Ayers (2006), this study utilizes the single-
most recent analyst forecast issued prior to the earnings announcement as an alternative 
forecast benchmark. Because the single-most recent analyst forecast is perceived as more 
accurate in predicting actual earnings than the consensus mean (median) forecast. Likewise, 
Brown and Kim (1991) find that the single-most recent analyst forecast more accurately 
reflects the market’s earnings expectation than the consensus mean forecast. Assuming that 
firms intend to meet or beat market expectations, using a more current forecast proxy should 
provide a more powerful test of whether firms use discretionary accruals to meet or beat 
analyst forecasts. 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑗,𝑡  (unexpected earnings) is defined as firm j’s year t 
actual earnings per share minus the single-most recent analyst forecast provided prior to the 
earnings announcement, both are available from the CSMAR analyst forecast database from 
2008 to 2013.  
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Table 3.11 Spearman Correlations between Earnings Quality Proxies 
 
 
Earnings 
Predictability 
Earnings 
Persistence 
Value 
Relevance_1
3 
Value 
Relevance_1
5 
Value 
Relevance_1
8 
Conservati
sm_13 
Conservati
sm_15 
Conservati
sm_18 
Timeline
ss_13 
Timeline
ss_15 
Timeline
ss_18 
Accr
uals  
Smoot
hness 
Earnings 
Predictability 
1             
Earnings 
Persistence 
0.0324* 1            
Value 
Relevance_13 
0.0254 -0.0486* 1           
Value 
Relevance_15 
0.0116 -0.0294 0.8631* 1          
Value 
Relevance_18 
-0.0234 0.0172 0.5521* 0.6991* 1         
Conservatism
_13 
0.0004 -0.0136 -0.0130 -0.00560 -0.0061 1        
Conservatism
_15 
-0.0156 -0.0192 0.0310 0.0196 0.0225 0.0036 1       
Conservatism
_18 
-0.0025 -0.0393* 0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0117 -0.0014 0.0021 1      
Timeliness_1
3 
-0.0075 -0.0077 0.3569* 0.3099* 0.1774* -0.0019 0.0477* -0.0013 1     
Timeliness_1
5 
-0.0107 0.0052 0.3231* 0.3632* 0.2443* 0.0054 0.0339 -0.0084 0.5716* 1    
Timeliness_1
8 
-0.0272 -0.0003 0.2363* 0.2679* 0.3387* -0.0054 0.0161 0.0144 0.3170* 0.4011* 1   
Accrual 
Quality 
-0.0239 -0.0042 -0.0082 -0.0105 -0.0042 -0.0012 -0.0033 0.0023 -0.0269 -0.0183 -0.0166 1  
Smoothness 0.1302* 0.0262 0.0120 0.0152 -0.0212 0.0005 -0.0051 0.0023 -0.0400* -0.0192 -0.0314* 
0.12
32* 
       1 
 
Notes:*p<0.05
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3.8. Summary 
 
There is a debate whether state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have more incentives to manipulate 
earnings than in non-state-owned enterprises (Non-SOEs). Since there is one more type of 
agency cost in SOEs, i.e. the agency cost between the state and the controlling owner, and 
this type of agency cost cannot be addressed simply by ownership concentration, the 
entrenchment effect of ownership concentration on earnings management is more serious in 
SOEs than in Non-SOEs. According to financial distress theory, SOEs have the advantage to 
receive financial subsidies from government while NSOEs face more financing constraints. 
Therefore, incentives for Non-SOEs to manipulate earnings are stronger than in SOEs (Wang 
et al., 2008). The agency theory, however, argues that state ownership in SOEs creates 
incentives and regulatory backing for self-serving purposes, thus motivating SOEs to 
manipulate accounting numbers (Liu et al., 2014). The political cost hypothesis complements 
the agency theory and illustrates that SOEs’ managers manipulate accounting numbers in 
response to government intervention. When governments aim to expropriate the benefits of 
firms, SOEs would report conservatively to disguise the profits. However, when governments 
impel firms to enhance performance via stringent government regulations, SOEs would report 
aggressively to meet specific thresholds.  
 
This study contributes to provide a better understanding of the nature of accounting 
information quality by measuring the effect of government ownership and its associated 
institutional incentives on listed firms’ earnings quality in Chinese context with its unique 
political, social, cultural and economic environment and huge sample size. It investigates the 
impact of state ownership on earnings quality by comparing a sample of Chinese state-owned 
versus non-state-owned firms through tracking the ultimate controllers instead to grade 
government intervention. To fully capture the earnings attributes, this research examines the 
quality of reported earnings in China from the perspective of both accounting-based and 
market-based earnings attributes. Several variables are employed to proxy for Earnings 
Quality based on prior research (for instance, Ayers et al., 2006; Dechow et al., 2010 and 
Francis et al., 2004). Accrual quality, persistence, predictability, and smoothness are 
classified as ‘accounting-based’ earnings attributes. Value relevance, timeliness, and 
conservatism and are categorized as "market-based’ earnings attributes. Earnings Response 
Coefficient (ERC) is extended as a function of ‘market-based’ earnings quality via detecting 
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earnings surprise, which is measured by: (a) the deviation of actual earnings from a 
predicated amount based on a time-series model of earnings and (b) the deviation of actual 
earnings from the consensus (median) analyst forecast, computed using each analyst’s latest 
forecast before the earnings announcement. In addition, it tests whether analysts' forecasts are 
more accurate than time-series predicted statistics with random walk. This study further 
presents and summarizes how the explanatory power of the earnings/returns relation is 
enhanced by varying the return interval (13-month, 15-month and 18-month window).  
 
In the process of testing return-based metrics, the stock market is hypothesized as efficient in 
China and the stock returns are assumed to effectively capture the underlying firm-specific 
economic performance. However, as Morck et al. (2000) argued, Chinese stock market is of 
high synchronicity where stock returns capture low amounts of firm-specific information. 
This may lead the observed R2 not to reliably measure value relevance. Since the high 
volatility of Chinese stock prices and the great uncertainty concerning earnings would make 
the earning price ratio a rather noisy measure, thus explaining the low observed R2 in the 
regression. The issue of stock liquidity is another factor that may explain the variations of 
value relevance among firms in China. Gaio (2010) provides evidence that the country 
environment is important in explaining the variation in market-based earnings attributes. 
Although individual and institutional holdings constitute a company’s total tradable shares as 
in other stock markets, retail investors generate most of the trading volume in the Chinese 
market. 
 
The empirical results show that Chinese state-owned firms overall exhibit a lower earnings 
quality than non-state-owned firms supporting the agency theory. Since Chinese government 
ownership creates incentives and regulatory backing for self-serving purposes that negatively 
impact the listed firms’ financial reporting. This analysis clearly states that the SOEs are 
inferior to Non-SOEs in earnings persistence at the 1% significance level, but perform better 
than Non-SOEs in accruals quality and earnings smoothness at 1% significant level. It 
indicates that the earnings are more persistent in Non-SOEs than that in SOEs. The value 
relevance, predictability, conservatism and timeliness for SOEs and Non-SOEs are very close 
with no substantial difference. Simply according to the values, higher value relevant earnings 
and more predictable earnings and less conservative earnings (with 13-month and 18-month 
return interval) in Non-SOEs represent higher earnings quality; but less timely earnings in 
Non-SOEs implies lower earnings quality. It is consistent with previous studies that 
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conservatism reduces earnings persistence and predictability, facilitates earnings management, 
reduces analyst forecast accuracy, and may decrease the value relevance of earnings (e.g., 
Basu, 1997; Ball et al., 2008; Dichev and Tang, 2008; and Chen et al. (2014). Compliant with 
the political theories of North (1990) and Olson (1993), if managers of state-owned listed 
firms deem tunneling by the parent companies as disadvantageous expropriation by the 
government, they may report earnings numbers conservatively to avoid a high political cost 
(Healy and Wahlen, 1999). However, the conservatism with 15-month adjusted market return 
for SOEs is obviously inferior to that for Non-SOEs at 10% significance level, which means 
Non-SOEs’ reported earnings are more conservative than SOEs in China. Ewert and 
Wagenhofer (2012) present that tightening accounting standards will increase the ERC, 
which is also an important attribute of earnings quality. Non-SOEs with overall higher ERC 
(earnings response coefficient) than SOEs based on both predicted earnings and consensus 
analyst forecast earnings indicates higher earnings quality in Non-SOEs in China during 2008 
and 2013. It is consistent with prior literature, which provides evidence that earnings with 
more consistency and relevance will have stronger ERC (Kormendi and Lipe, 1987; Collins 
and Kothari, 1989; and Easton and Zmijewski, 1989). To sum up, consistent with prior 
studies, this study reports a very robust result in its analysis.  
 
However, one interesting finding is that predicted earnings based on the time-series statistical 
model with drift are more accurate than the consensus analyst forecast earnings, i.e. the 
deviation of actual earnings from analyst forecast earnings is larger than the deviation of 
actual earnings from the time-series predicated earnings. This result conflicts with findings in 
prior literature based on western developed countries, such as the US and the UK, indicating 
the malfunction of financial analysts in mainland China. Furthermore, SOEs manipulate 
down the earnings much more than Non-SOEs, manifesting the government generally 
expropriate the benefits of SOEs, according to the political cost hypothesis. The ERC_p 
findings indicate SOEs still manipulate earnings more than Non-SOEs from 2008-2010, 
rejecting the financial-distress theory, probably because the Chinese ¥4-billion fiscal scheme 
from late 2008 wasn’t designed in favour of SOEs. 
 
There are some limitations in the earnings quality measures. One initial concern related to the 
market-based earnings attributes is how well stock returns can proxy for economic income, 
particularly in emerging markets like China. Since emerging markets have very distinctive 
characteristics and are structurally different from both developed markets and each other. 
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Drummen and Zimmerman (1992) and Eftekhari and Satchell (1999) all demonstrate that 
country specific factors predominate over other factors (e.g. world factors and industry trends) 
in the determination of stock returns. This study relied on the assumption that the Chinese 
stock market is efficient and the stock returns effectively reflect and capture the fundamental 
firm-specific economic performance. However, Morck et al. (2000) argue that the stock 
market in China is of high synchronicity where stock returns capture low amounts of firm-
specific information. It may cause the observed R2 not to reliably measure value relevance.  
The second concern is related to this study’s accruals quality measure. Wysocki (2006) 
presume that Dechow and Dichev’s model (2002) fails to capture a firm’s earnings quality 
because there is a strong negative correlation between contemporaneous cash flows and 
accruals. Studies find that common law countries do not necessarily have higher quality in 
every attribute of earnings (e.g. Boonlert-U-Thai et al., 2006; Bushman and Piotroski, 2006). 
Meanwhile, all abnormal accruals models suffer from the inherent limitation that is difficult 
to validate the accuracy of their predictions. For example, it is unable to verify whether the 
estimates of discretionary accruals are the result of management’s opportunistic accounting 
choices, or just an artifact of the particular model employed. This is a construct validity 
problem, which means that these proxies utilized in this study are unable to reliably measure 
the underlying theoretical constructs they are intended to measure. The final concern is the 
analyst forecast error. Bartholdy and Feng (2013) investigate the quality of securities firms' 
earnings forecasts and stock recommendations in China and find that both earnings forecasts 
and stock recommendations are biased upwards and stock markets regard stock 
recommendations as having new information. They show the forecast error in the Bear 
market from September, 2002 to October, 2005 was larger than that in the Bull market 
between November, 2005 and October, 2007. The sample period for ERC model in this 
research is during the year of 2008 and 2013, which is deemed as a stage of Bear market. It 
will be a critical factor which has an impact on the analyst forecast accuracy.   
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Chapter 4 Earnings Management and Earnings Surprises: 
Management's Incentives to meet or beat Analysts’ 
Forecast Benchmark in China 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Understanding a company’s earnings quality requires expertise in finance, accounting, and 
corporate strategy and a strong knowledge of the industry and background in which the 
company operates and the corporate governance mechanisms monitoring and rewarding 
employees and managers. An analyst with such knowledge and expertise provides the capital 
markets with an important value-added service (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Dechow and 
Schrand, 2004). Ronen and Yaari (2008) identify analysts as one of the gatekeepers 
researching firms they followed and making predictions of future earnings and 
recommendations 47  on whether to buy or sell shares. Financial analysts are deemed as 
prominent information intermediaries to monitor management and improve earnings quality 
in capital markets. The activities in which financial analysts are engaged and the competition 
among them are considered to enhance the informational efficiency of capital markets for 
regulators and other market participants (Givoly and Lakonishok, 1979; Lys and Sohn, 1990; 
and Francis and Soffer, 1997). Prior literature argues that analysts reduce information 
asymmetry between investors and management (Brennan and Hughes, 1991; Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam, 1995; Bushman and Smith, 2001; Easley et al., 1998; Healy and Palepu, 
2001; Houston et al., 2006). Although extensive research in accounting and finance has 
examined the role of financial analysts in developed economies, this issue has not been 
thoroughly examined in an emerging market setting. The term ‘emerging market’48 refers to 
the securities markets of developing economies which have been gradually becoming an 
integral and indispensable part of the world capital markets (Liaw, 1999).  
 
Reported earnings are considered as a primary indicator of information quality (Dechow, 
1994; Dechow et al., 1998; Ronen and Yaari, 2008). Earnings are composed of accruals and 
                                                 
47 Recommendation terminologies are varying by firms and analyst. Common recommendations range 
from ‘strong buy’ and ‘buy’ through ‘hold’ to ‘sell’ and ‘strong sell’. (see Ronen and Yaari, 2008) 
48 Emerging markets are defined as economies with low to middle per capita income in a state of transition 
to developed economy status (The World Bank). 
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cash flows from operations. Accruals consist of both discretionary and non-discretionary 
components, and since discretionary accruals are believed to better reflect managerial 
judgment, most earnings quality research focuses on discretionary accruals. Sloan (1996) 
finds that the accrual portion of earnings is less persistent than cash flows, implying that 
firms with high levels of accruals have lower quality earnings. Some studies suggest that 
managers affect the direction and magnitude of accruals (e.g., Healy and Whalen, 1999; 
Dechow et al., 1996; and Richardson et al., 2003). Researchers have investigated whether 
companies manipulate earnings to meet analysts’ consensus forecasts based on quarterly 
earnings. Researchers identify that firms have incentives to manipulate earnings to beat such 
desirable benchmarks. For instance, Degeorge et al. (1999) state that managers consider three 
thresholds when they report earnings: (1) to report earnings above zero (i.e. positive profits); 
(2) to sustain recent performance, that is, retain at least last year’s earnings; and (3) to meet 
analysts’ consensus earnings expectations. Why do companies care about meeting or beating 
targets? Since accounting numbers are meaningless without making comparison with some 
benchmarks (Ronen and Yaari, 2008).  
 
A rising prevalence of firms playing the numbers game provide empirical results indicating 
that manipulators prefer to meet or narrowly beat analyst earnings forecasts rather than to 
beat them by a large margin (see Degeorge et al., 1999; Burgstahler and Eames, 2006; Ayers 
et al., 2006). It results in zero or small positive earnings surprises, because both earnings 
management and expectation management are costly.49 When a firm fails to meet analysts’ 
earnings expectations, investors will have doubts about management’s ability and their 
bonuses and stock options awards may suffer. Such doubts are much less likely to arise if the 
analysts’ earnings forecasts are just met. However, the analysts’ consensus forecast is 
endogenous. Although executives try to report earnings to meet or exceed analysts’ forecasts, 
analysts try to anticipate actual reported earnings (Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992). Prior 
evidence suggests that executives, realizing the importance of meeting or exceeding the 
analysts’ consensus, actively try to influence analysts’ expectations downward, especially 
                                                 
 
49 Manipulating earnings by shifting accruals from a future period to the current period reduces earnings in 
the future, making it more difficult to meet future earnings expectations. Meanwhile, managing earnings 
upward in current period will raise expectations about future earnings, further lowering the likelihood of 
meeting future earnings target. Manipulating analyst expectations is also costly; it increases stock price 
volatility as well as decreases the credibility of the managers with analysts. As Degeorge, Patel, and 
Zeckhauser (1999) and Burgstahler and Eames (2006) present, firms try to meet or beat analyst forecasts 
by a small margin. 
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when the earnings announcement date is approaching. Prior studies document that managers 
manipulate earnings and/or analyst expectations to avoid missing analyst earnings forecasts 
(for instance, DeFond and Park, 1997; Degeorge et al., 1999; Matsumoto, 2002; Burgstahler 
and Eames, 2006). Former SEC chairman Arthur Levitt (1998) suggests that managers are 
concerned about failing to meet earnings expectations set by analysts' forecasts and that 
‘earnings manipulation’ is a tool they can use to ensure capital markets are not disappointed. 
Such manipulations are referred to as the ‘numbers game’. 
 
Analyst forecast research has evolved considerably since the early studies documented a bias 
towards optimism in forecasts and recommendations. Frankel et al. (2006) demonstrate the 
informativeness of analyst forecasts complements the quality of financial statements. 
Analysts’ earnings forecasts have been found to be generally more accurate than time-series 
statistical models of earnings, presumably because they are able to incorporate timelier news 
into their forecasts (see Brown and Rozeff, 1978; Brown et al., 1987; Givoly, 1982; 
Bradshaw et al., 2012). Since fluctuations in stock prices are driven by information, one 
critical factor reflecting a capital market’s maturity is transparency of information which is 
related to the amount and quality of information that firms are required to disclose, and the 
informativeness of existing accounting reporting system.   
 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) demonstrate that firms are able to manage both cash flows 
and discretionary accruals around the profit and earnings increase benchmarks. Dechow et al. 
(2003) suggest that managers work harder around earnings benchmarks. Ayers et al. (2006) 
emphasize a probably systematic association between discretionary accrual proxies and firm 
performance: this is one disadvantage of studies on earnings benchmarks. This is because it 
will be difficult to interpret a positive association between discretionary accrual proxies and 
the odds of meeting or beating an earnings benchmark if they also represent firm’s underlying 
performance. In addition, trying to meet targets solely through earnings manipulation is not 
rational if investors assume that earnings that barely meet or beat a target are managed. It 
implies that rational investors will attributable less value to the earnings which are posited to 
be managed; this in turn means managers have no incentives to manage earnings in the first 
place. Some recent evidence implies that investors do not discount earnings that are just over 
a target (see Burgstahler and Eames 2003; Bartov et al., 2002; Kasznik and McNichols 2002; 
Matsumoto 2002; Dhaliwal et al., 2002; Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003). One explanation for 
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the fact that investors do not discount earnings that are just over a target is that it takes time 
for them to distinguish manipulators from non-manipulators.   
 
Firth and Gift (1999) suggest a major task of financial analysts working for stockbrokers and 
investment firms is to forecast future earnings of listed companies. Thus, the usefulness of 
analysts’ work is crucially subject to the forecast accuracy. There are substantial studies 
which have examined the accuracy, bias, and other characteristics of financial analysts' 
earnings forecasts based on the U.S. market. In contrast, there is little research on analyst 
forecast accuracy in other countries, despite the increasingly global nature of investing. 
Research into the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts is valuable for several reasons. 
Firstly, earnings forecasts and revisions in forecasts are major determinants of stock prices 
and stock price changes. Assessing the accuracy of forecasts can be used to help improve 
future forecasting and help investors make choices between analysts. Secondly, earnings 
forecasts may be used as inputs into the deliberations of regulators and policymakers. Finally, 
earnings forecasts are often used by researchers as a benchmark in studies on financial 
markets and accounting issues. Karamanou (2012) indicates that analyst forecast accuracy is 
anticipated to increase over time as analysts exert more effort and gain valuable forecasting 
experience following a market opening.  
 
Studies on whether small profit or small loss avoidance is an indication of earnings 
management is motivated by the observed kink in earnings around zero. Prior literature has 
documented a ‘kink’ in the distribution of reported earnings around zero: a statistically small 
number of firms with small losses and a statistically unusual large number of firms with small 
profits (Hayn, 1995; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). Dechow et al. (2010) identify earnings 
measures such as small profits and small loss avoidance as earnings management, which is a 
specific dimension of earnings quality. Meeting or beating an analyst forecast is an indication 
of earnings management based on the ‘kink’ in the distribution of forecast errors: actual 
reported earnings minus consensus analyst forecasts (e.g., Degeorge et al., 1999). 
 
This study aims to provide preliminary evidence on analyst forecast accuracy and further to 
test whether the managers utilize the discretionary accruals to meet or beat analysts’ forecast 
in the Chinese emerging capital market. Managers are generally assumed to have inside or 
superior information (i.e., asymmetric information) regarding earnings. Theoretically, if the 
managers provide informative disclosures and make revisions frequently over the period 
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before earnings announcements, there will be no or little earnings surprises (i.e. analyst 
forecast errors). Nevertheless, the sophistication of the managers could have an impact on the 
quality of information disclosed; for example, having incentives to manipulate disclosed 
information from earnings smoothing to misrepresentation.  
 
Logit regressions are applied in this chapter to detect whether there is a positive relationship 
between discretionary accrual proxies and firms’ propensity to meet or beat analysts’ forecast 
benchmarks. This study compares firm-year observations across adjacent analysts-based 
unexpected earnings ‘bins’ and examines the association between discretionary accrual 
measures and the probability that a firm reports a higher profit to meet or beat analyst 
forecast benchmark. Three available analyst forecasts: the mean, the median, and the single 
most current forecast are utilized in this chapter to do the robustness test. The residuals 
derived from the Performance Matched Discretionary Accrual Measure (Kothari et al., 2005) 
and Forward-looking model (Dechow et al. 2003) and Modified Jones Model (1995) as 
utilized as the estimates of Discretionary Accruals. Unexpected earnings/earnings surprise as 
defined by firm j’s year t actual earnings per share 50 minus the single-most recent analyst 
forecast or consensus mean (median) analyst forecast provided prior to the earnings 
announcement. This research assigns firms to ‘analysts-based earnings surprise’ bins based 
on the firm’s unexpected earnings per share (in cents). Larger earnings surprises lead to 
larger stock market reactions. Consistent with prior research (for example, Degeorge et al. 
1999; Payne and Thomas 2003; and Phillips et al. 2003), 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑗𝑡 is rounded to 
the nearest cent. Each just-beat and just-miss bin has a width of 0.01, and each firm-year 
observation appears once in a just-beat group and once in a just-miss group. According to 
Dechow et al. (1995), Guay et al. (1996) and Kasznik (1999) and McNichols (2000), one 
disadvantage of this study is that the discretionary accruals proxies employed for testing 
earnings management may capture non-discretionary accruals. 
                                                 
50 Basic EPS: Basic EPS is calculated by dividing profit or loss attributable to ordinary equity holders of 
the parent entity (the numerator) by the weighted average number of ordinary shares outstanding (the 
denominator) during the period. (IAS 33.1050) 
 
Diluted EPS: Diluted EPS is calculated by adjusting the earnings and number of shares for the effects of 
dilutive options and other dilutive potential ordinary shares. (IAS 33.31) The effects of anti-dilutive 
potential ordinary shares are ignored in calculating diluted EPS. (IAS 33.41) 
 
The earnings numerators (profit or loss from continuing operations and net profit or loss) used for the 
calculation should be after deducting all expenses including taxes, minority interests, and preference 
dividends. (IAS 33.12) 
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4.1.1. The development of China's securities analyst industry 
 
The capital market is an information-driven open market. High-quality information is the 
premise of capital resource allocation and particularly important for the Chinese stock market. 
It is determined by the structure and characteristics of the investors in mainland China. As the 
information users, Chinese investors have the following characteristics: (1) a large proportion 
of retail investors on investor distribution; (2) most retail investors have lack of investment 
experience; every year there is a large number of new investors access to the stock market; (3) 
investors have limited access to acquire information51 (Liping Song, General Manager of 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 2009). Song (2008) suggests at the awarding ceremony of the 
6th New Fortune Best Analyst, that the securities analyst industry is becoming more 
normative. However, with the advancement of the current economy and a deeper market 
reform, the securities analyst industry is encountering new demands and challenges. A 
growing number of innovative small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs 52 ) with new 
business modes and new economies are accessing the stock market in China. These 
enterprises have differences in assets, operations and managements from those of traditional 
enterprises. The transformations of economic setup and the construction of a multi-layered 
capital market also create new challenges. 
 
In 2005 there were 73 securities firms with about 700 analysts. According to Table 4.1, by 
June, 2015 the number of securities firms increased to 109 firms with more than 2300 
analysts. The securities analyst industry in China has a low starting point. Until 1st April 1998, 
the China Securities Regulatory Commission under State Council promulgated the ‘Securities 
and Futures Investment Advisory Management Provisional Regulations’. According to the 
provisional regulations, securities consulting professionals are able to engage in securities 
and futures advisory activities after being recognized by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission. It symbolizes the birth of a securities analyst industry with a clear definition 
and identification in mainland China. In December 2002, Securities Analysts Committee was 
established in Beijing under Securities Association of China. The Committee’s main duties 
include: enhancing self-regulation of securities analysts and investment advisers; researching 
and establishing relevant self-regulatory rules and practice standards; boosting the level of 
                                                 
51 http://www.szse.cn/main/aboutus/bsyw/39740455.shtml 
52 The small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in China have achieved rapid and sustainable growth in the  
past two decades. Such growth has increasingly contributed to China’s economic development. (Liu, 2008, 
National Development and Reform Commission) 
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practice of securities analysts and investment advisers; facilitating exchanges among 
securities analysts and investment advisers and reporting their opinions and suggestions, 
protecting their lawful rights and interests and aiding their career development (Securities 
Association of China). Securities analysts are required to follow the principles of 
independence, objectivity, fairness, prudence, professionalism and integrity. (Securities 
analysts Professional Code of Conduct53, September, 2012)  
 
Table 4.1 The development of China's securities analyst industry 
 
Up to June 2015 
Number of 
Securities 
Companies 
Securities 
Qualified 
Practitioner 
Number of 
Securities 
Analysts 
Percentage of 
Securities 
Analysts 
Total 109 259212 2391 0.92% 
(Source: Securities Association of China54) 
 
‘New Fortune Best Securities Analyst’, sponsored by New Fortune Magazine, is China's first 
indigenous market analysts’ rankings since 2003. Under the principle of ‘openness, fairness 
and justice’ and with its extensive influence, New Fortune Best Securities Analyst activity has 
been widely accepted by the market.  However, the overall quality of securities analysts' 
expertise and standard-ability is controversial in China. Hu (2005) compares analysts’ 
research reports in China and the United States via selecting three big securities companies 
respectively (Merrill Lynch, US Bancorp and Wedbush Morgan Securities versus Shenyin 
Wanguo, Guangda Securities and Shanghai Securities). His findings show that domestic 
analysts neither provide detailed calculation methods nor explain the data source used to 
make predictions in their research reports: it impairs the reports’ reliability and affect 
decision making.  However, US counterparts elaborate on the selection of forecasting model 
and sample data in their reports.  
 
4.1.2. Contribution and Frame Structure 
 
This research makes potential contributions in several aspects. Firstly, it improves upon 
previous studies by considering firms’ earnings management with respect to analysts’ 
forecasts based on the Chinese emerging capital market. It will provide both theoretical and 
                                                 
53 http://www.sac.net.cn/flgz/zlgz/201207/t20120703_43727.html 
54 http://person.sac.net.cn/pages/registration/sac-publicity-report.html 
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practical implications for accounting standards setters in China. Secondly, detecting earnings 
management from the analysts’ perspective, this analysis also contributes to earnings 
management research by empirically investigating managers' use of their reporting discretion 
to ‘meet or beat’ analysts' forecasts. It provides a better understanding of the properties of 
analysts’ forecasts (e.g., analyst forecast accuracy) by modelling firms’ earnings management 
practices and analysts’ response to them. Finally, some evidence shows a relation between 
discretionary accruals and meeting or beating analyst forecasts, and firms managing earnings 
upward or downward to meet consensus forecasts; this poses a challenge to researchers 
attempting to link the two activities. This study investigates the competing explanations for 
the positive associations between discretionary accrual proxies and firms’ propensity to beat 
earnings benchmarks.  
 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 explains the theoretical 
framework for this empirical chapter. Section 4.3 reviews the literature related to earnings 
quality. Section 4.4 makes hypotheses development. Section 4.5 explains the research 
methodology applied in this analysis. Section 4.6 describes the sample selection. Section 4.7 
presents the descriptive statistics and empirical results. Section 4.8 reports the robustness test 
results. Section 4.9 summarizes and concludes. 
 
4.2. Theoretical Framework 
 
Gleason and Mills (2008) indicate that beating external targets is an indication of earnings 
management, supporting evidence that consistently meeting targets are important. Some 
studies on target beating are probably attributable to the presumed assumption of market or 
analyst efficiency (e.g. Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003; Bartov et al., 2002; Bhojraj et al., 2009; 
Burgstahler and Eames, 2003). In an efficient market, stock prices are posited to reflect the 
best (most precise) information available at any point in time. Disclosure studies presume that, 
even in an efficient capital market, managers have superior information to outside investors 
on their firms’ expected future performance. A mechanism to reduce agency problems is the 
board of directors, whose role is to monitor and discipline management on behalf of external 
shareholders. Kawakatsu and Morey (1999) investigates the relationship between financial 
liberalization and the Efficient Markets Hypothesis and find little evidence that deregulation 
improves the efficiency of the markets. If the stock market is efficient in anticipating analysts’ 
rational behavior, the market should adjust for the skewness-induced bias in analyst forecasts.  
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4.2.1. Analyst Forecast Efficiency  
 
Financial analysts as information intermediaries engage in private information production to 
reveal any manager misuse of firm resources, and mitigate agency problems (information 
asymmetry) between corporate insiders and outside shareholders (Brennan and Hughes, 1991; 
Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1995; Bushman and Smith, 2001; Easley et al., 1998; Healy 
and Palepu, 2001; Houston et al., 2006). Financial analysts have long been considered to 
make sophisticated and unbiased judgements, to incorporate all publicly available (firm-
specific, industry, financial and market) information and to be well informed about the arrival 
of any new information. They are presumed to be rational experts who forecast future 
earnings and make recommendations on an unbiased basis; they are considered to be less 
likely to misunderstand the implications of financial information than naïve investors. Prior 
literature on financial analysts refers to ‘Analyst Forecast Inefficiency’ as forecasts that fail to 
accurately incorporate new information on a timely basis and/or that are biased (often 
described as irrational or suboptimal). Easterwood and Nutt (1999) emphasize that analysts’ 
rational behavior hypothesizes that the analysts immediately and fully incorporate public 
information into their forecasts without bias. Several studies document that analysts (1) make 
biased forecasts and (2) tend to misinterpret new information. It has been evidenced that 
analysts generally produce upwardly biased forecasts (Fried and Givoly, 1982; O'Brien, 1988; 
Butler and Lang, 1991; Brous, 1992; Brous and Kini, 1993; Francis and Philbrick, 1993; 
Kang et al., 1994; and Dreman and Berry, 1995). Analysts are supposed to systematically 
underreact to bad news (Lys and Sohn, 1990; Abarbanell, 1991; Abarbanell and Bernard, 
1992; Ali et al., 1992; Elliot et al., 1995; and Teoh and Wong, 1997). However, DeBondt and 
Thaler (1990) and Brown (1993) conclude that analysts systematically overreact to good 
news. Whether analysts systematically underreact or overreact depends on the nature of the 
earnings information they receive. However, neither under-reaction nor over-reaction is 
consistent with rational forecasts and an efficient market for expert information.  
 
Analysts’ under-reaction to bad news or overreaction to good news implies that analysts are 
systematically optimistic when they consider the implications of new information. 
Specifically speaking, analysts appear to overreact (underreact) to good (bad) news in prior 
year earnings, which is consistent with incentive-based explanations of analyst optimism. 
They do not fully recognize transitory working capital accruals and thus do not make 
corresponding adjustment for earnings forecast. Easterwood and Nutt (1999) explain two 
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reasons for analysts to exhibit systematically optimistic interpretations. Firstly, the sell-side 
analysts are generally employed by brokerage and investment banking firms and have 
economic incentives to promote the purchase of stocks, rather than to produce statistically 
optimal forecasts (supported by Schipper, 1991; Pratt, 1993; Womack, 1996; and Carleton, 
Chen, and Steiner, 1998 and the references therein). Secondly, analysts derive part of their 
expertise from the close relationship with the top management of the firms they follow, 
allowing access to more inside information. This access might be diminished if analysts did 
not give a favorable recommendation. In some cases, there is also a possibility for analysts to 
be pessimistic about the future of the firms. However, it is less likely that the consensus 
forecast would be pessimistic because analysts do not have motivations to behave in this 
manner.  
 
Generally speaking, the more experienced the analysts are, the more efficient is their use of 
historical earnings and accuracy (Mikhail et al., 2003). Under the Analyst Efficiency 
Hypothesis, analysts are deemed as unbiased and qualified predictors of future expected 
earnings. The variation in their forecast accuracy reflects attributes of earnings that are 
related to Earnings Quality. Francis et al. (2004) summarize the evidence on analysts’ 
incentives to make accurate and unbiased forecasts. Analyst forecast error (referring to 
earnings surprise or unexpected earnings here) is measured as the difference between 
reported actual EPS and analysts’ forecast EPS. This measure introduces behavioral 
influences in at least two forms. Firstly, it contains the impact of analysts' self-selection 
biases, cognitive biases, and their incentives for optimism. Previous studies have documented 
optimistic bias in earnings forecasts by security analysts. Secondly, it contains the effects of 
management ‘guidance’ to analysts (see Bartov et al. 2002). Both influences are expected to 
affect forecast errors, but do not necessarily affect the quality of information contained in the 
earnings number itself. However, management manipulations of earnings to affect analyst 
forecast errors may influence the quality of the information in earnings. 
 
The aggregated forecast errors are regarded as a function of aggregated items such as the 
general level of analysts’ ability in that country, the unexpected macro-economic events 
affecting corporate profits in general, and the country’s capital market transparency. 
Emerging markets also display differences in the characteristics of analyst forecasts. Chang et 
al. (2000) found that analyst forecast accuracy differs remarkably among countries. The 
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market transparency is reflected in the general level of private incentives to voluntarily 
disclose information, the rigor of its regulatory requirements, and the integrity of its 
accounting standard. They are in support of the role of transparency in affecting the analysts’ 
ability to make forecasts. Error decreased with a higher mean number of analysts, increased 
analyst activity, increased accounting disclosure, and lower variability of returns, and when 
an English-style legal system existed. Analyst following (a determinant of accuracy) 
increased with firm size, capital market development, and the quality of accounting standards. 
These country-specific measures explained a large part of the variation in the accuracy and 
extent of analyst activity among countries. The variation in analyst following and 
performance do not appear to be entirely a function of country development. Firth and Gift 
(1999) find that accuracy is generally greater in more mature markets, and that composite and 
financial risks are more significant determinants of accuracy than firm size and analyst 
following. Hope (2003a, 2003b) investigates how differences in regulations across countries 
affect the information environment and the characteristics of analysts' forecasts. They report 
that across countries, a strong enforcement of accounting standards is associated with 
improved forecast accuracy, and the level of disclosure about accounting policies is inversely 
related to forecast errors and dispersion. Barniv et al. (2005) conclude that consistent with 
legal and financial reporting environments influencing analyst activities, superior analysts 
maintain superiority in common-law countries, but not in civil-law countries. 
 
4.2.1.1. Analysts’ influence on managers 
 
A question investors may have concern about is whether the analysts’ forecasts have value, 
i.e., the informativeness of analyst forecasts. Prior literature shows that the informativeness of 
the analysts’ forecasts increases monotonically as forecasts are closer to year end. The 
analysts’ earnings forecast are considered to be informative if their forecast is more accurate 
than the random walk forecast. 
 
In a contemporaneous study, Matsumoto (1999) investigates temporal changes in the earnings 
surprise distribution. She employs the consensus analyst forecast as the measure of estimates 
rather than the single most recent forecast. Brown (2001) confirms that managers of growth 
firms are relatively more likely than managers of value firms to report profits that meet or 
beat analyst forecasts, and, when they do, they are more likely to report profits that create 
small positive surprises. 
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Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) observe that managers attempt to avoid reporting losses and 
earnings decreases. On their basis, Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999) further propose 
that managers try to prevent reporting earnings that miss analyst forecasts. Both of them find 
that avoiding losses is more prevalent than avoiding earnings decreases, and Degeorge et al. 
conclude that meeting or beating analyst forecasts is less widespread than avoiding losses or 
earnings decreases. Burgstahler and Eames (1998) confirm that managers tend to report 
earnings that meet or beat analyst forecasts consistent with the findings of Levitt (1998) and 
Vickers (1999) and Turner (2000). Analysts always interact directly with management during 
earnings release conference calls, when they are given the opportunity to enquire about a 
firm’s accounting report. Corporate executives, usually the chief financial officers (CFO), 
have to face and answer those questions. In the question and answer session, analysts often 
ask a wide range of questions related to the company’s financial statements. 
 
Moreover, analysts have other channels to express their concerns about firms, such as 
through their research reports to their clients, through making recommendations and forecasts 
to the investors, and through their appearance in the public media, including newspapers and 
television, often reaching an extensive audience. Analysts also play an active role in 
corporate fraud detection as gatekeepers. Dyck, Morse, and Zingales (2006) find that the 
most efficient external whistle-blowers for discovery of corporate fraud are analysts. Because 
of analysts’ active participation in the information distribution process, managers’ financial 
reporting decisions can be influenced by the intensity of analyst coverage.  
 
4.2.2. Management’s Motivations to Meet or Beat Analyst Forecast  
 
Academic studies find consistent evidence of managers taking actions to avoid negative ‘bad 
news’ earnings surprises (Payne and Robb 2000; Brown 2001; Burgstahler and Eames 2001). 
Because managers are likely to be concerned that a negative earnings surprise will lead to 
significantly lower stock prices and will adversely affect their performance evaluation. 
Furthermore, Skinner and Sloan (2001) submit that the stock market response to negative 
earnings surprises tends to be large and asymmetric, particularly for growth stocks, indicating 
a high cost to missing analysts' expectations. More importantly, Ball et al. (2003) contend 
that in China managers face pressure from the government. This affects their political future 
and is thus likely to be a greater influence than either compensation incentives or market 
forces, as is the case documented in the US literature; for instance, in China, management 
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may be promoted and transferred to government/large groups, appointed as officials or 
awarded political titles if their or their firm’s performance is excellent. These findings 
support that managers acquire benefits from manipulating earnings to meet or beat analyst 
forecasts. In the case of earnings management, managers must implicitly believe that users 
are neither able to detect earnings management nor do find it cost effective to do so. 
 
Matsumoto (2002) detects what factors have influence on managers to take actions to avoid 
negative earnings surprises in her study and explores the mechanisms through which 
managers achieve this goal. Her findings exhibit that firms with the following characteristics 
are more likely to meet or beat analysts' forecasts: (1) higher transient institutional ownership; 
(2) greater reliance on implicit claims with their stakeholders; and (3) greater value-relevance 
of reported earnings. Managers generally manipulate earnings upward if unmanaged earnings 
fail to reach analysts’ expectations. Managers have strong incentives to avoid negative 
earnings surprises because such negative surprises often lead to negative price revisions 
(Brown et al. 1987) and overall negative impact on the publicity for the firm.  
 
Managers place greater emphasis on meeting or exceeding analysts’ expectations, hence, both 
reported earnings and earnings forecasts are manipulated to achieve this aim: several studies 
provide the evidence (see Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997;  Matsumoto, 1999; Richardson, 
Teoh and Wysocki, 1999; Burgstahler and Eames, 2001; and Brown, 2001). The pressure 
imposed on management to meet analysts’ earnings expectation is sometimes explained as 
the single most important cause of earnings management. As stated by Barth et al. (1999), the 
market rewards companies that consistently report positive earnings surprise and penalize 
those which miss analysts’ forecasts. Furthermore, managers of growth firms are expected to 
be more likely than those of value firms to meet or beat analyst estimates. The growth firms 
(market value of common equity/book value of common equity=large ratios) are more likely 
than value firms (market value of common equity/book value of common equity=small ratios) 
to experience adverse valuation consequences when their managers report earnings that miss 
analysts’ estimates (Dreman and Berry, 1995; Fox, 1997; Skinner and Sloan, 1998).  
 
McDonald and McGough (1999) and The Economist (1999) suggest that managers from 
growth firms have relatively more compensation in stock and options which are closely 
bundled with the firms’ stock price. A significant portion of managerial compensation in the 
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U.S. is in the form of stock-based option. Prior literature shows that short-run stock prices are 
sensitive to meeting analyst forecasts (Bartov, Givoly and Hayn, 2002; Kasznik and 
McNichols, 2002; Skinner and Sloan, 2002). Such positive investor reaction to just meeting 
the analyst forecast creates a favorable environment for managers who attempt to sell their 
shares. From the trading incentives, McVay et al. (2006) predict that management’s 
upcoming insider sales help explain the earnings discontinuity around the analyst forecast 
threshold. However, as Ding et al. (2007) and Tricker (2009) argued, the CSRC simply 
allowed listed companies to remunerate managers with stock options from 2005.  
 
4.3. Empirical Literature Review 
 
Earnings convey important and valuable information for investment decisions. Degeorge et al. 
introduce behavioral thresholds for earnings management. They identify earnings 
management attempting to exceed three vital thresholds: (1) report positive profits, (2) 
sustain recent performance, and (3) meet analysts’ expectations. Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997) examine the manipulation behavior of earnings to meet the first two thresholds. Payne 
and Robb (1997) show that managers use discretionary accrual to align earnings with analysts’ 
expectations. Prior research investigating firms’ reported earnings with respect to analysts’ 
forecasts generally assume that analysts’ earnings forecasts are one of the benchmarks by 
which the market evaluates the underlying performance of a firm. Many researchers assert 
that firms manipulate earnings and/or guide analysts’ expectations to meet or slightly exceed 
analysts’ earnings forecasts (Burgstahler and Eames, 1998; Brown, 1997; Degeorge et al., 
1999; Dechow et al., 2000; Matsumoto, 2002).  
 
Gleason and Mills (2008) propose that target beating is an indication of earnings management 
based on their findings. In other words, they deem meeting or beating a target as a censored 
measure of earnings management. However, there are contradictory results in other studies. 
For instance, Bhojraj et al. (2009) argue, based on their findings that the market does not 
view target beating as evidence of earnings management. 55  Bartov et al. (2002) also 
document a higher contemporaneous quarterly return associated with meeting or beating 
analyst forecasts, implying that the market consider target beating as an outcome of efficient 
                                                 
55 Bhojraj et al. (2009) find that firms that just beat analyst forecasts by using accruals or by cutting 
discretionary expenses experience short-term stock price improvement. Assuming that the accruals 
adjustments undermine earnings quality, and assuming market efficiency, these results suggest that the 
market does not view target beating as evidence of earnings management. 
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contracting rather than an evidence of an erosion in decision usefulness. In addition, 
Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) and Burgstahler and Eames (2003) demonstrate that analysts 
do not detect earnings management to meet or beat targets, although Libby et al. (2008) 
suggest an alternative explanation for these findings is that the complicated incentives of 
analysts lead them to neglect earnings management .  
 
There is a negative relationship between the accruals and subsequent earnings forecast errors, 
indicating that analysts are not aware that large accruals in prior periods will result in 
predictable declines in earnings in subsequent periods (Bradshaw, Richardson and Sloan, 
2001). Yet some studies conclude that when analysts can rationally anticipate accruals 
management, they appropriately incorporate the implications of accruals into their forecasts 
(Kim and Schroeder, 1990; Coles et al., 2006; Burgstahler and Eames, 2003). Previous 
studies compare different discretionary accrual proxies for firms that just beat and just miss 
earnings benchmarks to examine whether firms take advantage of discretionary accruals to 
meet or beat earnings benchmarks (e.g., Dechow et al. 2003; Phillips et al. 2003; Ayers et al., 
2006). It shows that the observed asymmetric distribution of earnings surprises results not 
only from firms’ earnings management behavior, but also from analysts’ anticipation of such 
behavior. Brown (2001) and Matsumoto (2001) find a disproportionate number of cases in 
recent years where earnings per share (EPS) are slightly (by a few cents) above analysts’ 
forecasts. They further find an increase over the years in the number of cases where actual 
EPS are exactly on target. Degeorge et al. (1999) ascertain that the MBE (meet or beat 
expectations) strategy is one of three performance thresholds that management tries to meet. 
Evidence provided by other studies suggests that both earnings manipulation and 
expectations management are used to accomplish this objective. Burgstahler and Eames 
(1998) provide evidence that downward revisions of forecasts occur more frequently when 
the revision would be sufficient to avoid a negative earnings surprise, suggesting managers’ 
influence on analysts’ forecast revisions. Such influence is also supported by Skinner (1997), 
Kasznik and Lev (1995), Francis et al. (1994) and Soffer et al. (2000), who show that 
companies increasingly tend to warn investors about forthcoming unfavorable earnings.   
 
The evidence that earnings manipulated by managers when firms just meet or beat consensus 
analyst forecast is more persuasive. This stream of literature discusses three different 
perspectives: (1) the first perspective describes the mechanisms that firms adopt to boost 
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earnings that just meet or beat a target. For instance, firms make accounting choices such as 
managing tax expense (Dhaliwal et al., 2004), managing the classification of items within the 
income statement (McVay, 2006), and managing the creation and reversal of restructuring 
charge accruals (Moehrle, 2002). Ayers et al. (2006) find a correlation between discretionary 
accruals and meeting or beating analyst forecasts and reporting small earnings increases. In 
order to meet or beat analyst forecasts, firms are likely to engage in real activities such as 
repurchasing shares (Bens et al., 2003; Hribar et al., 2006), selling fixed assets or marketable 
securities (Herrmann et al., 2003); (2) the second perspective detects the relation between 
target beating and firms’ equity market incentives to meet or beat a benchmark which 
includes the ownership structure of the firm (Matsumoto, 2002; Beatty et al., 2002) or 
managers’ compensation/stock ownership (Cheng and Warfield, 2005; McVay et al., 2006). 
Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) indirectly link earnings management activities to equity 
market incentives; and (3) the third perspective is from the association between target beating 
and firms’ opportunities to meet or beat a target. Frankel et al. (2002) document a correlation 
between target beating and lower audit quality. Brown and Pinello (2007) demonstrate that 
small negative analyst forecast errors (negative earnings surprises) are more prevalent in 
unaudited interim quarters, since there is a stronger kink in the distribution of earnings 
around the consensus analyst forecast in interim quarters in which the earnings management 
is greater. This finding contradicts with the previous evidence of a stronger kink around zero 
in the fourth quarter supported by Kerstein and Rai (2007) and Jacob and Jorgensen (2007), 
who argue that the small profits represent earnings management in the kink around zero. 
 
Researchers have reported a ‘kink’ in the distribution of reported earnings around zero: a 
statistically small number of firms with slight losses and an unusually large number of firms 
with small profits (e.g. Hayn, 1995; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). A common but 
controversial explanation is that firms with unmanaged earnings just less than zero (i.e., firms 
with small losses) intentionally manage earnings upward to report a small profit. Therefore, 
earnings measures such as small profits and small loss avoidance have been identified as an 
indication of earnings management, and as one specific dimension of earnings quality. 
Similarly, researchers have proposed that meeting or beating an analyst forecast is an 
indication of earnings management based on the ‘kink’ in the distribution of forecast errors: 
reported earnings less consensus analyst forecasts ( Degeorge et al., 1999). Burgstahler and 
Eames (1998) observe that there are a disproportionately large number of small positive 
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earnings surprises and a disproportionately small number of negative earnings surprises. That 
is, more firms beat analysts’ forecasts than fail to do so. It implies that earnings management 
that responds to analysts’ forecasts leads to an asymmetric distribution of earnings surprises. 
Earnings surprise depends upon two variables, actual reported earnings and analysts’ 
forecasts. Some evidence shows that firms probably manage earnings upward or downward 
to meet consensus forecasts. Matsumoto (2002) suggest that the analyst forecast target can be 
managed (forecast guidance). Researchers rely on the assumption that, in the absence of 
earnings management and/or forecasts guidance, the distribution of earnings surprises would 
be symmetrical around zero. Degeorge et al. (1999) document that firms will manage 
earnings downwards to report small positive earnings surprises rather than large ones (analyst 
forecast error) if actual earnings sufficiently exceed forecasts. Meanwhile, they evidence that 
avoiding loss or avoiding earnings decreases is more important than avoiding negative 
earnings surprises for managers.  
 
However, Brown and Caylor (2004) have different opinions and show that avoiding negative 
earnings surprises has become the primary goal for managers since the mid-1990s. Large 
negative earnings surprises will give rise to a dramatic decline in stock price (see Skinner and 
Sloan, 1999). Brown (1997) and Barua et al. (2003) argue that firms will manage earnings 
downwards even further in order to build up accounting reserves when they find analysts’ 
forecasts benchmark are unattainable. Evidence from recent empirical work provides that 
managers prefer to take actions to avoid negative earnings surprises. Burgstahler and Eames 
(2001) find a larger-than-expected proportion (assuming a smooth distribution) of zero and 
small positive forecast errors in the distribution of analysts' forecast errors. Brown (2001) 
presents an overall increase in the percent of zero and positive forecast errors over time. 
Richardson et al. (1999) also find evidence of a temporal decline in the extent to which actual 
earnings fall short of analysts' expectations. Francis and Philbrick (1993) and Lin and 
McNichols (1998) focused on incentives for analysts to bias their forecasts. 
 
Previous studies on whether small profits and loss avoidance indicate earnings management 
provide mixed evidence. Dechow et al. (2003) find that discretionary accruals are similar in 
both the small profit group and the small loss group on the basis of a large sample. Beaver et 
al. (2003) find that small profits are associated with earnings management via discretionary 
loss reserves at P&C insurers. Phillips et al. (2003) discover that deferred tax expense is 
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useful in detecting earnings management to meet benchmarks such as avoiding losses. Small 
positive profits associated with greater incentives for earnings management in the fourth 
quarter documented by Kerstein and Rai (2007) and Jacob and Jorgensen (2007) and with 
greater opportunities to manipulate earnings due to low audit effort evidenced by Caramanis 
and Lennox (2008). As suggested in Ayers et al. (2006), they find a significant positive 
association between discretionary accrual proxies and beating the benchmark. They draw the 
conclusion that there is an intensified relation regarding earnings management around the 
analysts’ forecast benchmark. 
 
Prior literature support that firms manipulate earnings in order to beat expectations. Bannister 
and Newman (1996) find that firms that may fail to beat analysts’ forecasts participate in 
income-increasing earnings management more than those whose earnings exceed the 
expectations. Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) observe that firms which received ‘buy’ 
recommendations are more likely to manage reported earnings to meet analysts’ expectations. 
Kasznik (1999) shows that firms manage earnings in order not to disappoint the market given 
expectations formed in response to earlier voluntary disclosures. McVay (2006) shows that 
firms meet analysts’ expectations by expense shifting. The tendency to narrowly beat 
forecasts is more prominent for growth firms. Growth stocks are punished more severely, 
relative to value stocks, for the same amount of negative earnings surprise, providing 
incentives for growth firm managers to avoid negative earnings surprises (Brown, 2001; 
Skinner and Sloan, 2002). Through detecting the market response to positive and negative 
forecast errors, Lopez and Rees (2002) investigate whether the capital market rewards and 
punishes firms for meeting or not meeting analysts’ earnings forecasts. Kasznik and 
McNichols (2001) document that annual market adjusted returns are significantly greater for 
firms that meet analysts’ expectations and find a market premium to meeting or beating 
analysts’ forecasts and a differential response coefficient between firms that beat or miss 
analysts’ forecasts. Consistently, Bartov et al. (2001) demonstrate that investors reward those 
firms where earnings meet or exceed analysts’ forecasts with a higher quarterly return.  
 
4.3.1. Analysts’ Forecasts: Proxy for Market Expectations  
 
Time-series statistical models have been used frequently in previous research to provide 
earnings expectations. Evidence consistent with earnings management to meet earnings 
forecast is provided by Kasznik (1999) and Payne and Robb (1997). It is argued that financial 
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analysts' forecasts may have an advantage over a time-series prediction model for three main 
reasons: firstly, analysts have an edge with broader information which incorporates non-
accounting information on the firm such as industry trend and firm sales and production 
figures, general macroeconomic information, and other analysts’ forecasts, as well as the 
historical series of earnings. Analysts presumably utilize all publicly available (and 
occasionally unpublished) information while the time-series prediction model exclusively 
relies on past earnings. Secondly, the time-series model as a proxy for market expectations is 
further impaired by the underlying assumptions that the earnings generating processes are 
stationary with stable parameters and that the model characteristics are applicable to all firms. 
Finally, financial analysts have a timing advantage in that they can use more recent 
information about the firm's earnings which only becomes widely available after the fiscal 
year end. Late forecasts incorporating a greater amount of autonomous information are 
somewhat better than early forecasts.  
 
Analysts’ forecasts of earnings are currently widely used in accounting and finance research 
as proxies for the unobservable market expectations (i.e. proxies for a future expected 
earnings). The stock market inclines to rely on analyst forecasts to a greater extent than time 
series model predictions indicating that analyst forecasts exhibit more desirable quality than 
time-series model predictions (Fried and Givoly, 1982; Hopwood and McKeown, 1990). 
Previous studies compare the analysts’ forecasts of earnings with that predicted by time-
series models and document that analysts' forecasts provide better proxies for market 
expectations of both revenues and expenses. For instance, Givoly and Lakonishok (1979) 
demonstrate that financial analysts' forecasts have more information content. They show that 
prediction errors of analysts are more closely associated with security price movements, 
hence argue that analysts' forecasts provide a better surrogate for market expectations than 
forecasts generated by time-series models. Consistently, O’ Brien (1988) proposes that 
financial analysts’ forecast of earnings is a better surrogate for market expectations.  
Moreover, properties of analyst forecasts have been found to be associated with market and 
firm attributes. For example, analyst following and accuracy (dispersion) have been 
positively (negatively) associated with the quality of the firm's information environment 
(Abarbanell et al., 1995; Healy et al., 1999; Hope, 2003; Lang and Lundholm, 1996). Analyst 
coverage and accuracy have been positively associated with firm value (Lang et al., 2003).   
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Some evidence suggests that superior analysts exert a greater impact on prices, supporting 
Brown's (1993) conjecture that forecast accuracy and the association with stock prices should 
be considered as two sides of the same coin. Mikhail et al. (1997) demonstrate forecast 
accuracy increases with firm-specific experience, and market reactions are more closely 
related with the forecast errors of analysts with firm-specific experience. Analysts make cash 
flows estimates to fill in an information gap when earnings have low quality or decision-
relevance. Hong et al. (2000) state that forecast accuracy is directly associated with the 
likelihood of promotion, particularly for less experienced analysts. The quality (i.e., accuracy) 
of the earnings forecasted by analysts is described as a function of the following not mutually 
exclusive factors. They are: (1) the amount of information from voluntary disclosure and 
from involuntary disclosure issued by regulatory agencies, stock exchanges, and the 
accounting professionals, and (2) the general macro-economic impact, unexpected events 
affecting the firm, and the ability of the analysts. The latter factor contains the ability to 
acquire new information at low cost (i.e., from networking) to gain access to the managers, to 
process information efficiently and quickly, and to utilize the resources of the brokerage 
firms. Brokerage firms can take advantage of their economies of scale in acquiring macro-
economic information and their economies of scope in sharing relevant information with 
analysts in the same firm. Jacob et al. (1999) find that analyst forecast accuracy is affected by 
innate ability, company assignments, brokerage affiliation, and industry specialization. There 
appears to be little benefit from experience. Gilson et al. (2000) find that, for focused 
companies, analysts that specialize by industry issue more precise forecasts than non-
specialist analysts. Lang and Lundholm (1993) find that firms with more informative 
disclosures have a larger analyst following, less dispersion in analyst forecasts, and less 
volatility in forecast revisions. 
 
On the other hand, Ang and Ma (1999) find that analyst forecast earnings for Chinese stocks 
are less accurate than for Hong Kong listed firms. They provide evidence based on the 
inability of the sophisticated financial analysts from some leading international and regional 
brokerage firms to make earnings forecast accurately for Chinese stocks comparable to that 
for Hong Kong stocks. It implies the analysts often miss their forecasts and by a large degree 
in China. Their results show analysts’ forecast of Chinese listed firms’ earnings, over the 
entire period, incline to overestimate (be optimistic), i.e. analysts’ forecasts exceed reported 
earnings on average. One factor resulting in the difference in firms’ earnings may be the 
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transparency between different stock markets. Earnings forecasts are generally optimistic 
indicating that analysts try to maintain relationships with managers when recommendations 
are negative (Francis and Philbrick, 1993; Dugar and Nathan, 1995). One of the most widely 
held beliefs among accounting and finance academics is that incentives and/or cognitive 
biases induce analysts to produce generally optimistic forecasts (see, e.g., reviews by Brown, 
1993 and Kothari, 2001). This view is repeatedly reinforced when studies that employ 
analysts’ forecasts as a measure of expected earnings present descriptive statistics and refer 
casually to negative mean forecast errors as evidence of the purportedly ‘well-documented’ 
phenomenon of optimism in analyst forecasts. The belief is even more common among 
regulators (see, e.g., Becker, 2001) and the business press (see, e.g., Taylor, 2002).  
 
Prior literature has employed three common methods to measure analysts’ earnings forecasts: 
(1) the mean of analyst forecasts adopted by Barefield and Comiskey (1975) and Fried and 
Givoly (1982); (2) a single forecast from value line used by Brown and Rozeff (1978) and 
Brown et al. (1987a, b); and (3) the median of analyst forecasts employed by Elton et al. 
(1981) and Brown et al. (1984). The fundamental difference between the most recent forecast 
as the consensus analyst forecast and either the mean or the median is that the former is 
constructed using the forecast date, while the latter two are not. O’ Brien (1988) contrasts 
these three proxies for analyst forecasts and concludes that the most recent earnings forecasts 
are slightly superior to either the consensus mean or median forecasts in accuracy. It supports 
evidence that forecast dates are more relevant for determining accuracy than individual error, 
suggesting that forecast timeliness is a characteristic for distinguishing better forecasts. 
 
4.4. Hypotheses Development 
 
Meeting or beating expectations is regarded as the phenomenon of firms announcing earnings 
that either meet or beat the consensus analysts’ forecasts of earnings (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). 
The importance of meeting or beating expectations is that earnings are the statistics predicted 
by analysts with sophistication and financial expertise (DeFond and Hung, 2003). Hence, 
successfully meeting analysts’ forecast or failing to beat them can attract a lot of attentions in 
the press and from investors. The reason why firms attempt to meet or beat expectations is 
that the market rewards this behavior. The stock market provide a significant stock price 
premium (penalty) for meeting or beating (missing) analysts’ earnings forecasts, after 
controlling for the magnitude of  forecast error (Barth et al., 1999; Bartov et al., 2002; 
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Kasznik and McNichols, 2002; Lopez and Rees, 2002; Bhojraj et al., 2003; Chen, 2003; Das 
and Zhang, 2003; and Brown et al., 2006). Matsumoto (2002) and Williams (2006) express 
that firms are under the capital-market pressure to meet or beat expectations in order to 
sustain their stock prices. The range of earnings surprise over which the market’s reaction is 
the strongest lies in the vicinity of one cent (referring to as ‘Fen’ in RMB) (+1 cent of MBE 
firms and -1 cent for firms that missed the forecast). Meeting or Beating Expectations is 
considered to be another case of managing earnings in order to beat a threshold which is the 
consensus analysts’ forecast. 
 
The ‘Information perspective’ provided by Healy and Palepu (1993) discuss the existence of 
information asymmetry between management and other stakeholders, with management 
having superior information. When information asymmetry is high, such as the phenomenon 
in China, stakeholders and investors do not have sufficient resources or access to relevant 
information to monitor manager's behavior, which leads to the practice of earnings 
management (Schipper, 1989; Warfield et al., 1995). Bhattacharya et al (2012) propose that 
poor earnings quality represents imprecise information about firms’ future cash flows. 
Furthermore, prior research present that poor earnings quality is associated with higher 
information asymmetry from the perspective of indirect links. Financial analysts as 
information intermediaries engage in private information production to reveal any manager 
misuse of firm resources, and mitigate agency problems (information asymmetry) between 
corporate insiders and outside shareholders (Brennan and Hughes, 1991; Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam, 1995; Bushman and Smith, 2001; Easley et al., 1998; Healy and Palepu, 
2001; Houston et al., 2006). Under the Analyst Efficiency Hypothesis, analysts are deemed as 
unbiased and qualified predictors of future expected earnings, and to incorporate all publicly 
available (firm-specific, industry, financial and market) information and to be well informed 
about the arrival of any new information. They are presumed to be rational experts who 
forecast future earnings and make recommendations on an unbiased basis; they are 
considered to be less likely to misunderstand the implications of financial information than 
naïve investors. The variation in their forecast accuracy reflects attributes of earnings that are 
related to Earnings Quality. 
 
Management judgment with respect to determining earnings is often associated with 
discretionary accruals. Managers may use these discretionary accrual choices in an 
Chapter 4 Earnings Management and Earnings Surprises: Management's Incentives to 
meet or beat Analysts’ Forecast Benchmark in China 
 
194 
 
opportunistic manner (perhaps to increase their own compensation or conceal poor 
performance) or they may use this discretion to improve the informational value of earnings 
(perhaps to communicate to investors the long-term performance of the firm). In any case, 
discretionary accruals are often used as a measure of earnings quality (e.g., Dechow and 
Dichev, 2002; Francis et al., 2004). In the context of testing market’s efficiency with respect 
to earnings management, the tests are joint tests of the discretionary accrual models and 
market efficiency. 
 
Are analysts’ forecasts biased? Do analysts underreact or overreact to information in prior 
realizations of economic variables? This empirical literature provides conflicting conclusions 
and is not converging to a definitive answer to either question. On the one hand, theories that 
predict optimism in forecasts are consistent with the persistent statistical finding in the 
literature of cross-sectional negative (i.e., bad news) mean forecast errors as well as negative 
intercepts from regressions of forecasts on reported earnings. On the other hand, such 
theories are inconsistent both with the finding that median forecast errors are most often zero 
and with the fact that the percentage of apparently pessimistic errors is greater than the 
percentage of apparently optimistic errors in the cross-section. 
 
Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) present statistical evidence that demonstrates how the two 
asymmetries in forecast error distributions can indicate analyst optimism, pessimism, or 
unbiasedness. For example, this study’s empirical evidence explains why prior research that 
relies on parametric statistics always finds evidence of optimistic bias as well as apparent 
analyst underreaction to prior bad news for all alternative variables chosen to represent prior 
news. They find that extreme negative unexpected accruals included in reported earnings go 
hand in hand with observations in the cross-section that generate the tail asymmetry. They 
also observe that the middle asymmetry in distributions of forecast error is eliminated when 
the reported earnings component of the earnings surprise is stripped of unexpected accruals. 
This evidence suggests benefits to refining extant cognitive- and incentive based theories of 
analyst forecast bias and inefficiency so that they can account for an endogenous relation 
between forecast errors and manipulation of earnings reports by firms. The evidence also 
highlights the importance of future research into the question of whether reported earnings 
are, in fact, the correct benchmark for assessing analyst bias and inefficiency. 
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Recent evidence suggests that the incidence of earnings management is particularly 
pronounced when earnings fall below certain thresholds. Three thresholds have been 
considered in the literature: avoiding reporting a loss; reporting a growth in profits; and 
meeting the analysts’ consensus forecast. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al. 
(1999) find that there is a higher-than expected frequency of firms in the US with slightly 
positive reported earnings (and earnings changes) and a lower-than expected frequency of 
firms with slightly negative reported earnings (and earnings changes). The same pattern has 
been observed in the UK (Gore et al., 2002). Such discontinuities in the distributions are 
consistent with managers trying to beat the benchmarks in question. A key issue is how 
managers decide which benchmark to try to beat when the benchmarks conflict. Degeorge et 
al. (1999) report that there appears to be a hierarchy to the benchmarks, with firms behaving 
as if reporting a profit is of most importance, followed by reporting growth in earnings, with 
meeting analysts’ forecasts mattering only if the other two thresholds have been met. Failing 
to meet a threshold will result in a large decline in stock price. This analysis predicts that 
board monitoring will constrain income-increasing earnings management when pre-managed 
earnings undershoot these thresholds. It conjectures that managers are most likely to engage 
in income-increasing earnings management when pre-managed earnings fall short of key 
threshold levels. 
 
Assuming that firms intend to meet or beat market expectations, one would expect that results 
improve when utilizing a forecast proxy that better represents these expectations. This study 
improves upon previous studies by considering firms’ earnings management with respect to 
analysts’ forecasts. Analysts are hypothesized to understand these earnings management 
practices, and incorporate firms’ expected behavior into their forecasts. Analysts account for 
earnings management practices by lowering the otherwise optimal forecasts. The hypothesis 
is that analysts are aware of firms’ intentions to manage earnings so that they slightly beat 
forecasts or maximize positive earnings surprises, and that analysts make strategic forecasts 
in view of firms’ anticipated behavior. Therefore, the hypothesis is developed as follows: 
 
H0: Managers tend to use discretionary accruals to meet or beat analyst forecast. 
H1: Managers do not tend to use discretionary accruals to meet or beat analyst forecast. 
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4.5. Empirical Modeling 
 
4.5.1. Proxies for Discretionary Accruals 
 
Prior research suggests that accruals have lower persistence than operating cash flows and 
discretionary accruals are less persistent than nondiscretionary. Based on prior literature, the 
residuals are derived from the Performance Matched Discretionary Accrual Measure (Kothari 
et al., 2005) and Forward-looking model (Dechow et al. 2003) and Modified Jones Model 
(1995) as the estimates of Discretionary Accruals. 
 
4.5.1.1. Performance Matched Discretionary Accrual Measure  
 
Kothari et al. (2005) develop a performance-matching model to examine discretionary 
accruals by adding lagged return on assets.  
 
 𝑇𝐴𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (
1
𝐴𝑉𝐺 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆
) + 𝛽2(∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑗,𝑡 − ∆𝐴𝑅) + 𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 
                                                                                               (Equation 4.1) 
All the variables used here are scaled by average total assets except ROAj,t−1, deflating 
by average total assets is meant to mitigate heteroskedasticity. 
𝑻𝑨𝒋,𝒕（Total Accruals）= Earnings before extraordinary items – Cash flows from 
operations 
𝑨𝑽𝑮 𝑨𝑺𝑺𝑬𝑻𝑺 =（Assetst + Assetst−1）/2 
∆𝑺𝑨𝑳𝑬𝑺𝒋,𝒕 =Change in Sales Revenue 
∆AR =annual change of end of fiscal year net accounts receivable 
𝑷𝑷𝑬𝒋,𝒕  = Net Property, Plant and Equipment 
𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒋,𝒕−𝟏= Lagged rate of return on assets  
 𝜺𝒋,𝒕=The residuals from the regression are the estimates of Discretionary Accruals 
 
Kothari et al. (2005) find that having an ROA in the regression reduces discretionary accruals 
when they expect the null hypothesis of no earnings management to hold. Prior literature 
demonstrates that accruals are related to performance (McNichols and Wilson, 1988; Dechow, 
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Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995; Kasznik, 1999).  McNichols (2000, p. 333) states that 
‘researchers comparing firms that differ in earnings performance or growth characteristics 
may well observe (or not observe) differences in estimated discretionary accruals that relate 
to the performance characteristics of these firms rather than their incentives to manage 
earnings.’ Ronen and Yaari (2008) point out that performance affects the estimation of 
earnings management because NDA (Nondiscretionary Accruals) may be erroneously 
classified as DA (Discretionary Accruals) when performance is abnormal and the relationship 
between accruals and performance is non-linear.  
 
One advantage of this analysis relative to performance-matched discretionary accruals 
(Kothari et al. 2005) is that it does not need to specify the exact nature of the correlation 
between discretionary accruals and performance (e.g., ROA). Relative to performance-
matching, this analysis may result in more powerful tests of earnings management around 
earnings benchmarks as it does not generate ‘noise’ in the tests via the matching process. 
Accordingly, this method may reduce the likelihood of falsely accepting the null hypothesis 
of no earnings management due to low power tests. 
 
4.5.1.2. Forward-looking model  
 
Dechow et al. (2003) develop the forward-looking model to capture the discretionary accruals 
as follows (Equation 4.2). 
 
𝑇𝐴𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1((1 + 𝑘)∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆 − ∆𝐴𝑅) + 𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝐸 + 𝛽3𝑇𝐴𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑅_𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑗,𝑡+1+𝜀𝑗,𝑡  
                                                                                                                                       (Equation 4.2) 
 
All variables are deflated by average total assets except GR_SALESj,t+1 
 
Where: 
 
𝑻𝑨𝒋,𝒕（Total Accruals）= Earnings before extraordinary items – Cash flows from operations 
∆AR=α+ 𝑘∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆+ε 
∆AR =annual change of end of fiscal year net accounts receivable 
∆𝑺𝑨𝑳𝑬𝑺𝒋,𝒕 =Change in Sales Revenue 
𝒌= is the slope coefficient from a regression of ∆AR on ∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆 
𝑷𝑷𝑬𝒋,𝒕  = Net Property, Plant and Equipment 
𝑻𝑨𝒋,𝒕−𝟏=Lagged Total Accruals, i.e., Total Accrualst-1 
𝑮𝑹_𝑺𝑨𝑳𝑬𝑺𝒋,𝒕+𝟏=(𝑺𝑨𝑳𝑬𝑺𝒋,𝒕+𝟏 − 𝑺𝑨𝑳𝑬𝑺𝒋,𝒕)/ 𝑺𝑨𝑳𝑬𝑺𝒋,𝒕 (i.e., growth in sales) 
𝜺𝒋,𝒕=The residuals from the regression are the estimates of Discretionary Accruals 
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In this forward-looking model, Dechow et al. (2003) regress the change in accounts 
receivable, ∆AR, on the change in sales, ∆𝐒𝐀𝐋𝐄𝐒𝐣,𝐭. 𝒌 measures the sensitivity of the change 
in nondiscretionary accounts receivable to sales revenue. 𝒌 = 1 if 100% of the change in 
accounts receivable is nondiscretionary and k = 0 if all the change is discretionary. 𝒌 times 
sales separates Non-discretionary accruals from Discretionary accruals in the accounts 
receivable. This adapted Jones model adds back the nondiscretionary accounts 
receivable, 𝒌∆𝑺𝑨𝑳𝑬𝑺, to the change in cash sales, ∆𝑺𝑨𝑳𝑬𝑺 − ∆𝑨𝑹, which yields [∆𝑺𝑨𝑳𝑬𝑺 −
∆𝑨𝑹]+ 𝒌∆𝑺𝑨𝑳𝑬𝑺= (𝟏 + 𝒌)∆𝑺𝑨𝑳𝑬𝑺 − ∆𝑨𝑹. 
 
Dechow et al. (2003) find that k takes value between 0 and 0.392, with an average of 0.07 
(median of 0.068), in their 637 cross-sectional regressions, obtained from all two-digit SIC 
Compustat firms that were not financial institutions in the 1998-2000 period.  
 
Previous studies have suggested the value of including lagged total accruals in the regressions 
to enhance the accruals model’s ability and the adjusted R2 (Kang and Sivaramakrishnan, 
1995; Beneish, 1997; Chambers, 1999; Nwaeze, 2001): past accruals has been controlled for 
reversals. Dechow et al. (2003) also control for the growth in sales. They measure it as the 
ratio of sales in the following period to sales in the current period minus one. The NDA 
model ths incorporates a forward-looking variable. Growth is a characteristic of firm. 
 
McNichols (2000) reports that young firms are characterized by high growth and high normal 
accruals. A failure to take into account these features might lead to erroneously classifying 
NDA as DA. McNichols measures growth as the median of analysts' long-term earnings 
growth forecasts (reported by I/B/E/S) in the last month of the fiscal year. The regression of 
DA on the rate of returns on assets (ROA) and the growth variable yields a significant 
positive association between DA and growth. 
 
4.5.1.3. Modified Jones Model  
 
Dechow et al. (1995) present a modified Jones model. All the variables used here are scaled 
by average total assets. 
 
𝑇𝐴𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆 − ∆𝐴𝑅) + 𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝐸+ 𝜀𝑗,𝑡  
                                                                                                                              (Equation 4.3) 
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Where: 
 
𝑻𝑨𝒋,𝒕（Total Accruals）= Earnings before extraordinary items – Cash flows from operations 
∆𝑺𝑨𝑳𝑬𝑺𝒋,𝒕 =Change in Sales Revenue 
∆AR =annual change of end of fiscal year net accounts receivable 
𝑷𝑷𝑬𝒋,𝒕  = Net Property, Plant and Equipment 
𝜺𝒋,𝒕=The residuals from the regression are the estimates of Discretionary Accruals 
 
One disadvantage of this study we should concern about is that the discretionary accruals 
proxies for earnings management may be capturing nondiscretionary accruals (Dechow et al., 
1995; Guay et al., 1996; Kasznik, 1999; and McNichols, 2000).  
 
4.5.2. Proxy for Earnings Surprise 
 
Although the quality of analyst research can be measured by several methods, this study 
examines one important attribute of analyst earnings forecasts: analyst forecast error/ 
earnings surprise (i.e. forecast accuracy). Forecast accuracy has been documented to be 
beneficial to capital markets. Forecast accuracy has been shown to be related to the level of 
firm disclosure (Lang and Lundholm, 1996), and to be positively associated with firm value 
(Lang et al., 2003). The disclosure quality and transparency are important to the investment 
decision of foreign investors (Kim and Singal, 2000). As markets open, more foreign 
investors enter the market, increasing the demand for better information (Karamanou, 2012). 
Aggarwal et al. (2005) find that US institutional investors prefer to invest in countries with 
high quality accounting standards. Prior US research has identified that the stock market 
inclines to rely more on analyst forecasts than the predictions generated by time-series 
models (Fried and Givoly, 1982; Hopwood and McKeown, 1990). This reflects the timing 
and informational advantage of analysts (Brown et al., 1987; Fried and Givoly, 1982; 
Hopwood and McKeown, 1990; Kross et al., 1990).  
 
Earnings surprise/unexpected earnings are defined as firm j’s year t actual earnings per share 
(EPS) minus the single-most recent analyst forecast or consensus (mean/median) analyst 
forecast provided prior to the earnings announcement: both are available from the CSMAR 
database. Basic EPS is calculated by dividing profit or loss attributable to ordinary equity 
holders of the parent entity (the numerator) by the weighted average number of ordinary 
shares outstanding (the denominator) during the period (IAS 33.10 56 ). Diluted EPS is 
                                                 
56 http://www.iasplus.com/en/standards/ias/ias33 
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calculated by adjusting the earnings and number of shares for the effects of dilutive options 
and other dilutive potential ordinary shares (IAS 33.31). The effects of anti-dilutive potential 
ordinary shares are ignored in calculating diluted EPS (IAS 33.41). The earnings numerators 
(profit or loss from continuing operations and net profit or loss) used for the calculation 
should be after deducting all expenses including taxes, minority interests, and preference 
dividends (IAS 33.12). 
 
Negative forecast errors reflect analyst optimism, and positive forecast errors reflect 
pessimism. Both the single-most recent analyst forecast and consensus analyst forecast are 
employed as the analyst forecast benchmark. O’Brien (1988) and Brown (1991) suggest that 
the single-most recent analyst forecast is more accurate in predicting actual earnings than the 
consensus mean forecast. Likewise, Brown and Kim (1991) find that the single-most recent 
analyst forecast more accurately reflects the market’s earnings expectation than the consensus 
mean forecast. Assuming that firms intend to meet or beat market expectations, using a more 
current forecast proxy should provide a more powerful test of whether firms use discretionary 
accruals to meet or beat analyst forecasts. Recent research suggests that firms ‘walk down’ 
analyst forecasts during the sample period (Richardson et al. 2004).  
 
According to the CSMAR Database, analysts’ earnings forecasts do not include unusual or 
non-recurring charges, so the reported earnings per share (EPS) exclude the extraordinary 
items. The literature commonly normalizes EPS by deflators such as price per share or assets 
per share in an attempt to homogenize the distribution from which the different observations 
are drawn. However, because EPS is measured (and reported and forecast) rounded to the 
closest penny, spurious patterns can arise in the distribution of such normalized EPS. This 
problem appears to have been overlooked previously (Degeorge et al., 1999). 
 
4.5.3. Logit Analyses across Adjacent Unexpected Earnings Group 
 
𝐸𝑀𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖 ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗𝑡
𝑖
+ 𝜀𝑗𝑡 
                                 (Equation 4.4) 
Where: 
∆CashFlowsjt=the change in Cash flows from Operations from year t-1 to year t, scaled by 
average total assets. 
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Sample firms are assigned to ‘analysts-based unexpected earnings’ bins based on the firm’s 
unexpected earnings per share (in cents). Consistent with prior research (e.g., Degeorge et al. 
1999; Payne and Thomas 2003; Phillips et al. 2003), in this research 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑗𝑡 is 
rounded to the nearest penny. Each just-beat and just-miss bin has a width of 0.01, and each 
firm-year observation appears once in a just-beat group and once in a just-miss group. Based 
on Ayers et al. (2006), this research investigates 19 pseudo targets in these analyses 
consisting of firms with earnings surprise between negative ten cents per share and positive 
ten cents per share. Meanwhile,  𝐸𝑀𝑗𝑡  is redefined to equal 1 if 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑗𝑡 equals 
X cents per share, and 0 if 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑗𝑡 equals X minus one cent per share. X refers 
to the unexpected earnings target, and X equals 0 for the actual analysts’ forecast benchmark. 
In addition, the performance variable is controlled on the basis of Phillips et al. (2003) by 
utilizing the annual change of cash flows as ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 in the analysis. Following prior 
literature, this analysis applies Logit regressions to detect whether there is a positive 
relationship between discretionary accrual proxies and beating analysts’ forecast benchmarks.  
 
4.6. Sample Selection 
 
The sample data focus on firms listed in the A-share stock market, which are required to 
report under Chinese GAAP.57 B shares, H shares, overseas shares, and firms that are dual-
listed/cross-listed are excluded because they are subject to either different accounting 
standards or different listing regulations. The reason why the sample concentrates on firms in 
the A-shares market only is because the small sample sizes in either the B shares market or H 
shares market do not allow for a reasonably powerful test. In addition, Ang and Ma (1999) 
find the forecast errors are found to be related to type of listing (e.g., H shares versus B 
shares), and size of the firm, but have little or no relation to the number of analysts 
forecasting the firm. 
 
Meanwhile, financial institutions, insurance and banking firms are excluded from the samples 
because their accounting standards and earnings properties are different from the rest of firms 
and thus non-comparable. Furthermore, the regulated firms are likely to face different 
earnings management incentives than non-regulated firms. In order to keep the consistency 
                                                 
57 A shares market is open to domestic investors. B shares market is open to foreign investors and is traded 
in foreign currencies. H shares are firms listed in the Hong Kong stock exchange. Firms listed as B shares 
are required to report under international accounting standards. Firms listed as H shares are required to 
report under Hong Kong GAAP. 
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and better examine the time effect on firm-specific earnings quality, the sample firms do not 
include the new entry and delisted firms between 2008 and 2013. It implies that each sample 
firm in the sample has six consecutive years of observations. Hence, the panel data is strongly 
balanced. The financial data are collected from both the CCER and CSMAR database. To 
mitigate the effect of extreme observations, the outliers are winsorized in the top or bottom 
one percentile (e.g. the modified Jones model abnormal accruals, Performance Matched 
Discretionary Accrual and forward-looking model abnormal accruals greater than 100 percent 
(in absolute value) of lagged total assets, details see DeFond and Subramanyam 1998; 
Dechow et al. 2003; Phillips et al. 2003). Finally, each firm-year observation must have 
sufficient information available to calculate the requisite variables in the Logit regression.  
 
The data about analysts’ earnings forecasts and reported actual earnings are acquired from 
CSMAR database. All per share data are adjusted for splits and stock dividends using the 
CSMAR adjustment factors. There are 626 listed firms in the final sample. The time span 
ranges from 2008 to 2013, because there is insufficient data or missing information on 
analysts’ forecast before 2008 in the CSMAR database. The securities analyst industry in 
China has a low starting point. For instance, until December 2002, Securities Analysts 
Committee was established in Beijing under Securities Association of China. Therefore, after 
deducting missing values, in total there are 3130 firm-year observations between the fiscal 
year of 2008 and 2013.  
 
4.7. Descriptive Statistics and Empirical Results 
 
4.7.1. Variable Definitions 
 
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑗𝑡  = the unexpected earnings (firm j’s year t actual earnings per share 
minus the single-most recent analyst forecast or consensus (median) analyst forecast provided 
prior to the earnings announcement both available from the CSMAR database; and 
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑗𝑡 is rounded to the nearest cent (Fen in RMB); 
 
𝐸𝑀𝑗𝑡 =1 if 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑗𝑡  equals X cents (Fen in RMB) per share and 0 if 
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑗𝑡equals X less one cent per share. X refers to the unexpected earnings 
target, and X equals zero for the actual analysts’ forecast benchmark; 
 
Total Accruals = Earnings before extraordinary items – Cash flows from operations, scaled 
by average total assets; 
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Discretionary Accruals = The residuals from the regression are the estimates of Discretionary 
Accruals in the modified Jones model (1995) and Forward-looking model (Dechow et al. 
2003) and Performance Matched Discretionary Accrual Measure (Kothari et al., 2005). 
Discretionary Accruals Model is estimated cross-sectionally by year and industry; 
 
∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 = Annual change of cash flows from operations; 
 
∑j 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗𝑡= 1 (0) if firm j is (is not) in industry j in year t, based on CSRC Industry Code. 
 
4.7.2. Descriptive Statistics and Results 
 
4.7.2.1. Analysts’ Forecast Benchmark Analyses 
 
Table 4.2 Panel A reports the univariate analyses for the analysts’ forecast benchmark. Panel 
A indicates that Performance Matched Discretionary Accruals, Forward-looking 
Discretionary Accruals, and Modified Jones Discretionary Accruals are significantly smaller 
(more positive or less negative) in the actual just-beat bin relative to the actual just-miss 
bin.58  Consistent with Ayers et al. (2006), the results of this analysis for analysts’ forecast 
benchmark analyses, show little positive correlation between the discretionary accruals 
derived from three different measures and the earnings surprise bins. The Spearman 
correlation coefficients in Table 4.2 Panel C for Performance Matched Discretionary 
Accruals, Forward-looking Discretionary Accruals, and Modified Jones Discretionary 
Accruals and ∆CashFlows are 0.0154, 0.0198, 0.0155, and 0.0549* (p<0.10), respectively. 
Table 4.2 Panel C presents that none of the correlations are statistically significant, except the 
change of cash flows. Likewise, Panel C reports that none of three discretionary accrual 
proxies have a significant positive correlation with Earnings Surprise.  
 
The results in Table 4.3 Logit Analyses across Adjacent Unexpected Earnings Group provide 
little evidence of a positive association between discretionary accrual measures and beating 
pseudo targets derived from analysts-based earnings surprise through the comparisons of the 
coefficients for Performance-matched Discretionary Accruals, Forward-looking 
Discretionary Accruals, and Modified Jones Discretionary Accruals. In addition, this study 
finds no relations between ∆CashFlows and beating the analysts’ forecast benchmark. 
                                                 
58 Using the the single most recent analyst forecast exhibits the smallest bias from CSMAR database as the 
analyst forecast benchmark, prior research (Dechow et al. 2000; Phillips et al. 2003) reports no significant 
differences in univariate comparisons of Total Accruals, Performance Matched Discretionary Accruals, 
Forward-looking Discretionary Accruals, and Modified Jones Discretionary Accruals for just-beat and just-miss 
firms around the actual analysts’ forecast benchmark. This study finds similar results to prior research when the 
the single most recent analyst forecast from CSMAR is employed as the analysts’ forecast benchmark. 
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Notes: 𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = the unexpected earnings surprise (actual earnings per share minus the single-most 
recent analyst forecast provided prior to the earnings announcement both available from CSMAR 
database) 
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡= -0.01 actual just miss bin; 𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡= 0 actual just meet bin; 𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡= 0.01 actual just beat bin  
Panel A Table 4.2  Analysts’ Forecast Benchmark Analyses 
Earnings 
Surprise 
Performance 
Matched   
Dis. Accruals 
Forward-
looking  
Dis. Accruals 
Modified 
Jones  
Dis. Accruals 
     ∆cfo 
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = −0.09  0.0459 0.0484 0.0436  -0.0836  
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = −0.08 -0.0407     -0.0422    -0.0412 0.0224  
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = −0.07 -0.0325     -0.0256    -0.0325 0.0194  
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = −0.06 -0.0143 0.0001    -0.0120 0.0251 
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = −0.05 -0.0026 0.0013    -0.0018  -0.0230  
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = −0.04  0.0017     -0.0018 0.0022 -0.0092  
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = −0.03  0.0048 0.0034 0.0058  -0.0617  
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = −0.02  0.0058 0.0070 0.0066  -0.0028  
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = −0.01  0.0087 0.0075 0.0092  -0.0003  
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 0.00  0.0032 0.0007 0.0030 0.0130  
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 0.01  0.0135 0.0129 0.0135 0.0333  
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 0.02 -0.0014     -0.0078    -0.0031 0.0999  
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 0.03 -0.0029     -0.0013    -0.0019 0.1851  
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 0.04 -0.0081     -0.0099    -0.0097 0.0529  
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 0.05 0.0174 0.0168 0.0152 0.0923  
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 0.06 0.0319 0.0306 0.0337 0.0021  
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 0.07 
    
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 0.08 0.0319 0.0242 0.0303 0.1074  
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 0.09 0.1169 0.1133 0.1154 0.0364  
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Table 4.2 Analysts’ Forecast Benchmark Analyses (Continued) 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics  
 
Variables 
 
Obs. 
Mean 
(Median) 
SD 
(Variance) 
Skewness 
(Kurtosis) 
25% 
(75%) 
Min. 
(Max.) 
 3014      
    Consensus Median 
 
Single most recent 
 
  Consensus Mean 
 
 
 
 
 
0.4711 
(0.3700) 
0.4205 
(0.3105) 
0.4890 
(0.3850) 
0.4267 
(0.1820) 
0.4378 
(0.1916) 
0.4301 
(0.1850)  
 
2.4041 
(13.9233) 
2.6434 
(16.6185) 
2.2483 
(12.4463) 
0.1950 
(0.6270) 
0.1500 
(0.5500) 
0.2073 
 (0.6460) 
-0.0300 
(2.0500) 
-0.2000 
(2.1300) 
-0.0200 
(2.0571) 
 
 
Table 4.2 Panel B provides some descriptive statistics for the sample related to consensus 
analyst forecast collected from CSMAR database. There are 3014 firm- and year- specific 
observations in total during 2008 and 2013 after removing the missing values. Table 4.2 
Panel C demonstrates the Spearman Correlation between the proxies for earnings 
management (discretionary accruals absolute values) and the unexpected earnings surprise 
based on the single most recent analyst forecast. To provide more descriptive evidence on the 
behaviour of analysts' forecasts, Table 4.5 presents the distribution statistics for unexpected 
earnings (i.e. analyst forecast error), suggesting majority companies are centred on the just-
missing bin group in terms of the large number of frequency.  
 
Table 4.2 Analysts’ Forecast Benchmark Analyses (Continued) 
Panel C: Spearman Correlations 
 
Earning 
Surprise 
Performance 
Matched  abs 
Dis. Accruals 
Forward-
looking abs 
Dis. Accruals 
Modified 
Jones abs 
Dis. Accrual 
  ∆cfo 
Earning Surprise 1.0000     
Performance 
Matched 
Dis. Accruals 
 
0.0154 
 
   1.0000 
   
Forward-looking 
Dis. Accruals 
 
0.0198 
 
   0.9642* 
 
1.0000 
  
Modified Jones 
Dis. Accruals 
∆cfo 
 
0.0155     
       
0.0549*   
 
   0.9918*   
 
  -0.0003 
 
0.9613* 
 
0.0016 
 
1.0000 
 
0.0034 
 
 
 
1.0000 
 
Notes: *p<0.10
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Table 4.3 Logit Analyses across Adjacent Unexpected Earnings Group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
Performance-Matched  Dis. Accrual Forward-looking Dis. Accruals Modified Jones Dis. Accruals 
Just-Beat 
Just-Miss 
N e_1 detcfo pseudo R2 e_2 detcfo pseudo R2 e_3 detcfo pseudo R2 
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = −0.09 𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = −0.10 58 5.970** -1.682 0.156 5.219* -1.818 0.138 5.543** 1.708 0.145 
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = −0.08 𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = −0.09 73 -5.201*  1.468 0.153  -4.897  1.501 0.154 -4.758*      1.634 0.147 
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = −0.07 𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = −0.08 87  0.549  0.163 0.001   1.425 0.663 0.006  0.584 0.184 0.001 
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = −0.06 𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = −0.07 127 -0.100   -1.607 0.019   0.147    -1.439 0.020 -0.049    -1.585 0.019 
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = −0.05 𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = −0.06 195  0.777  0.295 0.003   0.173 0.070 0.000  0.668 0.266 0.002 
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = −0.04 𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = −0.05 290  0.702  0.235 0.002  -0.132 0.087 0.000  0.686 0.237 0.002 
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = −0.03 𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = −0.04 396  0.060 -0.163 0.002   0.335    -0.095 0.002  0.092    -0.160 0.002 
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = −0.02 𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = −0.03 1050 -0.002 0.057 0.000   0.536 0.152 0.001 -0.013 0.055 0.000  
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = −0.01 𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = −0.02 1363  0.368 0.049 0.000   0.192 0.119 0.000  0.330     0.046 0.000 
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 0.00 𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = −0.01 928 -0.391 0.034 0.001  -0.636    -0.078 0.001 -0.443     0.030 0.001 
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 0.01 𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 0.00 263  1.107 0.465 0.006   1.749 0.916 0.012  1.135     0.472 0.006 
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 0.02 𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 0.01 92  0.543   1.665* 0.028   0.398     1.698 0.031  0.420     1.620 0.028 
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 0.03 𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 0.02 51  0.315 0.475 0.011   0.721 0.497 0.013  0.411     0.483 0.011 
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 0.04 𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 0.03 27 -0.890   -0.741 0.025  -1.201    -0.762 0.027 -0.953    -0.746 0.026 
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 0.05 𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 0.04 20  2.214 0.997 0.027   2.179 0.475 0.017  2.146     1.001 0.026 
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 0.06 𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 0.05 13  0.175   -3.258 0.076  -0.058    -2.958 0.042  0.631    -3.165 0.077 
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 0.07 𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 0.06 3          
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 0.08 𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 0.07 2          
𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 0.09 𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 0.08 4          
 
Industry Effect 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
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4.7.2.2. Analyst Forecast Error (Earnings Surprise) 
 
For each firm year, analyst forecast error is defined as the difference between the actual 
reported earnings per share (EPS) and the analyst consensus (median) forecast, as well as the 
single most recent analyst forecast scaled by the closing stock price at the end of last year, 
and is expressed in percentage (see Brown and Caylor’s analysis in 2005). There might be 
concerns about the results which rely on the particular measure of analysts’ forecasts adopted. 
Hence, the single most recent analyst forecast and analyst consensus forecast are utilized as 
the alternatives method to test the magnitude of analyst forecast error for robustness. 
 
𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑡 =
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑗𝑡 − 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑡
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗𝑡−1
∗ 100 
(Equation 4.5) 
 
𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑡 =
∣ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑗𝑡 − 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑡 ∣
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗𝑡−1
∗ 100 
(Equation 4.6) 
Where: 
 
𝑨𝒃𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒆𝑭𝑬𝑹𝑹𝒋𝒕  is the absolute value of the forecast error measured as the difference 
between actual earnings and the mean (median) analyst forecast deflated by beginning price;  
𝑨𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍 𝑬𝑷𝑺𝒋𝒕 represents actual earnings per share; 
𝑨𝒏𝒂𝒍𝒚𝒔𝒕 𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕𝒋𝒕 represents the consensus analyst forecast for firm j and year t; 
𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒋𝒕−𝟏 is the beginning of the year stock price. 
 
Firth and Gift (1999) find that accuracy is generally greater in more mature markets, and that 
composite and financial risks are more significant determinants of accuracy than firm size 
and analyst following. Hope (2003a, 2003b) investigates how differences in regulations 
across countries affect the information environment and the characteristics of analysts' 
forecasts. They report that across countries, a strong enforcement of accounting standards is 
associated with improved forecast accuracy, and the level of disclosure about accounting 
policies is inversely related to forecast errors and dispersion. Barniv et al. (2005) conclude 
that consistent with legal and financial reporting environments influencing analyst activities, 
superior analysts maintain superiority in common-law countries, but not in civil-law countries. 
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Table 4.4 Analyst Forecast Error (Earnings Surprise) 
 
Analyst Forecast 
Error (%) 
 
Mean 
(Median) 
SD 
(Variance) 
Skewness 
(Kurtosis) 
25% 
(75%) 
Minimum 
(Maximum) 
 Actual EPS-
Analyst Median 
-2.4791 
(-1.0813) 
6.4177 
   (41.1876) 
-7.7417 
  (115.4098) 
-3.0608 
(-0.1699) 
-27.3869 
   (5.2147) 
Actual EPS-Analyst 
Single Most Recent 
-1.8814 
(-0.6409) 
6.1857 
    (38.2631) 
-8.4642 
  (134.9171) 
-2.3350 
(0.0528) 
-24.3681 
   (5.7053) 
Actual EPS-Analyst 
Mean 
-2.7341 
(-1.2887) 
6.5022 
    (42.2783) 
-7.4877 
  (109.2256) 
-3.3758 
(-0.2722) 
-26.4501 
      (4.9351) 
 
Notes: Analyst mean= the mean of the available analysts’ forecasts;  
           Analyst median = the median of the available analysts’ forecasts;  
           Analyst single most recent = the single most recent forecast from an analyst.  
          Negative bias implies overestimates of earnings per share forecasted by analysts. 
 
Table 4.4 reports that analyst forecast errors under three alternative calculations are 
predominantly negative (i.e., an optimistic bias results when analyst forecast earnings is 
subtracted from the actual earnings). The results indicate that both the mean and median 
value of unexpected earnings remain below zero. The mean (median) value of analyst 
forecast error based on mean consensus analyst forecast is -2.7341% (-1.2887%) of the stock 
price, compared with the mean (median) value -2.4791% (-1.0813) and -1.8814% (-0.6409) 
based on median consensus forecasts and single most recent forecast respectively. Generally, 
forecast errors exhibit statistically significant negative bias in previous literature. Negative 
bias corresponds to overestimates of earnings per share (EPS). It consists with some 
conventional wisdom that analysts prefer optimistic predictions and ‘buy’ recommendations 
in order to maintain good relations with firms’ management. The median consensus analyst 
forecasts are replaced by the single most recent forecasts and consensus mean forecasts 
which generate essentially the same results. 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the result of comparing the three analyst consensus measures; the single 
most recent analyst forecast (here, es22 referring to as Actual EPS minus Analyst Single 
Most Recent) exhibits the smallest bias with smallest standard deviation (variance) in these 
findings, indistinguishable from zero. Abarbanell and Lehavy (2000) suppose that a better 
matching of forecasts with actual earnings should increase the frequency of ‘perfect forecasts’ 
and small surprises, and reduce the frequency of extreme surprises. This study’s research 
findings are consistent with O’Brien (1988) and Brown (1991) and Ayers (2006) and Kim’s 
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(1991) results. They argue that the single-most recent analyst forecast is more accurate in 
predicting actual earnings than the consensus mean or median forecast, since the former more 
accurately reflects the market’s earnings expectation than the latter. When firms intend to 
meet or beat market expectations, a more current forecast proxy is assumed to provide a more 
powerful test of whether firms use discretionary accruals to meet or beat analyst forecasts. As 
per prior literature, the single most recent analyst forecast as one of proxies for market 
expectations has several advantages: (1) it is relatively more accurate than the consensus (e.g., 
O’Brien, 1988; Brown, 1991); (2) earnings surprises based on it are more highly associated 
with stock prices rather than the consensus (Brown and Kim, 1991); (3) it better represents 
the definition of earnings surprise used by researchers who want a timely expectation before 
earnings announcement. However, with the increasingly competitive nature of the earnings 
forecasting business, it will pose a potential validity threat to the study’s results because the 
consensus estimates intend to provide a timelier measure of analyst estimates over time.  
 
4.7.2.3. Analyst Optimistic Forecast 
 
Previous studies provide evidence that accounting conservatism results in noisy, biased, and 
inefficient earnings forecasts (e.g. Mensah et al., 2004). Helbok and Walker (2004) argue that 
analyst forecasts are optimistically biased under conditionally conservative accounting 
practices. Because analysts fail to efficiently incorporate the implications of conservative 
treatment of economic news into their forecasts until that news becomes available (Pae and 
Thornton, 2010). There is evidence showing that top management prefers analysts’ optimistic 
forecasts (see Francis and Philbrick, 1993; Das et al., 1998; and Lim, 2001). Consistent with 
the results exhibited as that analyst forecasts are optimistically biased (analyst forecast above 
actual earnings) in previous studies (see Brown et al., 1985; Stickel, 1990; Abarbanell, 1991; 
Dreman and Berry, 1995; and Chopra, 1998), this study obtain the same findings.  
 
The incentives for analysts are rewarded for providing information that generates trading 
volume and investment banking fees for their brokerage houses. Thus, analysts have 
incentives to make optimistic forecasts and recommendations when their brokerage house has 
been hired to underwrite or is being considered to underwrite a new securities issue (see Lin 
and McNichols, 1998; Dechow et al., 2000). 
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Figure 4.1Analyst Forecast Error Comparison 
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O’Brien et al. (2005) examine the recommendations of analysts following 4,640 firms that 
issued new equity between 1994 and 2001 period. They find that affiliated analysts treat good 
and bad news asymmetrically: They respond promptly to good news but prefer not to issue 
bad news. Analysts overreact (underreact) to earnings with positive (negative) information. 
Furthermore, each brokerage house has its own list of securities from which it wishes to 
generate a large volume of trade. Thus, there is additional pressure on analysts from their 
employers to issue recommendations that shed favourable light on these preferred stocks. 
Several studies examine the pressure on analysts to issue favourable reports (see Francis and 
Philbrick, 1993; Dugar and Nathan, 1996; Lin and McNichols, 1998; Francis and Soffer, 
1997; Michaely and Womack, 1999; Dechow et al., 2000; Lim, 2001; Chan et al., 2003; 
O’Brien et al., 2005; and Agrawal and Chen, 2006). This asymmetry in the reaction explains 
analysts’ observable over-optimistic forecasts. Analysts’ compromise under pressure from 
management suggests that analysts are weak gatekeepers. For example, analysts rarely warn 
the public of impending revelations of pernicious earnings opportunistic behavior. 
 
Consistent with Bartholdy and Feng (2013), the findings in this study show that both earnings 
forecasts and stock recommendations are generally biased upwards in Chinese local securities 
firms. They show the forecast error in the Bear market from September, 2002 to October, 
2005 was larger than that in the Bull market between November, 2005 and October, 2007. 
The sample period in this analysis for ERC model is during the year of 2008 and 2013, which 
is deemed as part of the Bear market. It will be a critical factor that has an impact on the 
analyst forecast accuracy. Firth and Gift (1999) analyse the significant differences in 
forecasting accuracies across different nations and explain a multitude of potential reasons for 
the differences. One potential dimension they investigated is the financial risk. Other reasons 
for the significant differences between countries in their analysis include disclosure 
regulations, accounting rules, tax regimes, corporate governance structures, and national 
economic policies and conditions.  
 
4.8. Robustness Test  
 
Prior literature provides an alternative measure of earnings management through examining 
the discontinuity of earnings distributions around earnings benchmarks. Ronen and Yaari  
(2008) refer to it as the distributional approach. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge, 
Patel and Zeckauser (1999) discover that there is a much higher percentage of firms that 
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slightly meet or beat earnings targets than those that slightly miss earnings targets, indicating 
the existence of earnings management. Previous studies that employ this approach show that 
there is a kink in the distribution function of the earnings management object around the 
benchmark. Yu (2008) points out both the advantage and disadvantage of a distribution 
approach. A distribution approach relies on fewer assumptions and can capture earnings 
management not only through accounting manipulations but also via real transactions. Its 
limitation is that it does not provide firm-level variations. From an earnings management 
perspective, researchers assume that unmanaged earnings are a draw from the normal 
distribution. Hence, earnings management is established if the distribution of earnings of all 
firms deviates from the normal distribution (Hayn, 1995; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997a; 
Kang, 2005). Table 4.5 reflects that Analyst Forecast Error is predominately 
distributed around the just-miss analyst forecast benchmark group (i.e., 11th bin group). 
Figure 4.1 Distribution of Analyst Forecast Error Comparison illustrates the identical result.  
 
Analyst forecast (expectation) is used as one earnings benchmark; managers try to avoid 
earnings disappointment (loss/negative earnings) through manipulating reported earnings. 
The sample is divided into 23 bin groups according to the magnitude of earnings surprise and 
count the number of firms that fall into different bins.  The study also makes a comparison 
with the discontinuity around analyst expectations, measured by the consensus (median) 
analyst forecast and single most recent analyst forecast and consensus (mean) analyst forecast. 
The bin on the immediate right-hand side of earnings targets contains firms that either 
narrowly meet or beat earnings targets. The bin on the immediate left hand side of earnings 
targets contains firms that narrowly fail to meet earnings targets. Among all the observations, 
there are averagely 56% more firms in the left-hand bin than in the right-hand bin. This result 
is contrary to the results of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge, Patel and 
Zeckauser (1999) on the discontinuity of earnings distributions in general. They report that 36% 
more firms in the right-hand bin than in the left-hand bin. An alternative explanation for the 
difference in the discontinuity of earnings distribution is that it is the outcome of 
manipulations of analyst expectation, not the outcome of direct manipulation of earnings. In 
practice, consensus analyst forecasts for earnings could be easily found from many sources, 
such as major finance websites. Hence, earnings targets for companies with a large number of 
following analysts are salient and explicit. One concern is that the quality of consensus by 
only a few analysts is not as good as that by a greater number of analysts. Thus, the forecast 
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precision could be affected by the number of following analysts (Yu, 2008), which is not 
discussed in this study. 
 
Table 4.5 Distribution of Analyst Forecast Error 
      ES_median                   ES_most recent                 ES_mean 
bin 
group 
Freq. Percent 
 
Freq. Percent 
 
Freq. Percent 
1 167 5.54  133 4.41  178 5.91 
2 23 0.76  18 0.60  30 1.00 
3 39 1.29  31 1.03  43 1.43 
4 38 1.26  34 1.13  52 1.73 
5 59 1.96  48 1.59  80 2.65 
6 101 3.35  76 2.52  110 3.65 
7 144 4.78  109 3.62  146 4.84 
8 191 6.34  157 5.21  208 6.90 
9 309 10.25  236 7.83  329 10.92 
10 487 16.16  407 13.50  511 16.95 
11 833 27.64  899 29.83  787 26.11 
12 41 1.36  68 2.26  20 0.66 
13 373 12.38  538 17.85  329 10.92 
14 98 3.25  115 3.82  82 2.72 
15 46 1.53  62 2.06  48 1.59 
16 19 0.63  28 0.93  17 0.56 
17 14 0.46  17 0.56  15 0.5 
18 11 0.36  11 0.36  8 0.27 
19 5 0.17  5 0.17  5 0.17 
20 1 0.03  3 0.10  1 0.03 
21 2 0.07  2 0.07  2 0.07 
22 1 0.03  2 0.07  2 0.07 
23 12 0.40  15 0.50  11 0.36 
Total      3,014       100    3,014       100    3,014       100 
 
Notes: 11th bin group here refers to as the just-miss analyst forecast benchmark group 
           12th bin group here refers to as the just-meet analyst forecast benchmark group  
           13th bin group here refers to as the just-beat analyst forecast benchmark group  
 
 
Consistent with previous studies, Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of analyst forecast error 
centered on the left hand side. It reflects asymmetric distribution of earnings surprise results 
(analyst optimistic bias), not only from earnings management behavior, but also from 
analysts’ anticipation of such behavior.   
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Note: Analyst Forecast Error = Actual EPS-Consensus Analyst Forecast (Median) Note: Analyst Forecast Error = Actual EPS-Analyst Forecast Mean value 
                    Figure 4.2 Distribution of Analyst Forecast Error Comparison 
 
Note: Analyst Forecast Error = Actual EPS-Single Most Recent Analyst Forecast 
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4.9. Summary 
 
This study makes several contributions. It improves previous studies by considering firms’ 
earnings management with respect to analysts’ forecasts. Financial analysts are assumed to 
understand these earnings management practices and incorporate firms’ expected behavior 
into their forecasts. This study provides a better understanding of the properties of analysts’ 
forecasts by modeling firms’ earnings management practices and analysts’ response to them.  
It provides both theoretical and practical implications for accounting standards setters in 
China. This study will provide additional insights on how emerging markets like China 
examine the role of financial analysts when the Chinese stock market becomes more efficient 
following market liberalizations. Important insights can be gained from this research with 
respect to analysts' decision processes, determinants of analyst expertise and distributions of 
analysts' earnings forecasts, market and analyst efficiency regarding value-relevant 
information, the impacts of analysts' economic incentives and behavioral biases on their 
research outputs, the influence of the institutional and regulatory environment, and the 
limitations of databases and various research paradigms. This research is anticipated to have 
implications for emerging behavioral finance theories of market inefficiency59. 
 
Firth and Gift (1999) analyse the significant differences in forecasting accuracies across 
different nations and explain a multitude of potential reasons for the differences. One 
potential dimension they investigated is the financial risk and composite risk. Other reasons 
for the significant differences between countries in their analysis include disclosure 
regulations, accounting rules, tax regimes, corporate governance structures, and national 
economic policies and conditions. They also find that accuracy is generally greater in more 
mature markets, and that composite and financial risks are more significant determinants of 
accuracy than firm size and analyst following. Hope (2003a, 2003b) investigates how 
differences in regulations across countries affect the information environment and the 
characteristics of analysts' forecasts. They report that across countries, a strong enforcement 
of accounting standards is associated with improved forecast accuracy, and the level of 
disclosure about accounting policies is inversely related to forecast errors and dispersion. 
Barniv et al. (2005) conclude that consistent with legal and financial reporting environments 
                                                 
59 Some behavioral finance theories of market inefficiency hypothesize psychological biases affect market 
prices (e.g., Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subramanyam, 1998). 
 
   
216 
 
influencing analyst activities, superior analysts maintain superiority in common-law countries, 
but not in civil-law countries. According to Table 1.6 GDP, Market Capitalisation and 
number of Listed Companies 2012 (OECD, 2014) in Chapter 1, China is under civil law 
jurisdiction where the financial analysts do not maintain superiority. This empirical study 
discovers an optimistic bias in analysts' forecasts for Chinese listed companies but fails to 
provide any evidence supporting that discretionary accrual measures are positively associated 
with just meeting or beating the analysts’ forecast benchmark. It challenges the ‘benchmark 
beating incentive’ in most prior literature based on western developed countries, such as the 
US and the UK.  
 
Kothari et al. (2005) find that ROA performance-matched accrual measures mitigate Type I 
research errors when the partitioning variable is correlated with performance.  There are two 
plausible explanations for the considerably weaker results for performance-matched 
discretionary accruals: (1) performance-matching reduces the power of statistical tests of 
earnings management around earnings benchmarks, and (2) the previous associations 
between discretionary accrual measures and beating the profit and analysts’ forecast 
benchmarks are attributable to an underlying association between discretionary accrual 
proxies and firm performance that is unrelated to earnings management.  
 
One disadvantage of this study is that the discretionary accruals proxies for earnings 
management may capture nondiscretionary accruals (Dechow et al., 1995; Guay et al., 1996; 
Kasznik, 1999; and McNichols, 2000). Discretionary accrual models have substantial 
measurement error (Dechow et al., 1995). In other words, the discretionary accruals are 
acknowledged as noisy proxies for earnings management activity. Bradshaw et al. (2001) 
show evidence of analysts’ accruals’ mispricing (see Chapter 9). Consistently, Ahmed et al. 
(2005) also document that analysts can’t distinguish discretionary accruals from non-
discretionary accruals. Additionally, generally speaking, the more experienced the analysts 
are, the more efficient is their use of historical earnings and accuracy (Mikhail et al., 2003). 
However, regarding how analysts use the information on earnings, the answer is not 
unambiguous. On the other hand, there is also evidence showing that analysts do not fully 
extract information from the accounting reports (e.g., Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992; 
Easterbrook and Nutt, 1999; Ali et al., 1992; Cheng, 2005, and the citations therein). 
Inefficiency in analysts' forecasts is an indication, but not conclusive evidence, of market 
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inefficiency. A well-recognized problem with studies that use analyst forecasts as the target is 
that beating an analyst forecast depends not only on the firm’s accounting choices, but also 
on the analyst’s forecasting actions. Analyst forecast errors are determined by reported 
earnings rather than unmanaged earnings. As Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) observed, 
earnings management is more likely in certain regions of the forecast error distribution. 
Inferences about analyst behaviour based on analyst forecast errors are problematic in cases 
which reported earnings are more likely to (systematically) deviate from unmanaged earnings. 
Meeting or beating expectations is regarded as the phenomenon of firms announcing earnings 
that either meet or beat the consensus analysts’ forecasts of earnings (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). 
The importance of meeting or beating expectations follows from the fact that earnings are the 
statistics predicted by analysts (DeFond and Hung, 2003). Hence, successfully meeting 
expectations or failing to beat them could attract a lot of attentions in the press and from 
investors. More importantly, the stock market rewards the firms that meet or beat 
expectations and a significant stock price premium (penalty) for meeting or beating (missing) 
analysts’ earnings forecasts has been documented, after controlling for the magnitude of the 
forecast error. Meeting or beating earnings is regarded as another case of manipulating 
earnings in order to beat a threshold which is the consensus analysts’ forecast. Matsumoto 
(2002) and Williams (2006) state that firms are under pressure from the capital market to 
meet or beat expectations in order to sustain their market prices. However, as Chen et al. 
(2008) argued, in China incentives for meeting or beating analysts’ forecast do not exist. 
Because the analysts only play a primitive role in Chinese stock market and their forecasts 
usually have no impact on stock price.  
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Chapter 5 Conclusions 
 
5.1. Summary and Key findings 
 
This thesis contributes to provide a better understanding of the nature of accounting 
information reliability by measuring the relation between informativeness of earnings and 
corporate governance based on the Chinese context with its unique political, social, cultural 
and economic environment and huge sample size. The empirical results from this thesis will 
add new insights to the existing corporate governance literature targeted on a large, fast-
growing, and transitional economy. It has implications for China’s regulators who are striving 
to improve accounting information, transparency, and corporate governance. The objective of 
this thesis aims to investigate accounting information quality and corporate governance by 
addressing three predominant empirical research questions in three studies. This thesis is 
structured in five chapters as follows.  
 
Chapter 1 gives an introduction to accounting information reliability and qualitative 
characteristics in FASB’s Conceptual Framework. China is an ideal context to be studied 
with its sui generis characteristics, which has adopted many of the corporate governance 
mechanisms applied in developed countries. Thus, the Chinese background and institutional 
context have been introduced in this thesis, including an overview of earnings management 
and corporate governance in China, split share structure reform and Accounting and Financial 
Reporting Standards application and convergence process and capital markets etc. The aims, 
objectives and research questions and research motivation and potential contribution as well 
as thesis structure are all included in Chapter 1.  
 
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 (i.e. the 1st empirical study) reviews some key 
papers that have had an influential impact on the literature related to earnings management as 
well as the empirical research in corporate governance in general. In addition, the concept of 
earnings management discussed in detail and the most widely used accrual models for 
capturing earnings management are considered. The distinct corporate governance model 
with two-tier board structure in mainland China is explained and compared with the 
American Model, UK Model and German Model in this section. More importantly, it 
examines the impact of corporate governance on earnings management in China through 
investigating whether the board composition and the independence, financial/accounting 
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expertise and official background of independent directors and supervisors are correlated to 
the absolute value of discretionary accruals or discretionary revenue. It focuses on two 
aspects from the perspective of board monitoring: the role of independent directors on the 
board and the supervisory directors in constraining earnings manipulation. It adds to the 
corporate governance literature by linking the independent directors and supervisory directors 
and earnings management. It documents that the principal-principal agency conflict between 
the controlling shareholders (the State) and minority shareholders is the main cause of 
earnings management in China.  
 
The key findings of this empirical study in this thesis suggest the Chinese two-tier board 
structure comprising a board of directors with at least one third independent directors and a 
supervisory board fails to mitigate earnings management. This conclusion is based on the 
research which used a large sample of Chinese listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2010. Most importantly, none of the 
Independent Directors and Supervisors variables is significant under both the discretionary 
accruals model with random effects and the discretionary revenue model with fixed effects. It 
provides the evidence that the independent directors and supervisor system are dysfunctional 
in monitoring the Board activities in China. Wang (2008) argues that the independent 
directors have made a certain but limited contribution to corporate governance in China, 
compared with the Supervisory Board which is perceived as just a decoration to the 
boardroom. The motive in China for introducing the mechanism of external, independent 
directors is to ensure greater corporate board independence and protection of investor 
interests. Theoretically, the independent directors and board of supervisors should have a 
positive effect on the quality of accounting information. Nevertheless, the findings show that 
the board of supervisors in listed companies is only a formality and it does not play its due 
role in quality control. These results are robust to the control of firm characteristics and 
corporate governance variables, as well as industry and time effects. One possible 
explanation for this finding is that independent directors and supervisory directors in China 
are often ‘vases’ and do not work as efficiently as in the developed countries. This indicates 
the independent directors and supervisory directors cannot voice for the minority 
shareholders; what they do is simply to agree with whatever the management or larger 
shareholders want, supporting the agency theory (conflict between controlling shareholders 
and minority shareholders) and stewardship theory.   
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Chapter 3 (i.e. the 2nd empirical study) investigates the quality of reported earnings in China 
from the perspective of both accounting-based (including accrual quality, persistence, 
predictability and smoothness) and market-based earnings attributes (including value 
relevance, timeliness, and conservatism in order to fully capture the earnings attributes. ERC 
is extended as a function of ‘market-based’ earnings quality via detecting earnings surprise, 
which is measured by: (a) the deviation of actual earnings from a predicated amount based on 
a time-series model of earnings and (b) the deviation of actual earnings from the consensus 
(median) analyst forecast (analyst forecast error), computed using each analyst’s latest 
forecast before the earnings announcement. A two-way test has been conducted to compare 
the difference in earnings quality between State-Owned and Non-State-Owned enterprises, 
since there is a debate whether SOEs have more incentives to manipulate earnings than in 
Non-SOEs. According to financial distress theory, the incentives for Non-SOEs to 
manipulate earnings are stronger than in SOEs, since SOEs have the advantage to receive 
financial subsidies from government while Non-SOEs face more financing constraints. The 
agency theory, however, argues that state ownership in SOEs creates incentives and 
regulatory backing for self-serving purposes, thus motivating SOEs to manipulate accounting 
numbers. The political cost hypothesis complements the agency theory and illustrates that 
SOEs’ managers would manipulate accounting numbers in response to government 
intervention (report conservatively to disguise the profits or report aggressively to meet 
specific thresholds). It tests whether analysts' forecasts are more accurate than forecasts based 
on time-series predicted statistics with random walk. This study also detects how the 
explanatory power of the earnings/returns relation is enhanced by varying the return interval 
(13-month, 15-month and 18-month return windows respectively).  
  
The same set of accounting standards will yield different accounting outcomes when different 
preparer incentives are provided. For this reason, the reporting incentives and the forces 
shaping them are likely to determine earnings quality. The empirical results show that 
Chinese state-owned firms overall exhibit a lower earnings quality than non-state-owned 
firms supporting the agency theory. Since Chinese government ownership creates incentives 
and regulatory backing for self-serving purposes that negatively impact the listed firms’ 
financial reporting. This analysis clearly states that the SOEs are inferior to Non-SOEs in 
earnings persistence at the 1% significance level, but perform better than Non-SOEs in 
accruals quality and earnings smoothness at 1% significant level. It indicates that the earnings 
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are more persistent in Non-SOEs than that in SOEs. The value relevance, predictability, 
conservatism and timeliness for SOEs and Non-SOEs are very close with no substantial 
difference. Simply according to the values, higher value relevant earnings and more 
predictable earnings and less conservative earnings (with 13-month and 18-month return 
interval) in Non-SOEs represent higher earnings quality; but less timely earnings in Non-
SOEs implies lower earnings quality. It is consistent with previous studies that conservatism 
reduces earnings persistence and predictability, facilitates earnings management, reduces 
analyst forecast accuracy, and may decrease the value relevance of earnings (e.g., Basu, 1997; 
Ball et al., 2008; Dichev and Tang, 2008; and Chen et al. (2014). Compliant with the political 
theories of North (1990) and Olson (1993), if managers of state-owned listed firms deem 
tunneling by the parent companies as disadvantageous expropriation by the government, they 
may report earnings numbers conservatively to avoid a high political cost (Healy and Wahlen, 
1999). However, the conservatism with 15-month adjusted market return for SOEs is 
obviously inferior to that for Non-SOEs at 10% significance level, which means Non-SOEs’ 
reported earnings are more conservative than SOEs in China. Non-SOEs with overall higher 
ERC (earnings response coefficient) than SOEs based on both predicted earnings and 
consensus analyst forecast earnings indicates higher earnings quality in Non-SOEs in China 
during 2008 and 2013. It is consistent with prior literature, which provides evidence that 
earnings with more consistency and relevance will have stronger ERC (Kormendi and Lipe, 
1987; Collins and Kothari, 1989; and Easton and Zmijewski, 1989). To sum up, consistent 
with prior studies, this study reports a very robust result in its analysis.  
 
One very interesting finding is that predicted earnings based on the time-series statistical 
model with drift are more accurate than the consensus analyst forecast earnings, i.e. the 
deviation of actual earnings from analyst forecast earnings is larger than the deviation of 
actual earnings from the time-series predicated earnings. This result conflicts with findings in 
prior literature based on western developed countries, such as the US and the UK, indicating 
the malfunction of financial analysts in mainland China. If earnings forecasts of analysts are 
more precise, it means that analysts can provide useful information for investors to make 
decisions and contribute to the capital market; otherwise, it means analysts are worthless. 
Some studies provide evidence that analysts' forecasts are more accurate than predicted 
statistics based on historical annual data, but contrary findings are acquired in this thesis. It 
answers the question whether Chinese security analysts make efficient earnings forecasts. It 
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seems analyst earnings forecasting behavior is inefficient which shows a pattern of 
overweighting private information. To some extent, it reflects the poor quality of information 
disclosure of listed companies in China. Since the better the corporate disclosure quality is, 
the better the prediction accuracy of the analyst will be. It suggests that analysts in China still 
have room to improve their ability to forecast and investors should be cautious when using 
analysts' forecasts. Furthermore, SOEs manipulate down the earnings much more than Non-
SOEs, manifesting the government generally expropriate the benefits of SOEs, according to 
the political cost hypothesis. Finally, the ERC_p findings indicate SOEs still manipulate 
earnings more than Non-SOEs from 2008-2010, rejecting the financial-distress theory, 
probably because the Chinese ¥4-billion fiscal scheme from late 2008 wasn’t designed in 
favour of SOEs.  
 
In Chapter 4 (i.e. the 3rd empirical study), it detects whether managers intend to manipulate 
earnings via discretionary accruals (the residuals derived from the Performance Matched 
Discretionary Accrual Measure and Forward-looking model and Modified Jones Model) in 
order to meet or beat analyst forecasts. It provides a better understanding of the properties of 
analysts’ forecasts by modeling firms’ earnings management practices and analysts’ response 
to them. This study assigns firms to ‘analysts-based unexpected earnings’ bins based on the 
firm’s unexpected earnings per share (in cents) and divides the earnings surprise (scaled by 
stock closing price) range from of -0.1 to 0.1 into 19 bins. Each just-beat and just-miss bin 
has a width of 0.01, and each firm-year observation appears once in a just-beat group and 
once in a just-miss group. This empirical study discovers an optimistic bias in analysts' 
forecasts for Chinese listed companies but fails to provide any evidence supporting that 
discretionary accrual measures are positively associated with just meeting or beating the 
analysts’ forecast benchmark. It challenges the ‘benchmark beating incentive’ in most prior 
literature based on western developed countries, such as the US and the UK. It indicates that 
managers do not intend to manipulate discretionary accruals to meet or beat analyst forecasts. 
As Chen et al. (2008) argued, in China incentives for meeting or beating analysts’ forecast do 
not exist. Because the analysts only play a primitive role in Chinese stock market and their 
forecasts usually have no impact on stock price.  
 
Chapter 5 discusses the main findings and limitations of this thesis and the reflections on 
Chinese context. It also provides the policy implications and includes the overall concluding 
remarks. 
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5.2. Reflections on Chinese Context 
 
The 2008 worldwide financial crisis reminded Asia and the world of the critical importance 
of strong corporate governance to underpin sound economic growth and value creation. 
Government regulations could also serve as an effective governance mechanism, especially 
when the law and law enforcement are weak (Johnson et al., 2001). However, the legal 
infrastructure in China is particularly weak. Pistor and Xu (2005) argue that the so-called 
‘administrative governance’ has played an active and positive role in the development of 
Chinese stock market, at least in its earlier stage. More recent evidence shows that 
government regulations are also the source of many problems in the Chinese stock market. 
Chinese government chose the staged privatization strategy. While implementing partial 
privatization, the government makes an effort to retain the control of the SOEs. By no means 
does such a scheme imply that self-dealing by managers and controlling shareholders is less 
pervasive in China.  But it does help explain the ‘control’ nature of the corporate governance 
practice widely adopted among the Chinese listed firms. 
 
China has its own very distinctive characteristics and is structurally different from either 
developed markets or other emerging markets. For example, mainland China (not including 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau) has a distinct two-tier board structure comprising a 
supervisor board including employee representatives and a board of directors with at least 
one third independent directors. Clearly, the corporate governance system adopted by the 
Chinese listed firms can be best described as a control-based model, in which the controlling 
shareholders – in most cases, the state – tightly control the listed firms through concentrated 
ownership and management friendly boards. As a consequence, there is a lack of timely 
disclosure of accounting information. The overall transparency in operations is low. What is 
worth noting is that the effectiveness of varied corporate governance mechanisms crucially 
hinges on the level of the overall institutional environment. When the legal system is 
incomplete and law enforcement is weak, and when business is closely connected to politics, 
the effectiveness of the conventional governance mechanisms, even though they are squarely 
in place, might also be greatly compromised (Liu, 2006).  
 
The motive in China for introducing the mechanism of external, independent directors is to 
ensure greater corporate board independence and the protection of investor interests. The 
board size in Chinese listed companies is primarily driven by firm complexity and board 
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independence is mainly driven by regulation. A higher independent director ratio indicates a 
higher level of board independence, and thus better protection of the interests of creditors and 
small investors. However, the independent directors do not play this role as authorities and 
small investors expect. A conservative accounting policy is found to be negatively related to 
the ratio of independent directors, which is inconsistent with the findings derived from the 
US stock market (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007). The weak legal and institutional 
environments (laws and enforcement) are generally associated with the highly concentrated 
share ownership of listed companies (La Porta et al., 1999). The ownership of Chinese listed 
firms is highly concentrated unlike the dispersed ownership in the US and UK, the agency 
problem shifts from conflicts between shareholders and managers to conflicts between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Ownership concentration is associated 
with low earnings informativeness as it prevents leakage of proprietary information about the 
firms’ rent-seeking activities. Ding et al. (2007) also claim that ‘the conflict of interests 
between controlling shareholders (the State) and minority shareholders is the root cause of 
earnings management in China.’ Even worse, the State is playing dual roles as both 
controlling shareholder and regulator (Clarke, 2003; Chen et al., 2006; Liu and Lu, 2007). 
When information asymmetry is high, stakeholders do not have sufficient resources or access 
to relevant information to monitor manager's behavior, which leads to the practice of earnings 
management (Schipper, 1989; Warfield et al., 1995). Controlling owners are considered to 
report accounting information for self-interested purposes, causing the earnings to lose 
credibility to investors outside China. 
 
There are discernible factors suggesting that accounting information may not be as value-
relevant in the Chinese market as in a mature market. Firstly, Chinese accounting systems 
and regulations were traditionally not market-oriented. Most listed companies were state-
owned before going public and the purpose of their accounting was not to provide useful 
information to investors but to facilitate centralized state planning and control. Although the 
Chinese government issued a separate accounting standard for listed companies as early as in 
1992, there have been numerous unresolved issues in implementing a shareholder-oriented 
accounting system. Consequently, the value of accounting information in China has been 
questioned in prior literature (Curran, 1994; Aharony et al., 2000; Haw et al., 1998). 
Secondly, the reliability of accounting information in China has been a source of concern. 
Independent auditing is relatively a new phenomenon in China. While it is true that financial 
statements of listed companies must be audited by CPAs, the quality of audits in China has 
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been generally perceived as low (Aharony et al., 2000). A relatively weak monitoring role by 
outside auditors may contribute to a lack of confidence in and less use of financial statements. 
Finally, compared to a mature market such as the US market, the Chinese market lacks a 
sufficient level of corporate governance such as independent outside directors, audit 
committees, and competition in the managerial labor market: all of which weakens investors’ 
confidence in their use of accounting information. 
 
Three institutional features of the Chinese political economy have been discussed in the prior 
literature, namely, (1) the extent of state ownership, (2) the level of market and legal 
institutions’ development, and (3) the degree of government power over auditors (managers’ 
decisions), affect Chinese listed firms’ earnings quality.  State (government) ownership might 
create incentives and regulatory backing for self-serving purposes that negatively impact the 
listed firms’ financial reporting (Liu, 2014). Compared with Non-SOEs, SOEs have more 
advantages in Mainland China and receive more favorable treatment. Stock market regulators, 
such as the CSRC, give preferential treatment by extending listing privileges to local and 
central SOEs based on political rather than economic objectives. For instance, when applying 
for listing, the government allows local and central SOEs to report the 3 years of pre-IPO 
earnings based on estimations because they are typically restructured from a parent company 
immediately prior to the IPO (Companies Law No. 137 promulgated in July 1994; CSRC 
Share Issuance Announcement in December 1996). This special provision enables these 
SOEs to provide favorable profit numbers, helping them qualify for listing and inflate their 
IPO prices (Aharony et al., 2000). In contrast, Non-SOEs must have been in operation for 3 
years prior to listing and therefore need to report actual earnings. Similarly, state banks give 
preferential treatment to local and central SOEs by granting loans based on political, social, 
or tax-motivated factors (Brandt and Li, 2003). SOEs receive political and financial support 
from the government. Government leaders have incentives to assist local and central SOEs 
(Kornai, 1993; Qian, 1994) because successful SOE listings bring more resources into local 
SOEs’ regions or central SOEs’ ministries, enhancing the government leaders’ political 
capital and increasing their chances for promotion (Li and Zhou, 2005). The government’s or 
state banks’ preferential treatment to local and central SOEs is likely to result in these SOEs’ 
lower demand for reputable (presumably large or non-local) auditors to serve as a signal of 
their quality. 
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Consistent with Bekaert et al. (1998) and Claessens et al. (1995), the distributions of stock 
returns in Chinese listed firms as in other emerging markets are highly non-normal and not 
identically distributed, with significant (usually positive) skewness and excess kurtosis that 
vary through time. Volatility tends to decrease following market liberalizations. These 
characteristics may become less pronounced as a market’s economy comes to more closely 
resemble a developed market through increased openness and liberalization. 
 
Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) develop a rational expectations model showing that 
accounting standards can limit opportunistic discretion in accounting earnings that are more 
reflective of a firm’s underlying economics and, therefore, are of higher quality. Because of 
both self-motivation and external pressure, the Chinese government has been active in 
developing accounting standards in harmony with IAS (Weetman, 2004). In 2006, the 
Ministry of Finance announced the introduction of 39 new Chinese Accounting Standards 
referring to the Basic Standard and the 38 specific Accounting Standards for Business 
Enterprises (ASBEs) issued by the Chinese Ministry of Finance. Although not complying 
fully with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), the new Chinese Accounting 
Standards nonetheless adopt the principles contained in IFRS and are therefore considered to 
be substantially converged with IFRS. The experience of implementation of IFRS in China is 
particularly interesting as China was moving from a “rules-based” to a more ‘principles-
based’ regime. The explicit recognition of IFRS by China also marks a significant step on the 
road towards a single, global accounting language. The more comprehensive disclosure 
requirements under IFRS relative to some domestic accounting standards may make earnings 
easier to understand and predict, improving analyst forecast accuracy (e.g., Ball, 2006).  
 
The importance of voluntary disclosures is a means of supplementing the earnings 
information. The Regulations on Information Disclosure of Listed Companies approved by 
CSRC’s 196th chairman meeting in December, 2006 and becomes effective from the issue 
date. According to laws including Corporate Law and Securities Law and administrative 
bylaws, these Regulations are intended to standardize the information disclosures of stock 
issuers, listed companies and other disclosure obligors, to strengthen the management of 
information disclosures and to protect the legitimate interest of investors. Information must 
be disclosed to all investors at the same time (CSRC).  
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5.3. Policy Implications 
 
Public governance is more likely a complement of corporate governance, but not its substitute. 
The role of government regulation as an effective governance mechanism has been seriously 
questioned. The current control-based governance model practiced by the Chinese listed 
firms damaged the investors’ confidence and thus hinder the development of China’s stock 
market; however, such corporate governance practice is rooted in China’s institutional setting; 
improving corporate governance is not just a firm-level initiative, and its success cannot be 
achieved within the stock market; switching attentions to the macro-level institutional factors 
is a must, and will pay off/succeed. It is becoming clear that a market-oriented governance 
model should be eventually put in place in China. This thesis will provide important 
implications for the policy makers and the corporate governance reforms in China to protect 
the minority shareholders’ interests in the future. In order to strengthen the role of the board 
of supervisors, the key thing is to ensure true and sufficient independence of the board of 
supervisors rather than it being subject to management. It has implications for market 
regulators, policy makers and standard setters who should pay more attention to enhance the 
authentic independence of independent directors and supervisory directors in Chinese firms. 
 
New accounting standards (2006 Chinese GAAP) may have improved the quantity of 
accounting information; however, investors have their own opinions about the quality of the 
accounting income. Therefore, it is important for standard setters/regulators and policy 
makers to know the reason of the low quality of reported accounting information. The policy 
makers should consider the overall institutional setting/environment in existing China. It is 
critical for policy makers and regulators to understand how the concentrated ownership 
structure in China is associated with incentives for firms to reduce accounting information 
quality. Implementing international accounting standards and disclosure rules by rote without 
considering the institutional environment in mainland China will not improve the corporate 
transparency. The participation of standard setters, preparers, auditors, and users is crucial to 
such research. This research has implications for China’s regulators who are striving to 
improve accounting information, transparency, and corporate governance. It implies that for 
consideration by the Ministry of Finance as the Chinese accounting standards setter and other 
regulatory bodies, Chinese regulators should (1) continue with their policy of openness and 
proportionate regulation. Enforcement actions should continue to be effectively 
communicated. More emphasis needs to be placed on disclosing explanations for the key 
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judgments made by preparers of financial statements, in accordance with IAS 1; (2) 
Regulators should consider how they can achieve their regulatory objective without providing 
inappropriate incentives for profit manipulation. This is particularly the case for the rule 
whereby if a loss is made for three consecutive years a company is delisted (The Institute of 
Chartered Accountants of Scotland, 2010). 
 
This analysis contributes to provide both theoretical and practical implications for accounting 
standards setters in China. There are some recommendations for the Government (State), 
which usually plays a dual role of market regulator and owner of SOEs with commercial 
operations. First of all, the government should not be engaged in the daily operations and 
management of SOEs. Rather, it should give them full operational autonomy to achieve their 
objectives. Secondly, the state should let SOE boards exercise their responsibilities and 
respect their independence. State-owned enterprises should follow high standards of 
transparency in accordance with the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. Thirdly, full 
administrative separation of responsibilities for ownership and market regulation is suggested 
as a fundamental prerequisite for creating a level playing field for SOEs and private 
companies and for avoiding distortion of competition. Fourthly, the state should not give an 
automatic guarantee regarding the SOE liabilities. Fair practices with regard to the disclosure 
and remuneration of state guarantees should also be developed and SOEs should be 
encouraged to seek financing from capital markets. Finally, enhancing transparency and 
accountability is central to improving the corporate governance of state-owned enterprises.  
 
5.4.  Limitations 
 
In this empirical analysis, some reflections e.g. the very low significance (the low adjusted R-
square, e.g., lower than 10%, implying the models in this analysis do not do a good job at 
explaining the dependent variables; it is normally the case in mainland China) of the 
empirical models can be recognized as a limitation of this study presented in Chapter 2. And 
there are construct validity problems in the abnormal accruals proxies and difficulties in 
drawing inferences from earnings quality and earnings management studies about decision-
maker preferences.  
 
In Chapter 3, there are some limitations in our earnings quality measures. One initial concern 
related to our market-based earnings attributes is how well stock returns can proxy for 
Biliography 
 
230 
 
economic income, particularly in emerging markets like China. Since emerging markets have 
very distinctive characteristics and are structurally different from both developed markets and 
each other. Drummen and Zimmerman (1992) and Eftekhari and Satchell (1999) all 
demonstrate that country specific factors predominate over other factors (e.g. world factors 
and industry trends) in the determination of stock returns. This study relied on the assumption 
that the Chinese stock market is efficient and the stock returns effectively reflect and capture 
the fundamental firm-specific economic performance. However, Morck et al. (2000) argue 
that the stock market in China is of high synchronicity where stock returns capture low 
amounts of firm-specific information. It may cause the observed R2 not to reliably measure 
value relevance. The second concern is related to this study’s accruals quality measure. 
Wysocki (2006) presume that Dechow and Dichev’s model (2002) fails to capture a firm’s 
earnings quality because there is a strong negative correlation between contemporaneous cash 
flows and accruals. Studies find that common law countries do not necessarily have higher 
quality in every attribute of earnings (e.g. Boonlert-U-Thai et al., 2006; Bushman and 
Piotroski, 2006). Meanwhile, all abnormal accruals models suffer from the inherent limitation 
that is difficult to validate the accuracy of their predictions. For example, it is unable to verify 
whether the estimates of discretionary accruals are the result of management’s opportunistic 
accounting choices, or just an artifact of the particular model employed. This is a construct 
validity problem, which means that these proxies utilized in this study are unable to reliably 
measure the underlying theoretical constructs they are intended to measure. The final concern 
is the analyst forecast error. Bartholdy and Feng (2013) investigate the quality of securities 
firms' earnings forecasts and stock recommendations in China and find that both earnings 
forecasts and stock recommendations are biased upwards and stock markets regard stock 
recommendations as having new information. They show the forecast error in the Bear 
market from September, 2002 to October, 2005 was larger than that in the Bull market 
between November, 2005 and October, 2007. The sample period for ERC model is during the 
year of 2008 and 2013, which is deemed as a stage of Bear market. It will be a critical factor 
that has an impact on the analyst forecast accuracy.   
 
One disadvantage of the third empirical study (i.e. Chapter 4) is that discretionary accrual 
models have substantial measurement error (Dechow et al., 1995). In other words, the 
discretionary accruals are acknowledged as noisy proxies for earnings management activity. 
Bradshaw et al. (2001) show evidence of analysts’ accruals’ mispricing. Consistently, 
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Ahmed et al. (2005) also document that analysts can’t distinguish discretionary accruals from 
non-discretionary accruals. Additionally, generally speaking, the more experienced the 
analysts are, the more efficient is their use of historical earnings and accuracy (Mikhail et al., 
2003). However, regarding how analysts use the information on earnings, the answer is not 
unambiguous. On the other hand, there is also evidence showing that analysts do not fully 
extract information from the accounting reports (e.g., Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992; 
Easterbrook and Nutt, 1999; Ali et al., 1992; Cheng, 2005; and the citations therein). 
Inefficiency in analysts' forecasts is an indication, but not conclusive evidence, of market 
inefficiency. A well-recognized problem with studies that use analyst forecasts as the target is 
that beating an analyst forecast depends not only on the firm’s accounting choices, but also 
on the analyst’s forecasting actions. Analyst forecast errors are determined by reported 
earnings rather than unmanaged earnings. As Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) observed, 
earnings management is more likely in certain regions of the forecast error distribution. 
Inferences about analyst behaviour based on analyst forecast errors are problematic in cases 
which reported earnings are more likely to (systematically) deviate from unmanaged earnings. 
Meeting or beating expectations is regarded as the phenomenon of firms announcing earnings 
that either meet or beat the consensus analysts’ forecasts of earnings (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). 
Matsumoto (2002) and Williams (2006) state that firms are under pressure from the capital 
market to meet or beat expectations in order to sustain their market prices. However, as Chen 
et al. (2008) argued, in China incentives for meeting or beating analysts’ forecast do not exist. 
Because the analysts only play a primitive role in Chinese stock market and their forecasts 
usually have no impact on stock price.  
 
In addition, some comments on potentially adding some political economy related control 
variables (for instance, under common-law or civil-law jurisdiction, industry trend and 
earnings target incentives, country-level institutions, audit quality, and internal controls etc.) 
to capture the uniqueness of the Chinese case as a limitation of this study. 
 
Finally, an area of the earnings quality literature that seems relatively under-researched is 
‘real activities’ manipulation. The fundamental importance of this area is evidenced in 
Graham et al. (2005), which concludes that earnings management is not only widely 
practiced, but that the majority of earnings management arises from manipulating real 
operating activities. The implications of this thesis indicate that managers’ real activities 
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manipulation is relatively commonplace. However, compared to the research that investigates 
accruals-based earnings management, research on activities management is scarce. The 
paucity of research in this area means we lack the knowledge about whether or how real 
transactions management influences the earnings quality. It should be further detected and 
developed in the future.  
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